



promoting youth involvement and  
social engagement

## DELIVERABLE

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<b>Executive summary</b>	<p>This report presents a collection of standardized country reports from the 10 partner countries involved in PROMISE. Using the most recent data available from macro-indicators and surveys, each country report provides a national baseline of the attitudes, activities and social involvement of young people. The macro-indicators used to describe the national context are used consistently throughout to allow comparison.</p> <p>In particular, each country report provides an overview of the general 'state of the country's health'; the situation that young people face; how young people feel about their situation; and what, if anything, they are doing to change it.</p> <p>We employ a concept of social and political engagement developed for PROMISE that includes four dimensions of engagement: civic activism, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement.</p>

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## Collection of country reports – D4.3

### INTRODUCTION

The deliverable D4.3 (D9 National Report level 2), is a collection of standardized country reports. Each country report provides a national baseline with a specific focus on young people. The focus of this deliverable is on each single country, leaving the main comparative goals to the deliverables D4.1 and D4.2. However, the adoption of a standardized template allows the reader to compare countries on similar topics.

#### General aspects

##### *Aim of these reports*

The aim of each country report is to provide information by using the most recent data available from macro-indicators and survey data on what being young in that specific country looks like, and how young people engage in society.

The deliverable is the result of the joint work of different partners (GESIS, IPI, UTARTU, UAB, HSE)<sup>1</sup>. The format and the content were discussed during the Quantitative workshop in Rome (February 2017) and finalized during the Consortium meeting in Porto (March 2018).

In particular, each country report is addressed to answer the following questions:

1. What is the general situation of that country?
2. What is the youth condition there?
3. What do young people think?
4. What do young people do? (engagement, social change)

##### *Target audience*

This collection of reports is designed to be read by a general audience. So, to make the inputs from the PROMISE project accessible for the general public, journalists, and policymakers, we opted for an informative output which makes use of graphs and provides clear easily understandable information. These reports will be used in the future by the country partners as a starting point for deeper analyses and academic publications.

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<sup>1</sup> IPI (Ines Sucic, Ivan Devic, Renata Franc) drafted the reports of Croatia, Portugal, Slovakia; UTARTU (Triin Pohla, Kristi Loide, Anna Markina) drafted the reports of Estonia, Finland, United Kingdom; the HSE (Yana Krupets) drafted the Russia report; UAB (Lara Maestripieri, Zyab Ibanez) drafted the Spain report; GESIS (Vera Lomazzi) drafted the reports of Italy and Germany.

The overall structure, the layout, and the template have been developed by Vera Lomazzi and Renata Franc upon the decisions taken during the Quantitative Workshop (Rome, February 2017) and during the Consortium meeting in Porto (March 2018).

## ***Standardized country reports***

This deliverable is a collection of country reports that are standardized in their layout and structure. The macro-indicators used to describe the national context are used consistently throughout to allow comparison.

The conceptualization of social and political engagement is developed and described in the Deliverable D4.1 and includes four dimensions of engagement: civic activism, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement.

The other concepts adopted (such as individual agency, relation with authority, etc.) rely on the definitions and on the operationalization made during the preliminary work of Work Package 2, on which we built the Survey Data Matrix (Milestone 5).

Although the theoretical framework and the structure adopted is the same for each country report, the data used may differ by country since we aimed to use to most recent data available.

## ***Structure of each country report***

Each report has four sections, which focus on specific aspects. The idea is to guide the reader starting from the broad picture of each country-context and finally describe the forms of participation and engagement of youth in that country.

The first two sections are based on macro-indicators (extracted from databank such as OECD, Eurostat, World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; etc). They also include extracts and references to the national reports from WP3 (D3.1) that have been taken into account to identify which contextual information could be relevant for all the countries.

Sections 3 & 4 make use of survey data. Variables depend on the source. Building on our previous work in WP2 (Survey Data Matrix available, M5), we were able to identify the most recent data available for each country.

The reports of Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain are based on Eurobarometer 2016 (EB2016)<sup>2</sup> and 2017 (EB2017)<sup>3</sup>. The reports of Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia are based on the European Social Survey 2016 (ESS2016)<sup>4</sup>.

## ***Section 1: Standards of living (the general situation of each country)***

How is the situation in that country? Key facts are shown by graphs based on a set of selected macro-indicators. These provide a general picture of the specific country compared to the other nine included in PROMISE.

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<sup>2</sup> European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2016): Eurobarometer 85.1OVR (April 2016). TNS opinion [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6696 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12642](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12642)

<sup>3</sup> European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6863 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12847](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12847)

<sup>4</sup> ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.



Ten macro-indicators have been selected to describe the “state of health” of a country, considering the economic situation, democracy, equality, access to resources and sustainability. For each topic, several indicators exist; we selected ten<sup>5</sup> among those more comprehensive and frequently used for similar purposes:

- GNI per capita, PPP
- Ease of doing business index (measures whether, in the specified country, the regulations support business or not)
- Unemployment, total%
- Corruption Perception Index
- Government effectiveness
- Freedom of the press
- Global Gender Gap
- Percentage of people with tertiary education
- Internet users

## *Section 2: Being young in each country: The youth condition*

This section aims to tell the reader a bit more about the situation that young people face in each country. Information will be provided by other macro-indicators that give a longitudinal overview of the situation.

Topics of this section are:

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 2.1 Demographic situation            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Demographic trends in [country] to show the proportion of people 15-29 years old vs people aged +65 years old</li> <li>▪ Percentage of young people living with parents (15-29 y.o.)</li> </ul>   |
| 2.2 Education and the Labour market: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Young people 25-29 years old with tertiary education by gender</li> <li>▪ Early school leavers (18-29 y.o.) by gender</li> <li>▪ NEET rate by gender (15-29 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Youth employment rate by gender (25-29 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Youth unemployment by educational attainment level (25-29 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (15-29 y.o.)</li> </ul> |
| 2.3 Health and Wellbeing             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Self-perceived health (15-29 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Current depressive symptoms – only in 2014 (15-29 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Crude death rate by suicide of young people by gender (15-29 y.o.)</li> </ul>  |
| 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Prevalence, Youth; types of drugs use amongst young people (15-24 y.o.)</li> <li>▪ Juveniles Prisoners, All Crimes (Male/Female)</li> </ul>   |

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix 1 for detailed references to the sources.

### ***Section 3: What do young people in each country think and feel?***

Survey-data are used to inform the reader on young people's perceptions about their country (life satisfaction, feeling about security, social climate, etc.); their relation with the authority (evaluation of the current political system, trust in institutions, etc.); and their view on future prospects (optimism towards the future, etc.). In addition, this section provides information about the opinions of young people about relevant social issues (gender equality, migration, refugees, and environment). Data used are the most recent available and graphs focus only on young people. We break down these variables in order to show relevant differences by gender, migration background, place of living (if available in the data and when the sample size allows meaningful comparisons).

The topics of this section are:

- 3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints
  - 3.1.1 [Country] situation
  - 3.1.2 Personal situation
- 3.2 Relation with authority
- 3.3 Opinion on social issues

### ***Section 4: Engagement and social change: What do young people do?***

How do young people participate in the social change in their country? Is it easy for them to take action? What are their repertoires of participation?

Data used are the most recent available and graphs focus only on young people. We break down these variables in order to show relevant differences by gender, migration background, place of living (if available in the data and when the sample size allows meaningful comparisons). Engagement is defined as in D4.1, but variables can differ by the source.

The topics of this section are:

- 4.1 Civic engagement
- 4.2 Formal political participation
- 4.3 Activism
- 4.4 Everyday engagement

*The detailed lists of questions used for compiling the Sections 3 and 4, both for the reports based on ESS2016 and those based on EB2016/EB2017, are provided in Appendix 1. General information about the samples is shown in Appendix 2. Adjusted post-stratification weights for the youth sub-samples have been applied.*

# United Kingdom




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
Population	65.637.239
Population aged 15-29 years old	19.0%
Population aged 65 years old and above	18.4%
Birth Rate	11.9
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	13.2%

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
## 1. Standards of living in the United Kingdom<sup>6</sup>

The economy of the United Kingdom (UK) is the sixth-largest in the world (measured in GDP). UK came out of economic recession in the last quarter of 2009 but encountered new difficulties after voting to leave the EU in June 2016. In 2016, the gross national income (GNI) was 42100 (Fig. 1.1) and the unemployment rate had fallen to 4.7 by 2017 (Fig. 1.3). The business environment in the UK is generally favourable: regulations are business-friendly (Fig. 1.2), level of corruption is perceived as low (Fig. 1.4) and the government is seen as effective (Fig. 1.5).


**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**




**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>6</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




Freedom House which continuously evaluates the freedom of the press, categorised UK media as “free” in 2017 scoring 25 points on the ‘Freedom of the press’ assessment scale (Fig. 1.6). The UK ranks high for equality in the Global Gender Gap Index (Fig. 1.7) and the share of people using the internet is the highest (close to 95%) among the PROMISE project countries (Fig. 1.9). Despite considerable tuition fees, the share of people with tertiary education is also high at 42.4% (Fig. 1.8).

**Fig. 1.8 % of people with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**




**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**



## 2. Being young in the United Kingdom – The youth's condition in the UK

### 2.1 Demographic situation


**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in the United Kingdom, 1950 -2015: proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years old and more**



The number of young people in the UK has fallen by almost a million since the 1990s to around 8.2 million while the population overall has increased. The UK, like other countries in the EU, is an ageing society and is experiencing the associated social problems of an older population (see Deliverable D3.1). The proportion of over 65-year-olds has increased steadily since 1950 (Fig. 2.1). The proportion of young people (aged between 15 and 24 years) has been influenced by three baby booms: a short baby boom immediately after WW II (peak in 1946), second baby boom during the 1960s (peak in 1964), and a third smaller boom with a peak in 1990.


Compared to their parents' generation, young people today stay in education longer and their transition to the labour market is much more prolonged, resulting in longer dependence on their parents and delaying independent adulthood (see Deliverable D3.1). More than half of 18-24-year-old live with their parents (Fig. 2.2). Among young people aged between 25 and 29 years, one in five still live with their parents.

**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2005-2016**




## 2.2 Education & Labour market

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




The share of young people with tertiary education in the UK has increased significantly during the last decades despite the introduction of student tuition fees in 1998, and subsequent controversial hikes in the fee cap to £3,000 in 2006 and £9,000 in 2010 (see Deliverable D3.1). The number of women gaining a university degree is slightly higher than that of men (Fig. 2.3). The share of early leavers from education and training has decreased significantly between 1999 and 2016 (Fig. 2.4), but the share of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) has remained at a similar level since a steep rise in 2007 (Fig. 2.5).


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1999-2016)**




**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**




**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**



**Fig. 2.7 Young people at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2005-2013)**



**Fig. 2.8 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**




Youth employment rates remained relatively steady between 2000 and 2016: between 83 and 88% for young men and 70 and 75% for young women (Fig. 2.6). The share of young people at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion decreased between 2005 and 2007, but rose to even higher levels between 2009 and 2013 (Fig. 2.7). During the economic crisis of 2008-2009, youth unemployment levels increased significantly, affecting young people with lower levels of education (levels 0-2) the hardest (Fig 2.8). Despite some fluctuations, the economy of the UK recovered quickly from the crisis. By 2016, the level of youth unemployment also dropped to pre-recession level.




## 2.3 Health, well-being, and risk of marginalization


**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender (2005-2015)**



**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**



**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**



The share of young people in the UK who perceive their health as good or very good, has declined over the last decade: from 76.3 and 73.8 among young men and women respectively to 69.8 for all (Fig. 2.9). Depression affects the lives of many young people in the UK. In 2014, nearly one in every ten young women (aged between 15 and 24 years) reported depressive symptoms (Fig. 2.10).


Crude death rate per one hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people decreased a little between 2000 and 2010, more noticeably among young men: from 13.5 to 9.1% (Fig. 2.11).

## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


In 2015, 12% of young men and half as many young women admitted to using illegal drugs during the last month (Fig. 2.12).

The share of juvenile prisoners decreased significantly between 2008 and 2015, especially among young men: from 40.59 to 10.83 (Fig. 2.13). The share of juvenile prisoners among young women has always been lower than that of young men: the share of female juvenile prisoners per one hundred thousand inhabitants dropped to 0.00 (in England and Wales) in 2014.

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used any illegal drugs ( 2015)**



**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2008-2015) by gender**




### 3. What do young people in the United Kingdom think and feel?


#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints

##### 3.1.1 United Kingdom's situation

**Fig. 3.1 Perception of social climate**



**Fig. 3.2 State of services**




The current mood in the UK amongst young people, whilst diverse, contains a general undertone of discord: they feel that their generation has been hit hard by problems caused by previous generations (see Deliverable D3.1). Young people in the UK perceive the social climate as neither positive nor negative: mostly their opinion lies somewhere in the middle with three questions, on whether most people:

1. are helpful, vs. look out for themselves
2. try to be fair, vs take advantage of you
3. can be trusted, vs you can't be too careful (Fig 3.1)


The majority of young people also feel that the state of education and healthcare is either good, or neither bad nor good (Fig. 3.2), and that their satisfaction with the economy, government and democracy is limited to an extent (Fig. 3.4).

**Fig. 3.4 Satisfaction with ...**




Safety after dark is an issue for a fair share of young people in the UK: one third of young women and young people living in a big city, and nearly half of those who experience poor economic conditions feel unsafe to walk alone in the local area after dark (Fig. 3.3).

**Fig. 3.3 Feeling unsafe to walk alone in local area after dark by gender, age, economic condition and place of residence**




### 3.1.2 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.4 Satisfaction with life**




**Fig. 3.5 Self-reported happiness**




At the personal level, young people in the UK mostly feel satisfied with their lives (Fig. 3.4) and happy (Fig. 3.5). The gap between rich and poor in the UK is widening and this can also be seen in the reports of satisfaction with life and happiness of young people with different economic conditions (Fig. 3.6). The share of young people who are satisfied with their lives and happy is also lower among the older age group (25-29-year-olds), young people living in big cities and those who believe they belong to a group being discriminated against.

**Fig. 3.6 Satisfaction with life and happiness by gender, age, economic condition, place of residence and perceived discrimination**



### 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.7 Opinion on the inclusiveness of the political system by gender, age and economic condition**




Nearly half (44%) of young people in the UK believe that the political system is not very inclusive: that the system only allows people to have a say in what the government does ‘only very little or not at all’. And every second young person in the UK (50%) also believes that people have very little or no influence on politics. Young men, 15-19-year-olds and those who are economically well-off believe that the political system is more inclusive than their counterparts (Fig. 3.7).

Also, the young in the UK tend to trust political and law and order institutions only to a certain extent. Only 8.8% of young people in the UK have high trust in political institutions (the parliament, politicians, political parties and the European Parliament) (Fig. 3.8). Having high trust in law and order institutions is more common (50.5%), particularly among young men and in the younger age groups (15-19 and 20-24 years) (Fig. 3.9).

**Fig. 3.8 Trust in political and law&order institutions**




**Fig. 3.9 High trust in law&order institutions by gender and age**




### 3.3 Opinion on social issues

Nearly all (95%) young people in the UK believe that the climate is changing (Fig. 3.10). Nearly half (47.5%) also believe that climate change is caused entirely or mainly by human activity (Fig. 3.11). The share of those who believe that the climate change is caused entirely by human activity is highest among young women (9.9%), the oldest age-group (25-29-year-olds, 12.3%) and young people living in big cities (12.1%) (Fig. 3.12).


**Fig. 3.10 Opinion on the occurrence of climate change**



**Fig 3.11 Opinion on the factors causing climate change**




**Fig. 3.12 Opinion on causes of climate change by gender, age and place of residence**




In the UK, the vast majority of young people (approx. 90%) agree with the statement that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish, and disagree with the statement that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (Fig. 3.13). Despite the fact that the gap between the rich and poor in the UK is widening (see Deliverable D3.1), the statement that ‘for a fair society differences in the standard of living should be smaller’, received less support, just under 60% of young people.

**Fig. 3.13 Opinion on equality and social inclusion by gender, age and economic condition**




Opinions on the benefits of migration are diverse as nearly half of young people in the UK feel that immigrants enrich the cultural life of the country, make the UK a better place to live and are generally good for its economy, while the other half do not feel that immigrants and immigration benefit the country (Fig. 3.14).

**Fig. 3.14 Opinion on immigrants and migration by gender, age and place of residence**




**Fig. 3.15 Opinion on migration**



The UK is said to be a 'melting-pot' of different ethnicities and religions with nearly 20% of young people from ethnic minority groups (see Deliverable D3.1). More than a quarter of young people in the UK would allow many new immigrants to come and live in their country (Fig. 3.15). More than half of young people in the UK also believe that the government should be generous in judging applications for refugee status; and that granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members to the country. (Fig. 3.16). However, less than 38% of young people believe that most refugee applicants are in real fear of persecution in their countries.



**Fig. 3.16 Opinion on refugees by gender and age**




## 4. Engagement and social change (What do young people do?)


### 4.1 Civic engagement

Fundamental changes in the economy, weakening of family and community relationships and the rapid development of technology in the 1990s have impacted the socialisation of young people to such an extent that young people's lives are increasingly characterised by a combination of risk and uncertainty. Consequently, young people's primary concern has become to insure their immediate future against a variety of perceived risks, whilst maintaining independence as a long-term goal, thus providing little incentives to participate in formal political and civic organisations. (see Deliverable D3.1) More than one third of young people (38.3%) in the UK feel that they take part in social activities less than their peers (Fig. 4.1) and around 40% believe they take part in social activities the same as their peers. Also, a majority of young people in the UK do not have experience with working in the civil society: less than 5% of young people reported to have taken part in voluntary work in a civil society organisation or association during the last year (Fig. 4.2).

**Fig. 4.1 Taking part in social activities**




**Fig. 4.2 Working in a civil society organisation or association in the last 12 months**




## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Voting in last national election**



**Fig. 4.4 Formal political participation**




Recent studies argue that, in the UK today, young people are more interested in participative, localised and immediate issues, while the exclusion of young people in traditional forms of (institutionalised) political participation persists (see Deliverable D3.1). Only a little more than one third of young people voted in the last national elections (Fig. 4.3). Less than 1% of young people have worked in a political party or action group and nearly 12% had contacted a politician or government official in the last year (Fig. 4.4).

In 2014 and 2016, young people in the UK attempted to make themselves heard in party politics through referendums: in Scotland regarding independence, and in the UK over membership of the European Union. The majority of young people voted for an independent Scotland and to remain in the EU, however, while their voices were heard they did not outnumber the voices of older generations voting for Scotland to remain part of the UK, and for the UK to exit the European Union (see Deliverable D3.1).


## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Activism**



Nearly half of young people in the UK had signed a petition during the last year and 8.1% of the young had taken part in a lawful public demonstration (Fig. 4.5). The share of those who had signed a petition during the last year was higher among women, young people in two older age groups (20-24 and 25-29-years old) and those whose economic conditions allow them to live comfortably (Fig. 4.6).


**Fig. 4.6 Signing a petition in the last 12 months by gender, age and economic condition**



#### 4.4 Everyday engagement


About half (52.5%) of young people in the UK are quite or very interested in politics (Fig. 4.7). The share of those who are interested in politics, is a little higher among young men and in the middle age group (20-24 years). However, in rural areas, the share of those who are interested in politics, is considerably lower at 34.8%.

**Fig. 4.7 Interest in politics: share of quite or very interested by gender, age and place of residence**




The majority of young people in the UK are concerned about climate change. The share of those who are very or extremely worried is higher among young women, younger age groups (15-19-year-olds) and young people living in big cities (Fig. 4.8). Nearly 40% of young people in the UK feel personal responsibility to reduce climate change and nearly half (47.5%) would buy the most energy efficient home appliance (Fig. 4.9). 59.1% are confident that they could use less energy than now, and two out of three young people often or always do things to reduce energy use.


**Fig. 4.8 Concern about climate change by gender, age and place of residence**



**Fig. 4.9 Taking action against climate change: share of people who ...**




**Fig. 4.10 Consumer participation and life-style by gender and age**



Only about 15% of young people had boycotted certain products or worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker while nearly half (44.1%) of the young in the UK had posted or shared something about politics online (Fig. 4.10). The share of those who had boycotted certain products or posted or shared something political online was higher among young men than women but lower for those who had worn a campaign badge or sticker. When comparing different age groups, the share of those who posted or shared political content online was higher among older age groups (20-24 and 25-29 years).


Time spent in a day to follow news about politics and current affairs, varies to a great extent among the young people in the UK. While nearly one third (31.9) spend less than 10 minutes on it, a little over a quarter (26.4%) spend more than one hour each day following news about politics and current affairs (Fig. 4.11). The share of those who spend more than one hour a day following news is highest among young men and people in the middle and oldest age group (20-24 and 25-29-year-olds).

**Fig. 4.11 Time spent in a day to follow news about politics and current affairs by gender and age**



# Italy


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	Population	60.776.000
	Population aged 15-29 years old	15,2%
	Population aged 65 years old and above	22,4%
	Birth Rate	1,456
	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	9,7%


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## 1. Standards of living in Italy<sup>7</sup>

**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP  
(current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index  
(1=most business-friendly regulations),  
2017**




Italy's economic situation is still suffering from the 2008 crisis juxtaposed with a long period of political instability.

The gross national income (GNI) is 38,430, but the 11,6% of the labour force is currently unemployed. Due to unfriendly regulations, doing business in Italy is not easy and the perceived corruption is quite high. As a possible consequence of this situation, the Government effectiveness is rated quite low.


**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of  
total labor force) (modeled ILO  
estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index -  
Transparency International (1 to 100;  
1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness:  
Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very  
low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>7</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.



**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures.” According to these criteria, the Italian press is not completely free (31). Among the PROMISE project’s countries, Italy is also among those with bigger gender gap (0,692) and ranks as 82 out of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017.

Italy also has a very low share of the population with tertiary education (17,7%), and of internet users (61,3%).

**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**




## 2. Being young in Italy


### 2.1 Demographic situation

The demographic transition in Italy reflects in a complete overturn of the share of the youngest and oldest age-groups in the population. In the past 65 years, the proportion of youth aged between 15 and 24 years, dropped from 17,3% to 9,3%, while people aged 65 years old or more specularly increased and nowadays they represent almost one-quarter of the Italian population.

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Italy, 1950 -2015:**  
proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years  
old and more



**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2004-2016**




This demographic transition impacts on many aspects of social life.

With no specific youth policies for housing, and with the effects of the economic crisis, young people face difficulties in finding their way to becoming independent adults. In the past 12 years, the share of young people aged 25-29 years who still live with their parents remained stable between 63 and 66%.

Far from being just a “cultural” Italian issue, as it is often described, the high proportion of young people living with their parents reflects structural problems (see Deliverable D3.1).

## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Italy


**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




Since 2004, education provides increasingly better features. Youth with a tertiary education steadily increased, in particular in the case of women: today one-third of females aged between 25-29 years old have a university degree.

As shown in figure 2.4, the Italian school system made many efforts to deal with the phenomenon of early school leavers: since 1992 they decreased from about 37% to 14%, again females appear to be more engaged in the school system. However, considering a broader age group (15-29 years old), the share of youth who is not in employment, education, training (NEET), is stable, and bigger in the case of females (about 16%). During the economic crisis, NEET young men increased by about 4 percentage points.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1992-2016)**



**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**



**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**




More than one out two females and two out five males aged 25-29 years old are not employed (Fig.2.6). The situation has not changed much over 16 years.


The economic crisis had strong consequences on youth unemployment. In 2007 about 12% of the young people were unemployed, but this rate steadily increased to about 25% in 2014 (Fig. 2.7). Probably as a reflection of the Italian economic system, youth with a secondary degree are generally less affected than those with lower educational levels. Youth with tertiary education were the most affected by unemployment until 2010, later the situation improved a little, but in 2016 more than one-fifth of youth with a university degree is unemployed.

About one-third of the Italian youth is at risk of poverty (Fig.2.8), the trends both for men and women are quite stable, with an increase of about five percentage points from 2009 to 2013.

**Fig. 2.7 Italian youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**




**Fig. 2.8 Italian young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being

**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2004-2015)**




According to their self-report (Fig. 2.9), Italian youth, who perceive their health as good or very good, increased from about 57% in 2004 to almost 66% 2015. However, females reporting this positive feeling are consistently fewer than their male peers.


Young females, between 15 and 19 years old, report higher current depressive symptoms than their male peers and also compared to older females. In 2014, 2,1% of males aged either 20-24 or 25-29, reported current depressive symptoms, significantly more than among females of the same age.

Between 2006 and 2010 the crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants (Fig. 2.11) is quite stable, except for a moderate peak for men in 2007-08, and a small decrease over time. In any case, the rate is very much higher for males than for females.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**




**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**



## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... (2015)**



In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about 66% of the Italian youth admitted to having consumed alcohol in the last month, about 27% of them smoked tobacco, and 10% used illegal drugs. Except for tobacco, which was used more by females, males tend to use these substances more than the females.

Between 2008 and 2015 the number of juvenile prisoners increased (Fig. 2.13). This is much higher for young males than for females (about 20 vs. 1 young prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants). In the case of young men, the higher peak was in 2011 (25,6).

**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile Prisoners Per hundred thousand inhabitants (2008-2015) by gender**



### 3. What do young people in Italy think and feel?


This section aims to provide an overview of the young Italians' perception and evaluation about the current situation in their country and how they feel in such context. Despite the critical evaluation of the Italian context, young people appear quite satisfied with their personal life and tend to be optimistic towards their future, but they are less confident considering the whole general national and European context.

Their relation with authorities is very weak. Together with the feeling that their voice counts neither at the country nor the European level, the Italian young people express deep distrust in political institutions. This is probably because they feel unable to address the effects of the crisis with efficacy, leaving them marginalized.

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity and constraints

##### 3.1.1 Italian and European situation


**Fig. 3.1 Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Italy?**




About half of the young respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in Italy, without any differences between girls and boys.

Those that are at that age to have completed their experience with the school system and face the hard transition to the labor market and their adult life appear as the less satisfied. Young people aged 25-29 years old, and the employed, show the highest level of dissatisfaction (Fig.3.2).


**Fig. 3.2 Young people not satisfied with democracy in Italy by gender, age, employment status (%)**




**Fig. 3.3 How would you rate the situation of the Italian economy?**



**Fig. 3.4 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the Italian economy will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.5 Evaluation on the current Italian economy and expectations for the future by gender and age**




In line with the weak situation of the Italian economy (see Fig. 1.1 to 1.5 in section 1 “Standards of living”), 86% of Italian youth rate negatively both the Italian economy (Fig. 3.3) and the employment situation (Fig. 3.6). Although only one-fifth of them expect that things will be worse, more than the 40% think that the situation will not change in the next year (Fig. 3.4, Fig. 3.7). Youth aged 15-19 years old appear the most skeptical about a positive evolution (Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.8).


**Fig. 3.6 How would you rate the employment situation in Italy?**



**Fig. 3.7 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the employment situation in Italy will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.8 Evaluation on the current Italian employment, and expectations for the future by gender and age**






**Fig. 3.9 Do you think that in Italy the education system is adapted or not to the current world of work? (%)**




While education largely improved in the last decades as discussed in section 2 (see Fig. 2.3 to 2.5), half of the Italian youth are critical of how education prepares them for the world of work. The young people find that training, school, and university are poorly adapted to the real needs of the labour market (Fig.3.9).

The most critical are men, those aged 25-29, and those who live in rural areas (Fig. 3.10)

**Fig. 3.10 "The education system is not well adapted to the current world of work", by gender, age, place of living**




**Fig. 3.11 Do you have the feeling that young people have been marginalized by the economic crisis (%)**




This feeling of mismatch between their educational profile and the job market opportunities has probably been affected also by the impact of the crisis. Although for about 60% of the respondents the crisis has already reached a peak (Fig. 3.12), for most of the young people (80%) the crisis marginalized youth in Italy, affecting their participation in work and social life (Fig. 3.11). However, those who lives in big cities, those aged 20-24 years old, and women appear to be the most positive about the situation post-crisis (Fig. 3.13).


**Fig. 3.12 What to you think about the impact of the economic crisis on the job market?**



**Fig. 3.13 "The impact of crisis on jobs already reached its peak", by age, gender, and place of living**



**Fig. 3.14 Direction things are going in Italy (%)**




When asked to evaluate the direction things are going in Italy and Europe, 7% young people answered “don’t know” in relation to Italy (Fig 3.14), and 12% answered don’t know in relation to Europe (Fig 3.15). Only a small minority feel that things are going in the right direction – 8.6% in relation to Italy and 9.4% for Europe. Whereas the vast majority feel that things are going in the wrong direction – over half, 55.5% in relation to Italy and 41.8% for Europe.


The dissatisfaction with the general national situation and the distrust in those that should rule the country (see next section, Fig.3.31), could help in explaining this feeling, as well as the perceived distance from the institutional level of Europe, together with possible lack of knowledge about it.

However, only a minority (about 9%) think that things are going in the right direction (Fig. 3.14, Fig. 3.15) and only one quarter has positive expectations about the life of the future generation (Fig. 3.16).

**Fig. 3.15 Direction things are going in the EU (%)**




**Fig. 3.16 Do you think that life for the next generation in EU will be... (%)**



### 3.1.2 Perceived agency


**Fig. 3.17 "My voice counts in Italy"**




Young people living in Italy feel that they are not being heard, neither at the national nor the European level (Fig. 3.17, Fig. 3.17a).

About seven out ten young Italians think that their voice doesn't count. This feeling is extremely common regardless of gender, however it tends to be stronger among the youngest and those living in rural areas (Fig. 3.18).

**Fig. 3.17a "My voice counts in EU"**




**Fig. 3.18 "My voice does not count" by gender, age, place of living**




### 3.1.3 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.19 Are you satisfied with your life in general?**




Despite the negative evaluation of their country's situation, most of the Italian youth declare to be satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.19), this is mainly the case for women and young people still in education (Fig. 3.20), while the unemployed display the lowest level of life satisfaction.

**Fig. 3.21 % agreement: "You have confidence in the future"**




Seven out ten young Italians are also quite optimistic about the future (Fig. 3.21). Women and youth aged 20-24 years old are the most confident (Fig. 3.22).


**Fig. 3.20 Young people satisfied with their life by gender, age, employment status**




**Fig. 3.22 Young people who have confidence in the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.23 How would you rate your personal job situation?**



**Fig. 3.24 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: your personal job situation will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.25 Evaluation on the current personal job situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




Italian young people seem to rate their personal current situation much better than the national one. Six out ten rate good or very good their personal job situation (Fig. 3.23) and only the 5% have a negative expectation about the future. The most optimistic are women and those aged 20-24 years old. The evaluation of their household's financial situation displays quite similar positive views (Fig. 3.26-3.28).


**Fig. 3.26 How would you rate your household financial situation?**



**Fig. 3.27 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the financial situation of your household will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.28 Evaluation on the current household's financial situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




## 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.29 Trust in Law & Order institutions**




**Fig. 3.30 Young people who tend to trust in Law&Order institutions, by gender and age**




Most young people express trust in Law and Order institutions (in particular, the Police and the Army) (Fig. 3.29), especially women (Fig. 3.30). But youth manifest also a strong distrust in political institutions, especially in political parties, trusted only by 10% (Fig. 3.31). Women and youth aged 20-24 appear as the most critical (Fig. 3.32). Nevertheless, more than 40% of the youth overall, have trust in the EU.

**Fig. 3.31 Trust in political institutions**




**Fig. 3.32 Young people who NOT trust political institutions by gender, age**



### 3.3 Opinion on social issues


**Fig. 3.33 Percentage of agreement on statements regarding migration**



As a probable reflection of the migration crisis that affected Italy, with the very poor resources (in conjunction with the economic crisis) and the lack of support from the international community, about six out ten young people think that immigrants don't positively contribute to Italy (Fig. 3.33). This feeling is mainly shared by men and the oldest group. On the other hand, about 55% of the respondents believe that the country should help refugees.

Talking about the EU H2020 goals related to the environment, about 14% think they are too modest, and a large share of the Italian youth (about 59%) support these goals, revealing a concern for environmental issues.

**Fig. 3.34 Young people who agree with these statements by gender and age**



**Fig. 3.35 Do you find these H2020 goals... (%)**






## 4. Engagement and Social Change


In this section, we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Italy. We adopt the concept of social and political engagement as defined in D4.1, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement. In most of the cases, the questions are regarding which forms of participation do young people think are the most effective.

### 4.1 Civic engagement

**Fig. 4.1 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - civic engagement (%)**




**Fig. 4.2 Young people who says that individual help of the most needy is one of the best way of participation by gender and age**



Civic engagement as participation in civic society organizations is not particularly popular among Italian youth (see also D4.1). When asked about the best ways to participate in the public life of the EU, membership in such organization is selected only by 13% of the sample (Fig. 4.1). Instead of joining formal organizations, young people seems convinced that the individual action of helping the most needy can be more effective. This is particularly true for women and the youngest age-group (Fig. 4.2). (Regarding the option of joining civic society organization, the small sample size do not allow to break down in categories).


## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Best ways of participating in the public life of EU -Formal traditional participation (%)**




Joining a political party or a trade union is not considered a good way to be active in the public life in Europe (Fig. 4.3). This does not come as a surprise, considering the very low trust in political institutions (Fig. 3.31) and the general idea that formal politics was not able to provide adequate responses to the crisis. However, more than four out ten young Italians think that voting is still one of the best ways of participating, regardless of age and gender. Compared to youth who live in rural areas and small town, this opinion is stronger among those living in big cities (Fig.4.4)

**Fig. 4.4 Voting is one of the best ways of participation, by gender, age and place of living**




## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Attend demonstrations is one of the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU - Activism**




One-fifth of the young respondents recognize the participation in demonstrations as one of the best ways to make young people's voices heard (Fig. 4.5). This belief is quite widespread among the young population, with relatively small differences by gender and age: only the youngest opted a bit less for this type of political action (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.6 Attending demonstrations is one of the best ways of participation by gender and age**



## 4.4 Everyday Engagement

**Fig. 4.7 What are the most important issues you are facing at the moment? (%) [max 2 answers]**




The most urgent issue for about one-third of young Italians is unemployment (Fig. 4.7). This is more than understandable, considering the high level of youth unemployment and the lack of adequate resources. Also migration, which already emerged as a potential issue in Fig.3.33, is confirmed as one of the most important issues that young people are directly facing.


Other aspects, like Pensions, Environment, and Housing, apparently are less urgent topics for young people living in Italy.

Although young people did not indicate environmental protection and the climate change among the most important issues in their personal life (Fig.4.7), most of them show a good level of awareness about environmental issues, as shown by their pro-activity in this respect (Fig.4.8). More than half of the young respondents sort waste, and more than one third undertook, in their daily life, pro-environmental routines that include reducing disposable items, reducing the use of water and energy, and buying local products (Fig. 4.8).


**Fig. 4.8 Which of these steps have you taken personally to protect the environment? (%)**



**Fig. 4.9 Engagement in environmental-friendly actions**



**Fig. 4.10 Moderate/high pro-environmental engagement by gender, age, place of living (%)**




Considering the number of their environment-friendly actions, we can consider different levels of young people's engagement in this dimension of participation (Fig. 4.9). About one out of two show a low engagement (1 or 2 actions), one out of three show a moderate engagement (3-5 actions), and a few (13%) indicate high engagement (6-8 actions). The group of those who display moderate/high engagement does not show differences by gender or age, but adopting this lifestyle seems to be easier for those who live in the rural areas, followed by those living in big cities (Fig. 4.10).


In line with the results reported in D4.1, it seems that young people prefer to put distance between them and everything that explicitly refers to the traditional politics. Even if they affirm concern about social issues affecting their personal life (Fig. 4.7), or feel marginalized by the crisis (Fig. 3.11) and rate as 'quite bad' the situation in Italy (see section 3.1), they do not talk much about politics (Fig. 4.11). Only a minority often discuss such matters, less than half do it only occasionally, and the others never talk about politics, regardless if the matters concern the local, national or European levels.

Among the young people who often discuss politics (Fig. 4.12), men and those aged 20-24 appear as the most involved in such talks on local and national matters, while the oldest group are most involved in discussing European matters.

**Fig. 4.11 How often do you discuss political matters with your friends or relatives? (%)**




**Fig. 4.12 Youth who often discusses political matters by gender and age**



# Germany

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
	Population	82.667.685
	Population aged 15-29 years old	17,0%
	Population aged 65 years old and above	21,3%
	Birth Rate	9,0%
	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	14,9%

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
## 1. Standards of living in Germany<sup>8</sup>

Among the PROMISE countries, Germany appears as one of the most reassuring economic contexts. This is not only because of the highest gross national income (GNI) of 49710 and of the lowest unemployment rate (3,8%), but also because the relatively friendly regulations can support the development of businesses in this country, together with one of the most moderate perceptions of corruption and a high perception of Government effectiveness, second only to Finland.


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP  
(current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index  
(1=most business-friendly regulations),  
2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of  
total labor force) (modeled ILO  
estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index -  
Transparency International (1 to 100;  
1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness:  
Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very  
low effectiveness perceived)**



<sup>8</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”. According to these criteria, the German press is quite free (index score of 20).


Among the countries considered, Germany is one of those with the smallest gender gap (0,778) and ranks at the 12th position out of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017, indicating a fair balance of opportunities for women and men.

Less than one-third of the active German population has a tertiary education, but almost nine out of ten use the internet, hinting at a smaller digital divide compared to the other countries.


**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**



**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**






## 2. Being young in Germany

### 2.1 Demographic situation


**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Germany, 1950 -2015: proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years old and more**



Together with many other European countries, Germany is facing a severe demographic transition. Between 1970 and 1990 the share of young and old people was about the same (Fig. 2.1). Since 1990 the gap in the proportion of older and younger population has increasingly become more pronounced. In the aging German society of 2015, people older than 65 years are double in number to young people aged 15-24 years old.


The share of young people living with their parent(s) decreased by about ten percentage points in ten years (Fig. 2.2). In 2016, slightly more than one quarter of the youth aged 25-29 years old was still living with their family of origin.

**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2005-2016**



## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Germany

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of Young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




Since 2004, education at all levels has improved. Youth with a tertiary education steadily increased (Fig. 2.3), in particular in the case of women: today almost one-third of the females aged between 25-29 years have a university degree.


Compared to other European countries, Germany shows lower rates of school drop out (Fig. 2.4) and exclusion from the labour market and school system (Fig. 2.5).

Since 1999, the numbers of early school leavers decreased from 15% to 10% without relevant differences by gender. On the contrary, females seem to be more exposed than males to the risk of becoming NEET (Fig. 2.5). In any case, the NEET rate appears quite stable over time, with only a slight decrease for females.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1999-2016)**



**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**



**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**




Less than 20% of men and less than 25% of women are unemployed. Except for a slight decline in 2004-2005, the youth employment rate is quite stable both for men and women (Fig. 2.6).


However, those with lower educational attainment are more exposed to the unemployment risk than those with higher degrees (Fig. 2.7). Between 2003 and 2009, the unemployment rate among those with less than lower secondary education, increased from 15,8 to 27,8 (peak in 2006). Only 3% of those with tertiary education are unemployed.

Nevertheless, the rate of young people at risk of poverty or exclusion increased from 22% in 2005 to 25% in 2013, with females more affected than males since 2006.

**Fig. 2.7 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**




**Fig. 2.8 Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being


**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2005-2015)**




German youth progressively reported better health conditions (Fig. 2.9). Males were more likely than females to perceive their health as good or very good.

Females also manifest current depressive symptoms more than males (Fig. 2.10), except in the older group (25-29 years old). The youngest females (15-19 years old) were the subgroup that reported these symptoms more than the other age groups (9,8%). Even if more females are reporting more depressive symptoms and are less positive in indicating their health conditions, females commit suicide four times less than males (Fig.2.11), with trends relatively stable over time.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**




**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**



## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime<sup>9</sup>

In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about seven out of ten of German young people reported to have drunk alcohol in the last month, without significant differences between genders. More males tended to smoke tobacco (32,2%) than females (21,6%). The number of males who admitted having used illegal drugs in the last month are almost double the number of females.

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... ( 2015)**



<sup>9</sup> No data for Germany on youth crime.

### 3. What do young people in Germany think and feel?


This section aims to provide an overview of German young people's perception and evaluation of the current situation in their country and how they feel in such context. German youth seems to be quite satisfied with the society they live in. The context of opportunities provided by the German system probably help them to reach their personal goals and feel quite satisfied with their life.

Generally speaking, their relation with authority does not appear particularly problematic: most of the young people have high trust in institutions, with the notable exception of political parties and the politicians, but they tend to perceive a good level of personal political efficacy.

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity and constraints

##### 3.1.1 Germany situation

**Fig. 3.1 Perception of the social climate**




A measure of perception of the social climate (Fig. 3.1), builds upon the position towards three statements\* and shows that most young German people cannot clearly define whether they live in a positive social climate or not. However only a few of them perceive it as negative, and about one out of four think that it is positive. This is particularly true for men, for those without a migration background, and those who live in country villages (Fig. 3.2).

\*“Most people can be trusted” (vs “you can’t be too careful”);


“Most people try to take advantage of you” (vs “Most people try to be fair”);

“Most of the time people are helpful” (vs “Most people are mostly looking out for themselves”)

**Fig. 3.2 Young people perceiving a positive social climate - by gender, migration background and place of living**




**Fig. 3.3 Rate of the status of education and health services in Germany nowadays (%)**




Most young people rate as 'good' the state of the health services and almost half consider the state of education in Germany to be 'good' (Fig. 3.3). Taking these two services together (Fig. 3.4), males, the youngest respondents, young people with migration backgrounds, and those living in small villages, are most likely to rate them positively.

**Fig. 3.4 Young people rating "Good" the state of services in Germany by gender, age, migration background and place of living**




**Fig. 3.5 Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark**




More than seven young people out ten feel safe when they are alone in their local area after dark (Fig. 3.5). However, the share of those who feel unsafe (Fig. 3.6) is mainly composed of females; young between 15-19 years old; those with no migration background; and those living in the suburbs or in small towns.

**Fig. 3.6 Young people who feel unsafe when walking alone in local area after dark by gender, age, migration background, place of living (%)**



**Fig. 3.7 Satisfaction with the situation in the country (%)**




Thinking about the current situation in Germany, young people appear quite satisfied. In particular (Fig. 3.7), most of them are satisfied with the state of the national economy and the way democracy works in Germany. However, they report less satisfaction with the national government.

Fig. 3.8 shows that the more satisfied are men, the youngest subgroup, those with a migration background, and young people living in big cities.

Females and those aged 25-29 years old report being less satisfied with the overall situation of the country.


**Fig. 3.8 Young people rather/very much satisfied with the situation in Germany - by gender, age, migration background, place of living**





### 3.1.2 Personal situation


**Fig. 3.9 Youth's satisfaction with life as a whole**




Considering their personal situation, young people living in Germany appear very satisfied (Fig. 3.9) and happy (Fig. 3.11), probably also as a reflection of the good opportunities allowed by the state of the economy of the country and the overall picture of stability and fairness (see section 1).

In the perspective of the opportunities to get resources to achieve their personal goals (and then being satisfied and happy), the breakdown for the socio-demographic characteristics is quite similar to the extent of satisfaction with life as a whole (Fig. 3.10) and the feeling of happiness (Fig. 3.12). Men, young people aged less than 24 years old, those without a migration background, and who live in country villages, are more likely to report these positive feelings.


**Fig. 3.11 Youth's happiness**



**Fig. 3.10 Young people rather or very much satisfied with life by gender, age, migration background, place of living**




**Fig. 3.12 "happy" young people by gender, age, migration background, place of living**



## 3.2 Relation with authority


### 3.2.1 General opinion on institutions

**Fig. 3.13 Political system allows people to... (%)**




In line with their perceptions (Fig. 3.7) about how democracy works in their country, most of the young people in Germany think that the political system allows people to have an impact on political matters (Fig. 3.13). However more than one-third do not perceive this kind of personal political efficacy.

**Fig. 3.14 Young people who think that the political system allows people to have influence on politics only very little or not at all**




**Fig. 3.15 Young people who think that the political system allows people to have a say in what government does only very little or not at all**



Looking at this latter group, men, those with a migration background and those living in country villages tend to perceive the possibility of influencing politics less than others (Fig. 3.14). However, only age appears to make some differences in perceptions of opportunities to have a say on what the government does. Interestingly, those who can already vote are less likely to perceive this efficacy (Fig. 3.15).

### 3.2.2 Trust in institutions


**Fig. 3.16 Trust in political institutions (%)**




While institutions like the German and the European parliaments still have the trust of most German youth (40% of young people trust them highly), politicians and political parties are the most critically evaluated (Fig. 3.16): only 20% of youth have high trust in them.

Considering a synthetic measure of trust in these four political institutions, Fig. 3.17 shows that youth with lower trust in political institutions are mainly composed of men, the oldest age group, those without a migration background, and those who live in big cities.

**Fig. 3.17 Youth with low trust in political institutions by gender, age, migration background, place of living**




**Fig. 3.18 Trust in Law&Order institutions (%)**




About seven out of ten of young Germans express high trust in the police and the legal system (Fig. 3.18). This high trust in law and order institutions is a common trait among German youth without relevant difference by sociodemographic characteristics, except gender and migration background. The composition of the share of those who have lower trust in such institutions presents a slight majority of men and people without a migration experience (Fig. 3.19)

**Fig. 3.19 Youth with low trust in Law&Order institutions by gender, migration background**




### 3.3 Opinion on social issues

**Fig. 3.20 Do you think world's climate is changing? (%)**




**Fig. 3.21 Young people who think that "world's climate is definitely changing", by gender, age, migration background, place of living**




German youth are reasonably aware of climate change. Most of them believe that the world's climate is definitely changing (Fig.3.20) and this is caused by human activity (Fig. 3.22). Such consciousness is more strongly established among women and those without a migration background. Differences by age and place of residence are not remarkable in terms of climate change awareness (Fig. 3.21). However more young people aged below 24 years old, compared to older respondents, and those with no migration background, believe the causes of this process are mainly due to human activity (Fig. 3.23).


**Fig. 3.22 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (%)**




**Fig. 3.23 Young people who think that "Climate change caused mainly by human activity", by gender, age, migration background, place of living**



**Fig. 3.24 Opinion on social issues - equality (%)**




**Fig. 3.25 Young people who agree with "gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish"**




Together with the concern for the environment and climate change, social equality appear as another important issue for German youth. About nine out of ten think that gay and lesbian couples should be free to live life as they want (Fig 3.25), and eight out of ten are against the idea that men should have more job opportunities than women when jobs are scarce (Fig 3.27). In this respect, the more conservative are men, the older age group, and those who have a migration background.

About six out of ten think that, for a fair society, the differences in standard of living should be smaller (Fig 2.26). The differences by sociodemographic characteristics are lightly remarkable considering age and migration background. The oldest and those who did not experience migration express more support for this statement.

**Fig. 3.26 Young people who agree with "for fair society, differences in standard of living should be smaller"**




**Fig. 3.27 Young people who disagree with "men should have more right to job than women when job are scarce"**




Young people who have a bad opinion of immigration are in the minority. Half of German youth think that immigration enriches the country's cultural life (Fig. 3.28) and the German economy (Fig. 3.29), and more than one third took an intermediate position on these aspects. Nevertheless, German youth appear a bit more tentative when expressing a position about whether, in general, immigration makes Germany a better place to live (Fig. 3.30).

In all these three aspects, the group who has a positive view on immigration is mainly composed of men, older than 25 years, and (more surprisingly) people living in big cities (Fig. 3.31 to Fig. 3.33).


**Fig. 3.28 Position towards immigration: country's cultural life (%)**




**Fig. 3.29 Position towards immigration: country's economy (%)**




**Fig. 3.30 Position towards immigration: country is a better/worse place to live (%)**




**Fig. 3.31 Young people who think that immigrants enrich country's cultural life**



**Fig. 3.32 Young people who think that migration is generally good for country's economy**



**Fig. 3.33 Young people who think that immigrants make country better place to live**




German youth are fairly open when talking about the “quantity” of allowed immigrants. However, when the immigrant belongs to a different ethnic group from the German native, the welcoming attitude is a bit colder (Fig. 3.34).


Looking at the refugees’ situation, only about one-third think that Germany should be generous when judging applications for refugee status (Fig. 3.35). In this respect, the most remarkable differences are by place of living (Fig. 3.36): those living in the big cities tend to be much more supportive than those living in the suburbs and villages, and probably have more direct experiences of such a situation. However, about 60% of German youth think that, once the refugee status is granted, refugees should be allowed to bring their close family members to live with them. There are no remarkable differences among the young people supporting this view.




**Fig. 3.34 Position towards immigration: Allow many/few immigrants**



**Fig. 3.35 Opinions towards the refugees' situation (%)**



**Fig. 3.36 Young people who think that granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members**






## 4. Engagement and Social Change

In this section, we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Germany. We adopt the concept of social and political engagement as defined in D4.1, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement.


### 4.1 Civic engagement

About one-third of the young respondents recently worked in a civic society organization (Fig. 4.1). Males, those aged 20-24 years old, those without a migration background and those living in big cities, tend to be slightly more engaged in such organizations than others (Fig. 4.2)

**Fig. 4.1 Have you worked in a civic society organization in the last 12 months?**




**Fig. 4.2 Young people who worked in a civic society organization**




In relation to their ability to get involved in social activities (Fig. 4.3), half of the young respondents estimated that they take part in social activities at a similar level to their peers, while one-third perceive themselves as less engaged. The rest, estimating themselves to be more socially involved, are mainly composed of men, those older than 25 years old, those without a migration background, and those living in big cities (Fig. 4.4), suggesting that the structure of opportunities and access to resources to engage and activate young people's potential is not homogeneous.

**Fig. 4.3 Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say to take part in social activities?**




**Fig. 4.4 Young people who take part in social activities more than their peers**




## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.5 Have you voted in the last national election?**



Almost half of the young respondents were not eligible to vote at the time of the data collection (Fig. 4.5). The majority of those entitled expressed their vote in the last national election. However, thinking about the possibility of voting for leaving/remaining in the EU, only 1,4% would not express their opinion (Fig. 4.7), and the vast majority would cast a pro-Europe vote.


**Fig. 4.7 Would vote for Germany to remain member of European Union or leave? (%)**




Young people living in the peripheries and in small towns or country village perceive national politics as something distant from them: their formal political participation is in fact lower than young people living in big cities (Fig. 4.6).

Other forms of formal political participation, including working in political parties and directly contacting politicians (Fig. 4.8), are experienced by very few young people.

**Fig. 4.6 Young people who voted for the last national election by gender and place of living (%)**



**Fig. 4.8 In the last 12 months, have you...? (%)**




### 4.3 Activism


About one-third of the youth signed petitions and half of them also took part in lawful demonstrations (Fig. 4.9).

Signing a petition appears a more viable option to express their position (in support of, as well as against, something) for women, youth aged more than 25, those living in big cities and those without a migration background (Fig 4.10).


**Fig. 4.9 In the last 12 months, have you... ? (%)**



**Fig. 4.10 Young people who signed petition**



**Fig. 4.11 Young people who taken part in lawful demonstration**




On the other hand, taking part in activities which leads young people to expose their standpoint more evidently, is something engaged in more by: men, those aged between 20-24 years old, and by those with a migration background. Most of the demonstrations usually take place in the heart of the big cities, so it could be more difficult for young people living in villages located far from the cities to take part in such activities (Fig. 4.11).


## 4.4 Everyday Engagement

Expressing an interest in politics split the German youth in two: half of the young people were not interested and the other half were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ interested (Fig. 4.12). Men, those older than 25 years old, youth with a migration background, and those living in big cities, express interest in the topic “politics” more than the others (Fig. 4.13).

**Fig. 4.12 How are you interested in politics?**




**Fig. 4.13 Young people quite/very interested in politics**




Environmental issues appear relevant for most youth. For example, less than 15% of the young respondents are not worried about climate change (Fig. 4.14).

**Fig. 4.14 How worried about climate change are you? (%)**




**Fig. 4.15 Young people who is very/extremely worried about climate change**



In particular, women, those aged 20-25 years old, youth with a migration background, and those living in big cities are more worried about this issue (Fig. 4.15). The difference by gender is quite significant and indicates that females tend to be more concerned than males about this aspect.


In line with their concern about the environment, more than half of German youth feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change (Fig. 4.16).

**Fig. 4.16 To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change? (%)**



Almost seven out ten of them would buy the most energy efficient home appliances (Fig. 4.17), do things to reduce their energy use (Fig. 4.18), and are quite confident to be able to use less energy than they do now (Fig. 4.19). Women, those older than 25 years of age, and those living in big cities or their suburbs, tend to be more engaged in these forms of everyday engagement (Fig. 4.20, Fig. 4.21). The other subgroups are confident that they could use less energy than now and do more to reducing climate change (Fig. 4.22).


**Fig. 4.17 How likely to buy most energy efficient home appliance**




**Fig. 4.18 How often do things to reduce energy use**




**Fig. 4.19 Confidence in using less energy than now**




**Fig. 4.20 Young people who would buy most energy efficient home appliance (%)**




**Fig. 4.21 Young people who do things to reduce energy use**



**Fig. 4.22 Young people confident that could use less energy than now**



**Fig. 4.23 In the last 12 months, have you... (%)**



The young respondents also expressed other forms of everyday engagement.


Political online activity and political consumption appear as the most practiced forms of engagement (Fig. 4.23).

Almost four out of ten young people had posted or shared something about political matters online. The main differences, in this case, are by gender and migration background: females and youth who experienced migration find it easier express their positions online (Fig. 4.25).


Boycotting products (Fig. 4.24) is less likely by very young people, but women appear as the most critical consumers. In both cases, those living in big cities tend to be more engaged in these activities.

A small group of young people (about one in ten) express their political view by wearing or displaying badges and stickers (Fig. 4.23). (The small size of this group does not allow any meaningful breakdown by sociodemographic characteristics).

**Fig. 4.24 Young people who boycotted certain products (%)**



**Fig. 4.25 Young people who posted or shared anything about politics online**






Although half of German young people said they were not interested in politics (Fig. 4.12), in their daily life they express political opinions and follow political activities with quite an assiduity.


Less than two out of ten of them spend less than ten minutes a day following current political issues. More than four out of ten spend between 11 and 30 minutes, and about one-quarter reads, watches, or listens to political news for more than half an hour a day.

The main differences in this form of participation are by gender, age, and migration background (Fig. 4.27), with males, those older than 25 years old, and youth who experienced migration following the political news more than females, the youngest, and native Germans.

**Fig. 4.26 Time spent in a day to follow news about politics, current affairs (watching, reading, listening)**




**Fig. 4.27 Young people who spend more than 30 minutes a day for following political news**



# Spain

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	Population	46.443.959
	Population aged 15-29 years old	14,7%
	Population aged 65 years old and above	19,2%
	Birth Rate	9,0
	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	12,7%


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## 1. Standards of living in Spain<sup>10</sup>


Spain has been one of the European countries that suffered the most from the 2008 crisis. The actual gross national income (GNI) is 36450 and 17,4% of the labour force is currently unemployed, which is the highest rate among the PROMISE countries.

Although doing business is not that easy, it is the Southern European country in which there is the friendliest regulation. Furthermore, there is comparatively low perceived corruption and high government effectiveness perceived.


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**



<sup>10</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix 1 for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




Although performing better than Italy and Croatia, Spain score quite low (28) in comparative perspective in terms of freedom of press. It means that the safety of journalists might be at risk, state intrusion in media affairs is not minimal, and/or the press is subject to onerous legal or economic pressures compared to other countries such as Finland (12) or Portugal (17).


However, at least in terms of gender equality Spain is the Southern European countries that score the highest. It scores 24<sup>th</sup> in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017, far higher than other Southern Europe countries such as Portugal (33) or Italy (82).

The rate of tertiary educated is among the highest of the PROMISE countries, although we must remember that there is a strong dualization in the country with almost 40% of the population having low educational attainment. About eight in every ten people have internet access in Spain.


**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**



**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**



## 2. Being young in Spain


### 2.1 Demographic situation

The demographic transition in Spain show a similar trend compared to Western countries. In the last thirty years, the ratio of the population aged 15-29 has decreased from 20% of the 1950s, to 9,3% in 2015. At the same time, the proportion of people aged 65 or more has increased from 7,2% to 18,9%. Since 1995, there are more elderly than young people in Spain.


The imbalance between the young and elderly strata of the population is also magnified by the difficult situation of the youth which are particularly exposed to precarious and deteriorating labour market conditions.

Not unsurprisingly, the rate of young Spanish still living with their families is quite high. Almost all those under 24 years old live with their parents, but even when we focus on the 25 to 29 group, the majority of them are still living with their parents. The evolution in time highlights the growing trend in this phenomenon, which is also connected to the lack of positive housing policies and investment in youth (see Deliverable D3.1).

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends, 1950 -2015: proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years old and more**




**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2004-2016**



## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Spain


**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




The system of education in Spain shows a strong dualistic feature. From the point of view of tertiary education, Spain is already achieving the headline target set by European Commission for Europe 2020 (at least 40% of young 30-34 with tertiary education), showing especially good performances of women.

However, the number of early leavers from education and training is still very high among the young Spanish - especially for men - far from the objective (10%) set by the Europe 2020 strategy. From 1992, nevertheless, the situation has greatly improved with a reduction of about 20 percentage points in the rate of early leavers. Still, Spain is one of countries with the highest percentage of NEET (aged 15-29), especially among women. From the highest peak of 2005, the reduction in the NEET rate has stagnated due to the negative consequences of the economic crisis.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender aged 18-24 (1992-2016)**



**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**



**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**




Youth employment has been highly affected by the 2008 crisis. In 2007, about 80% of men and 70% of women aged 25-29 were employed in Spain, but in the following five years, numbers were down to 60% for both genders, with the highest relative loss among men. Men were more exposed, since the crisis has impacted mostly on male dominated sectors like manufacturing and construction.


Things are getting better now with a steady employment reprise starting in 2012, but still the before-crisis levels are far from being reached (-15 percentage points for men and -10 for women). However, the crisis has increased the dualisation of Spanish labour markets: young with low educational level were those who suffered the most from the crisis, with about 34,2% being currently unemployed.

The deteriorated labour market conditions have also impacted on the risk of poverty and exclusion, which has strongly increased during the last 10 years now affecting about one third of Spanish youth, although there is almost no difference between genders.

**Fig. 2.7 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**




**Fig. 2.8 Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being

**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2004-2015)**




According to their self-report (Fig. 2.9), Spanish young people declare to have a good health, and recent years show an increase in the numbers.


However, it is quite interesting to notice the increase in self-reported depressive symptoms, with increasing age. Figure 2.10 refers to 2014 and shows that between 1% and 5% of youth suffer from current depressive symptoms. Younger females are more prone to depression, but when the 25-29 age-group show almost no difference between men and women.

Between 2000 and 2010 the suicide rate among young people decreased steadily, especially for men, who were more likely to commit suicide compared to women.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**



**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people aged 15-29 years (2000-2010)**






## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


In 2015, the majority of Spanish young people were consuming alcohol, while about 30% of them were smoking tobacco. For tobacco and alcohol there is almost no difference between genders, but men and women differ strongly in the consumption of illegal drugs (about 20% of men have consumed drugs in the last month but only the 10% of women).

Men are also much more likely to be imprisoned. However, between 2010 and 2015 the juvenile imprisonment has steadily reduced, although even in 2015, there were 15 times more men than women.

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... (2015)**



**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile Prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2008-2015) by gender**



### 3. What do young people in Spain think and feel?

The majority of young people in Spain are pessimistic about their employment prospects and the economic situation. They are also unsatisfied with Spanish democracy in general, distrust political institutions both in their country and in Europe, and are particularly critical of the education and employment systems. Only a third of them thinks that life for the next generation will be easier. More or less a similar minority, 30%, feels their voice counts in Spain or Europe.


When assessing their personal life, however, the large majority of them are positive and confident about their future. This contrast between the negative perceptions of the institutional contexts at large, and their hopeful expectations at the individual level, calls for a more detailed explanation.

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity and constraints

##### 3.1.1 Spanish and European situation

**Fig. 3.1 Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Spain?**


■ fairly satisfied/very satisfied  
▨ not very satisfied/not at all satisfied




The majority of young Spanish are not satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Fig. 3.1), with almost no difference between men and women.

The highest rate of dissatisfaction can be found in those who are 20-24 years old. Students are slightly more satisfied, while there is no difference between those who are employed and those who are currently looking for a job (Fig. 3.2).


**Fig. 3.2 Young people not satisfied with democracy in Spain by gender, age, employment status (%)**




**Fig. 3.3 How would you rate the situation of the Spanish economy?**



**Fig. 3.4 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the Spanish economy will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.5 Evaluation on the current Spanish economy and expectations for the future by gender and age**



Young Spanish are quite pessimistic about the economic situation in their country, but even more pessimistic about the employment situation (Fig. 3.3 and 3.6). The majority of them think that it will be the same or even get worse in the next 12 months (Fig. 3.4 and 3.7). The youngest are the less optimistic about the future, while being the more positive about the present (Fig. 3.5 and 3.8). There is almost no difference between men and women, but while men are more positive about the economic situation, women are more positive about employment.


**Fig. 3.6 How would you rate the employment situation in Spain?**




**Fig. 3.7 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the employment situation in Spain will be... (%)**



**Fig. 3.8 Evaluation on the current Spanish employment, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.9 Do you think that in Spain the education system is adapted or not to the current world of work? (%)**




Spanish youth does not seem to trust their educational system, as the majority think that it not adapted to the current world of work (Fig. 3.9). Quite interestingly, those who are more critical are those who are employed, while the youngest in the sample are the most positive about the educational system (Fig. 3.10). We might suppose that those who are now in the labour market realise how their education is unsuitable for the job they have.

**Fig. 3.10 "The education system is not well adapted to the current world of work", by gender, age, place of living**




About 7 out of 10 young Spanish think that the crisis has marginalised young people, but at least the majority think that the worst is now over and that the impact on jobs has already reached its peak (Fig. 3.12). The most positive are those who are students, those who are aged 20-24 years old, and men (Fig. 3.13). Quite coherently the most pessimistic about the crisis are those who are currently unemployed, only 38,9% of them believe that the crisis has passed.


**Fig. 3.11 Do you have the feeling that young people have been marginalized by the economic crisis (%)**




**Fig. 3.12 What to you think about the impact of the economic crisis on the job market?**




**Fig. 3.13 "The impact of crisis on jobs already reached its peak", by age, gender, and place of living**



**Fig. 3.14 Direction things are going in Spain (%)**



**Fig. 3.15 Direction things are going in EU (%)**




Despite seeming in general trusting and positive, the majority of youth in Spain think that things are going in the wrong direction, both in their country and in Europe. Especially in the case of Europe, there is a consistent minority (about 30%) that does not have a judgement, possibly a symptom of the perceived distance from European institutions (see section 3.1.2).

Distrust in their political institutions might play a role in increasing their dissatisfaction, as also the effect of the crisis which in Spain has mostly impacted on young people, with deteriorating labour market conditions and increasing unemployment.

However, about 30% of young Spanish are still positive about the future, thinking that life for next generations would be easier, although 45% feel it will get worse (Fig. 3.16).

**Fig. 3.16 Do you think that life for the next generation in EU will be... (%)**



### 3.1.2 Perceived agency

**Fig. 3.17 "My voice counts in Spain"**

■ agree/totally agree ■ disagree/totally disagree ■ missing






Fig. 3.17 and Fig. 3.18 show clearly how young people in Spain think that their voices are not heard by the political and social institutions in Spain and the EU. Their opinion regarding Spain does not seem to change across gender or age, but it does change in terms of employment condition with unemployed persons reporting more disconnection (Fig. 3.18a). But, the sensation of being unheard in the EU is higher among those who are younger and those who are working (Fig. 3.18b). The stronger feeling of integration in Spain and in the EU is perceived by Spanish students.

**Fig. 3.18 "My voice counts in EU"**


■ agree/totally agree ■ disagree/totally disagree ■ missing



**Fig. 3.18a "My voice does not count" in Spain by gender, age, employment condition**




**Fig. 3.18b "My voice does not count" in Europe by gender, age, employment condition**




### 3.1.3 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.19 Are you satisfied with your life in general?**



**Fig. 3.21 % agreement: "You have confidence in the future"**



Even if the country has suffered significantly from the crisis, young Spanish seem to be very satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.19), although women are in general slightly more pessimistic compared to men (Fig. 3.20). Those who are still students or who are employed, are especially positive about their life. But those who are currently unemployed are those who report the lowest level of life satisfaction, signalling how work still retain a very important role in predicting happiness and satisfaction in life.

At the same time, the vast majority of Spanish youth are also confident in the future, especially men and those who are students or unemployed.

In fact, as it is possible to see in Fig. 3.22 women and employed people tend to be less confident in the future. These results might be interpreted as a legacy of an unresolved gender equality in the country and of a difficult labour market situation to which especially the young are exposed. Young are also less confident when they are in their early 20s.

**Fig. 3.20 Young people satisfied with their life by gender, age, employment status**




**Fig. 3.22 Young people who have confidence in the future by gender and age**







**Fig. 3.23 How would you rate your personal job situation?**



**Fig. 3.24 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: your personal job situation will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.25 Evaluation on the current personal job situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




Young people's opinion of their current job is split almost equally between good and bad. However, 65% feel that their household financial situation is good (Fig. 3.23 and 3.26). Only a small minority think that their situation will get worse in the future (Fig. 3.24 and 3.27). Women are more pessimistic about the current situation and over 25s are more optimistic about the future.


**Fig. 3.26 How would you rate your household financial situation?**



**Fig. 3.27 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the financial situation of your household will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.28 Evaluation on the current household's financial situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**






## 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.29 Trust in Law & Order institutions**




**Fig. 3.30 Young people who tend to trust in Law&Order institutions, by gender and age**




Young Spanish people express trust mostly in the Police and in Army, but they are quite reluctant to trust justice (Fig. 3.29); trust is higher in the youngest age-group, and slightly higher among women (Fig. 3.30). But they show a diffuse distrust in political institutions, especially in political parties trusted only by 9,6 % and national parliament, (Fig. 3.31). However, the European Union is the political institution that arouse the most positive attitude.

**Fig. 3.31 Trust in political institutions**




**Fig. 3.32 Young people who do NOT trust political institutions by gender, age**




### 3.3 Opinion on social issues

**Fig. 3.33 Percentage of agreement on statements regarding migration**




**Fig. 3.34 Young people who agree with these statements by gender and age**



When referring to migration, Spanish youth show a wide spirit of hospitality (Fig. 3.33). The majority of them think that immigrants contribute a lot to their country. The statement “Spain should help refugees” is strongly supported by young Spanish. In general, women are more open compared to men. Regarding the EU H2020 goals related to environment, a large majority (over 60%) support the goals, but it is also quite interesting to notice that a consistent minority (about 10%) think that they are too modest.

**Fig. 3.35 Do you find these H2020 goals... (%)**




## 4. Engagement and Social Change


In this section we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Spain.

### 4.1 Civic engagement

**Fig. 4.1 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - civic engagement (%)**




**Fig. 4.2 Young people who says that individual help of the most needy is one of the best way of participation by gender and age**



Spanish young are willing to engage in civic activities, about one respondent in four think that joining formal associations or NGOs is the best way to participate in the public life (Fig. 4.1). However, they also more frequently think that individual mobilization is the best way of public participation: 32,9% vs. 23,9% to join formal associations. In particular, those who are more willing to opt for individual engagement are women and the youngest in our sample. While those are working are less propense to opt for individual mobilization, maybe because they have less spare time to invest in civic engagement compared to students and under 19s (Fig. 4.2).


## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Best ways of participating in the public life of EU -Formal traditional participation (%)**




The diffuse distrust of young Spanish towards political, national and European institutions is reflected in the way they participate in public life: only a minority consider that joining a political party or a trade union is one of the best ways to participate in public life (Fig. 4.3). It is also probably linked to the diffuse conviction that neither the national government nor the European institution are able to listen to the voices of the young. But, voting still retains its importance: this especially occurs among the 25-29 age group, and among students (Fig. 4.4). Employed and the youngest group (15-19) are the least supportive of voting.

**Fig. 4.4 Voting is one of the best ways of participation, by gender, age and place of living**




## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Attend demonstrations is one of the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU - Activism**



About 20% of young Spanish think that demonstrating is one of the best ways to participate in public life (Fig. 4.5). Men, and those over 25 years old are slightly more positive towards this type of political participation (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.6 Attending demonstrations is one of the best ways of participation by gender and age**



## 4.4 Everyday Engagement


**Fig. 4.7 What are the most important issues you are facing at the moment? (%) [max 2 answers]**



Although ranked as only a minor issue among the most important current issues facing society (Fig. 4.7), actions for environmental issues gains wide support from young Spanish (Fig. 3.35). Not unsurprisingly then, young people in Spain are willing to take various actions to personally protect the environment (Fig. 4.8). Waste management and reduction of water are actions currently taken by the majority of the respondents. About one in four have changed their mode of transport, mostly because they try to reduce the use of cars (22,9%).


The effect of the crisis is clear when analysing the most important issues raised by young Spanish (Fig. 4.7), which are almost totally related to economic issues. The most urgent issue is unemployment, selected by 35,3% of the respondents. The second and the third are about the working condition and the cost of living, both still linked with the economic situation (although scoring about 15 percentage points less than unemployment). It is however quite interesting to notice how immigration is not perceived at all as a problem (only 0,6% choose the item – data not shown), confirming the welcoming climate for migrants in Spain. Education is another important issue (19%), which is quite understandable considering the highly dualized labour market that characterises Spain (see section 1). Environmental issues and terrorism are relatively minor concerns and are the only topics of concern not directly linked with economic conditions.

**Fig. 4.8 Which of these steps have you taken personally to protect the environment? (%)**




Considering the number of environment-friendly actions, we can consider different levels of youth's engagement in this dimension of participation, as shown in Fig. 4.9. About half of young Spanish show a low engagement in environmentally friendly actions, with about 45% taking only 1 or 2 actions and about 8% that do not take any action at all. The highest commitment comes with age, with more than half of the over 25s taking at least 3 actions. Men, students and the unemployed are the least committed (Fig. 4.10).

**Fig. 4.9 Engagement in environmental-friendly actions**




**Fig. 4.10 Moderate/high pro-environmental engagement by gender, age, employment status (%)**




Despite their distrust in political institutions and the scarce involvement in formal political participation, seven out of ten young Spanish at least occasionally discuss political matters with their peers and family. However, their interest changes regarding the type of political issues, with European matters raising the lowest interest among the interviewees. If we focus on the minority that frequently discuss political matters, men are the most involved. Interest in politics seems correlated with age, and it grows as the person grows older (Fig. 4.12).

**Fig. 4.11 How often do you discuss political matters with your friends or relatives? (%)**



**Fig. 4.12 Youth who often discusses political matters by gender and age**



# Portugal




Population	10.324.611
Population aged 15-29 years old	16,0 %
Population aged 65 years old and above	21,1 %
Birth Rate	8,3
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	8,1 %

## 1. Standards of living in Portugal<sup>11</sup>


Portugal's economic situation is stabilizing in the past couple of years but there is still a reduced overall competitiveness in the economy.

The gross national income per capita (GNI) in Portugal is 30000 (Fig.1.1) and 9,9% of the labour force is currently unemployed (Fig.1.3). Doing business in Portugal is not easy (Fig.1.2). However, the perceived corruption in Portugal was lower than average (global average Corruption Perception Index score in 2016 was a paltry 43) and the perceived Government effectiveness was relatively high (Fig.1.4, Fig1.5).


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>11</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.



**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**



**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”. According to these criteria, the press in Portugal is not completely free (17) (Fig.1.6), but it is still among PROMISE project’s countries with the highest freedom of the press.


Portugal’s Gender Gap Index is 0,73 which places Portugal in the middle among the PROMISE project’s countries (Fig.1.7) and ranks it at position 33 out of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017.

Portugal has medium share of population with tertiary education (23.9%) and of internet users (70%) (Fig.1.8, Fig.1.9).

**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**




## 2. Being young in Portugal

### 2.1 Demographic situation


The demographic transition in Portugal reflects in a complete overturn of the share of the youngest and oldest age-groups in the population. In the past 65 years, the proportion of youth aged 15-24 dropped from 19% to 10%, while the share of the people older than 65 years increased from 7% to 21%, and nowadays they represent more than one fifth of the Portuguese population (Fig.2.1).

In the past 12 years the share of youth aged 25-29 years who still live with their parents increased from 51.4% to 62.4% (Fig.2.2).

**Fig. 2.1. Demographic trends in Portugal 1950-2015: proportion of people aged 15-24 years old vs 65 years old and more**




**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2004-2016**



## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Portugal


**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




Since 2004, the share of youth with a tertiary education steadily increased, particularly in the case of women: today almost 45% of the women between 25-29 years old have a university degree (Fig.2.3).

The Portuguese school system made many efforts to keep more youth in education: since 1992 the percentage of early school leavers decreased from about 50% to 13%, and again women appear to be more engaged in the school system (Fig.2.4). Considering a broader age group (15-29 years old), the share of youth who is not in employment, education, training (NEET), is somewhat bigger in the case of women (although over the past twelve years this has dropped overall from 7.5% to 5.2%), and was quite stable over the same period in the case of men (about 4.5%). Over the time-period, the percentage of NEET women fluctuated much more than that of NEET men (Fig.2.5).


**Fig 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1992-2016)**



**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**



**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**




Regardless of gender, currently more than one out of four Portuguese youth aged 25-29 years old are not employed (Fig.2.6). Moreover, there has been a negative trend in employment rates over the past 16 years, especially in the case of men.


This overall rise in Portuguese youth unemployment rates is evident regardless of educational attainment (Fig. 2.7). Between 2007 and 2013 there was a more rapid increase in unemployment rates, especially among youth with the lowest educational level (from 4.8% to 26%). But since 2013 there was a notable decrease in unemployment rates, again more pronounced among youth with the lowest educational level.

Almost one third of the Portuguese youth is at risk of poverty (Fig.2.8), and the trends for both genders were quite stable until 2010. However, in 2011 the risk of poverty dropped – particularly for men – and since then has increased markedly.

**Fig. 2.7 Portugal's youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2012-2016)**




**Fig. 2.8 Portuguese youth at risk of poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being


**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender (2004-2015)**




About 50% of Portuguese men and about 40% of Portuguese women perceive their health as good or very good, and this trend is steady between 2004 and 2015 (Fig. 2.9). At the same time, in the oldest group of youth (aged 25-29) four times more woman than men reported depressive symptoms, while in younger age groups there were no such gender differences (Fig. 2.10).

The suicide rate is generally higher for men than women. (Fig. 2.11). Among women, there were moderate peaks in the suicide rate in 2003, 2007 and 2010, while among men there were evident peaks in 2002, 2004 and 2009. There is a slight overall increase in the rates for both genders.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**



**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**




## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about 42% of the Portuguese youth admitted to having consumed alcohol in the last month, about 25.5% of them smoked tobacco, and 3.5% used illegal drugs. Men tend to use these substances more than women do, and the difference is especially evident for alcohol consumption.

In 2013, there were imprisoned 30 men per hundred thousand inhabitants and 1,5 women per hundred thousand inhabitants (Fig. 2.13).

**Fig. 2.12. Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... ( 2015)**



**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2013) by gender**




### 3. What do young people in Portugal think and feel?

This section aims to provide an overview of the young Portuguese perception and evaluation about the current situation in their country, and how they feel in such context. Young people in Portugal appear satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, although most of them express distrust in political parties. The majority of young people in Portugal are dissatisfied with the national economy and employment opportunities, and have the feeling that they have been marginalized by the economic crisis. Also, they do not perceive that they are being heard, either at the national or at the European level. However, most of the Portuguese youth declare to be satisfied with their life, and hold optimistic views of their own future as well as the future of next generations in Portugal and in the EU. Also, young people in Portugal express trust in Law and Order institutions, and think that immigrants positively contribute to Portugal and that country should help refugees.

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints


##### 3.1.1 Portuguese and European situation

**Fig. 3.1. Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Portugal?**




About three quarters of young respondents are satisfied with the way democracy works in Portugal, without major gender and age differences (Fig.3.1, Fig.3.2). Unemployed youth show the highest levels of dissatisfaction (35%). (Fig.3.2).

**Fig. 3.2 Young people not satisfied with democracy in Portugal by gender, age, employment status (%)**







**Fig. 3.3 How would you rate the situation of the Portuguese economy**



**Fig. 3.4 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the Portuguese economy will be...**




**Fig. 3.5 Evaluation on the current Portuguese economy and expectations for the future by gender and age**




62% of the Portuguese youth rate negatively the Portuguese economy (Fig. 3.3) and the 75% rate negatively employment situation (Fig. 3.6). While about half of Portuguese youth think that the situation will not change in the next year, about 40% of Portuguese youth hold optimistic expectations that the economy and the employment situation will be better (Fig. 3.4, Fig. 3.7). Women and youth aged 20-24 years old are the most critical of the current economic situation, while expectations of future positive changes in the economy and employment are pretty much same regardless of gender and age (Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.8).


**Fig. 3.6 How would you rate the employment situation in Portugal?**



**Fig. 3.7 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the employment situation in Italy will be...**




**Fig. 3.8 Evaluation on the current Portuguese employment, and expectations for the future by gender and age**






**Fig. 3.9 Do you think that in Portugal the education system is adapted or not to the current world of work?**




The majority of Portuguese youth think that the education system is well (very or fairly) adapted to the needs of the labour market (Fig. 3.9), although such opinion is less prevalent among those aged 25-29 years (Fig. 3.10).

**Fig. 3.10 "The education system is well adapted to the current world of work", by age and gender**




The majority of young people in Portugal (85%) think that youth have been marginalized by the economic crises (Fig. 3.11), whereas for about 80% of them the impact of the economic crisis on the job market has already reach the peak (Fig. 3.12). Such opinion is more prevalent among those aged 25-29 years (Fig. 3.13).


**Fig. 3.11 Do you have the feeling that young people have been marginalized by the economic crisis**




**Fig. 3.12 What to you think about the impact of the economic crisis on the job market?**




**Fig. 3.13 "The impact of crisis on jobs already reached its peak", by age and gender**



**Fig. 3.14 Direction things are going in Portugal (%)**




**Fig. 3.15 Direction things are going in the EU (%)**



When asked to evaluate the direction things are going in Portugal and in Europe, almost one third of Portuguese youth think that things are going in the wrong direction, although about one quarter (or one fifth for the EU) think that things are going in right direction. However, the majority of Portuguese youth either don't know, or could not say if the direction of change is right or wrong (47% in the case of Portugal, and 51% in the case of the situation in the EU) (Fig. 3.14, Fig. 3.15)


Although the majority of Portuguese youth (43%) have positive expectations about life for the next generation in the EU, a significant portion of youth (29%) have pessimistic views (Fig. 3.16).

**Fig. 3.16 Do you think that life for the next generation in EU will be... (%)**



### 3.1.2 Perceived agency


**Fig. 3.17 "My voice counts in Portugal"**




Generally, the majority of young people living in Portugal feel that they are not being heard, either at the national or at the European level (Fig. 3.17, Fig. 3.18). However, about 40% perceive that their voices count at the national level and one third that their voices count at the EU level.

This feeling of not being heard is the same regardless of gender, while it tends to be stronger among the youngest age-group (Fig. 3.19).

**Fig. 3.18 "My voice counts in EU"**




**Fig. 3.19 "My voice does not count" by gender and age**




### 3.1.3 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.20 Are you satisfied with your life in general?**




Despite the negative evaluation of their country's situation, most of the Portuguese youth declare to be satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.20), this is mainly the case of men and the under 25s (Fig. 3.21), while satisfaction with life is less frequent among the unemployed.

**Fig. 3.21 Young people satisfied with their life by gender, age, employment status**




**Fig. 3.22 % agreement: "You have confidence in the future"**




Regardless of gender and age, more than 90% of young Portuguese are quite optimistic about the future (Fig. 3.22, Fig. 3.23).


**Fig. 3.23 Young people who have confidence in the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.24 How would you rate your personal job situation?**



**Fig. 3.25 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: your personal job situation will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.26 Evaluation on the current personal job situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




Portuguese young people seem to evaluate much better their personal current situation than the national one. Two thirds rate their personal job situation as good or very good (Fig. 3.24) and only 3% have a negative expectation about the future (Fig. 3.25). The current situation is rated highest by those aged 15-19, while the most optimistic for the future are those aged 20-24 years old. The evaluation regarding the household's financial situation displays quite similar trends (Fig. 3.27-3.29).


**Fig. 3.27 How would you rate your household financial situation?**



**Fig. 3.28 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the financial situation of your household will be...**




**Fig. 3.29 Evaluation on the current household's financial situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




## 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.30 Trust in Law & Order institutions**




**Fig. 3.31 Young people who tend to trust in Law & Order institutions, by gender and age**




Most young people express trust in Law and Order institutions (in particular: the Police and the Army) (Fig. 3.30), especially women and often the youngest (Fig. 3.31). However, youth manifest also a strong distrust in political parties (69%) and national parliament (49%). They had more trust in local public authorities (56%), and the EU (62%) (Fig. 3.32). The youngest age-group consistently appear as the least critical toward political institutions. At the same time, more men than women trust local public authorities, while more women than men trust the national parliament (Fig. 3.33).

**Fig. 3.32 Trust in political institutions**




**Fig. 3.33 Young people who tend to trust in political institutions by gender and age**



### 3.3 Opinion on social issues


**Fig. 3.34 Percentage of agreement on statements regarding migration**




The majority of youth in Portugal think that immigrants positively contribute to Portugal and that the country should help refugees (about 70%) (Fig. 3.34). These feelings are the most present among the youngest age-group (Fig. 3.35).

Talking about the EU's H2020 goals related to the environment, about half of Portuguese youth find them appropriate while almost one third of Portuguese youth think that these goals are too ambitious (Fig.3.36)

**Fig. 3.35 Young people who agree with these statements by gender and age**



**Fig. 3.36 Do you find these H2020 goals... (%)**




## 4. Engagement and Social Change


In this section we provide information about young people's social and political engagement, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement. In most of the cases, findings are based on questions regarding which forms of participation do young people think are the most effective.

### 4.1 Civic engagement

**Fig. 4.1 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - civic engagement (%)**



**Fig. 4.2 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - mentioned civic engagement by gender and age**




Civic engagement as participation in civic society organizations is not particularly popular among Portuguese youth. When asked about the best ways to participate in the public life of the EU, membership in such organization is mentioned only by 15% of the sample (Fig. 4.1). This way of civic engagement is less frequently mentioned by men than women (Fig. 4.2). Regardless of gender and age, individual actions of helping the most needy are more often mentioned (by about one quarter of the sample) as the best way of participation (Fig.4.1; Fig. 4.2).




## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Best ways of participating in the public life of EU -Formal traditional participation (%)**




For Portuguese youth joining a trade union is not considered a good way to be active in public life in Europe. At the same time, joining political party or voting in elections are considered as the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU by about one third of youth, regardless of gender (Fig. 4.3). Among the youngest age-group, voting is less considered to be one of the best ways of participating than among older age groups (Fig.4.4).

**Fig. 4.4 Voting is one of the best ways of participation, by gender and age**




## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Attend demonstrations is one of the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU - Activism**




Only 15% of the youth in Portugal recognizes the participation in demonstrations as one of the best ways to make young people's voice heard (Fig. 4.5). Women and the youngest opted a bit more for this type of political action (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.6 Attending demonstrations is one of the best ways of participation by gender and age**



## 4.4 Everyday Engagement


**Fig. 4.7 What are the most important issues you are facing at the moment? (%) [max 2 answers]**



The most important issue for about 40% of the youth in Portugal is the cost of living/prices (Fig. 4.7). Other important issues young people are facing in Portugal are work conditions, unemployment and taxation. Generally, it seems that youth in Portugal is mainly concerned with economic aspects of their lives, while issues in other spheres (e.g. Environment, Crime, Pensions, Immigration, Terrorism) are less important for them.


The majority of Portuguese youth actively include pro-environmental routines in their daily life. Almost two thirds of them sort waste, about a half reduce their use of water/energy, and 40% reduce their use of disposable items (Fig. 4.8).

**Fig. 4.8 Which of these steps have you taken personally to protect the environment?**




Based on participation in the number of different environmental-friendly actions, we can consider different levels of youth's everyday engagement (Fig. 4.9). About 1 out of 2 Portuguese youth shows a low engagement (1 or 2 actions), and a bit less of them show moderate engagement (3-5 actions), while only a few (2%) indicate high engagement (6-8 actions). Within the group of moderate/highly engaged, there are less men than women, and fewer of the youngest age--group (Fig. 4.10)

**Fig. 4.9 Engagement in environmental-friendly actions**




**Fig. 4.10 Moderate/high pro-environmental engagement by gender, age, place of living (%)**




Only a minority of Portuguese youth (less than 10%) often discuss any political matters with their friends and relatives, while about 40% do it only occasionally (Fig. 4.11). Among the young people who often discuss politics (Fig. 4.12), women and the oldest age-group appear as the most involved in such talks on national and European matters, while those aged 25-29 talk about local matters. The youngest ones almost never talk to others about politics, regardless of whether the matters are at the local, national, or European levels.

**Fig. 4.11 How often do you discuss political matters with your friends or relatives? (%)**



**Fig. 4.12 Youth who frequently discusses political matters by gender and age**



# Slovak Republic



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
Population	5.428.704
Population aged 15-29 years old	19,6%
Population aged 65 years old and above	14,5%
Birth Rate	10,3
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	3,3%

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
## 1. Standards of living in Slovak Republic<sup>12</sup>

The gross national income (GNI) in the Slovak Republic is 29910, and it is among the middle income countries within the PROMISE project (Fig.1.1). Also, 9% of the labour force is currently unemployed (Fig.1.3). Due to unfriendly regulations, doing business in the Slovak Republic is not easy (Fig.1.2). The perceived corruption is not high (Fig.1.4), but the Government effectiveness is rated as relatively low (Fig.1.5) in comparison to other PROMISE countries.


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**



<sup>12</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




The Freedom House evaluates the freedom of the press through 23 methodology questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. These include measurements of the robustness of political news, the safety of journalists, the extent of state intrusion in media affairs, and an evaluation of any onerous legal or economic pressures the press are subject to. According to these criteria, the Slovakian press is reasonably free (26) and on a par with many of the other PROMISE countries (Fig.1.6).


Slovakia is also among those with the biggest gender gap (0,694, Fig.1.7) and ranks at the 74th position out of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017.

The Slovak Republic has a low share of the population achieving tertiary-level qualifications (22%) (Fig.1.8), but the percentage of internet users is relatively high (80,5%) (Fig.1.9).


**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**



**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**




## 2. Being young in Slovak Republic

### 2.1 Demographic situation


Since 1950, the share of youth aged 15 - 24 in the Slovak Republic has dropped from 18% to 12%, while the share of people aged 65 years and over has increased from 7% to 14% (Fig.2.1).

The percentage of young people aged 18-24 living with their parents in the Slovak Republic is very high (more than 90%), and was stable between 2005 and 2016. On the other hand, the share of young people aged 25-29 living with their parents has risen over time, from 58% in 2005 to 72% in 2016 (Fig.2.2).

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Slovak Republic  
1950-2015: proportion of people aged 15-24  
years old vs 65 years old and more**




**Fig. 2.2. Percent of young people (18-29 years old)  
living with parents 2005-2016**



## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Slovak Republic

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




There has been an increase in the percentage of young people completing tertiary education in the Slovak Republic between 2004 and 2016. The share of youth with a tertiary education steadily increased, especially among women. Today more than 40% of the women between 25-29 years old have a university degree in comparison to 27,5% of men (Fig.2.3).


The percentage of young people who are early leavers from education has been quite stable since 2002, and during the whole analysed period is less than 10% (Fig.2.4).

Over time, the share of young women and men who are not in employment, education or training (NEET) is quite stable, and in general, it is much higher among women than men (14%, vs. 3%, Fig.2.5).

**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (2002-2016)**




**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**





**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**




More than 60% of women and 80% of men aged 25-29 are currently employed in the Slovak Republic (Fig.2.6). In the period from 2002 to 2016 employment rates for both women and men steadily increased (Fig.2.6).


In the same period, young people with the lowest education were the most affected by unemployment; in 2016 almost 50% of them were unemployed (Fig.2.7). Among those with secondary and tertiary education the unemployment rate is much lower (around 10% in 2016). The unemployment rate among young people who had completed secondary education declined between 2002 and 2016, while among those with tertiary education it remained quite stable (Fig.2.7).

Regardless of gender, the risk of poverty or exclusion declined between 2005 and 2013, and currently one fifth of Slovakian youth are at risk of poverty (Fig.2.8).

**Fig. 2.7 Slovakian youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2000-2016)**




**Fig. 2.8 Slovakian youth at risk of poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2005-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being

**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2005-2015)**




Slovakian youth who perceive their health as good or very good increased from about 53% in 2005 to about 66% in 2015. This increase was similar among women and men (Fig. 2.9).


In 2014, there were no reported depressive symptoms among the youngest ones, while among older age groups around 2% of men and women reported experiencing current depressive symptoms.

Between 2002 and 2010 the suicide rate per hundred thousand inhabitants (Fig. 2.11) was quite stable among women, while among men the suicide rate declined from 20 to 15. Generally, this rate is approximately four times higher among men than among women.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**



**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**




## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about 63% of Slovak youth reported having drunk alcohol in the last month, about 35% of them smoked tobacco, and 6,5% used illegal drugs. Men in comparison to women were heavier users of all substances.

Between 2009 and 2015 the numbers of male juvenile prisoners decreased from 28 to 17, while numbers remained steady for women at 0,6 (Fig. 2.13). Generally, the rate of juvenile prisoners is much higher for young men than for young women.

**Fig. 2.12. Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... ( 2015)**



**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2010-2015) by gender**




### 3. What do young people in the Slovak Republic think and feel?

This section aims to provide an overview of young Slovaks' perception and evaluation about the current situation in their country and how they feel in such context. Youth in the Slovak Republic are mainly dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country. They rate the national economy and employment situation negatively, and the majority think the economic situation will stay the same in the future. Additionally, the majority think that Slovakian youth have been, at least in some way, marginalized by economic crises. More than half think that the impact of the economic crisis on the job market has already reached its peak. Also, half of them think that the education system in the Slovak Republic is not very well adapted to the real needs of the labour market, and feel pessimistic regarding the direction things are heading in both the Slovak Republic and in Europe. Young people in the Slovak Republic express trust in the army but about half express distrust in the police, as well as in the justice system. The majority of young people in the Slovak Republic do not trust political parties and national parliament, but about half do trust the local public authorities and the EU. Youth in the Slovak Republic mostly perceive that their voice is heard at the national but not at the European level. The large majority of Slovakian youth don't think that immigrants positively contribute to the Slovak Republic, or that they should help refugees. Despite, in general, presenting a critical evaluation of the Slovakian context, young people appear quite satisfied with their personal lives, and are optimistic about their personal futures.


#### 3.1.1 Slovak and European situation

**Fig. 3.1. Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Slovak Republic?**




About half of young respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the Slovak Republic (Fig.3.1). Those who are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the Slovak Republic are more frequently men than women and youth from older age groups than the youngest age group (15-19 years) (Fig.3.2).


**Fig. 3.2 Young people not satisfied with democracy in Slovak Republic by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.3 How would you rate the situation of the Slovak economy**



**Fig. 3.4 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the Slovak economy will be...**




**Fig. 3.5 Evaluation on the current Slovak economy and expectations for the future by gender and age**




More than two thirds of Slovak youth rate the national economy and employment situation negatively (64%, 69% respectively, Fig. 3.3, Fig. 3.6). Such negative evaluations are more characteristic for youth in the older age groups (20-24; 25-29) than the younger one, and among men then among women (Fig.3.5, Fig.3.8). While half of Slovak youth think that the economic and employment situation will not change in the next year, more than one third are optimistic in this regard (Fig. 3.4, Fig. 3.7). Young people aged 15-19 appear the most optimistic about a positive change regarding the country's economic and employment situation (Fig. 3.5, Fig.3.8).


**Fig. 3.6 How would you rate the employment situation in Slovak Republic?**




**Fig. 3.7 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the employment situation in Slovakia will be..**



**Fig. 3.8 Evaluation on the current Slovak employment, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.9 Do you think that in Slovak Republic the education system is adapted or not to the current world of work? (%)**




Regardless of gender and age, around 50% of Slovak youth consider that the education system in the Slovak Republic is not adapted to the needs of the labour market (Fig. 3.9, Fig. 3.10).

**Fig. 3.10 "The education system is not well adapted to the current world of work", by gender and age**




Around two thirds of Slovak youth express the feeling that young people in the Slovak Republic have been, at least to some extent, marginalized by the economic crisis (Fig.3.11). At the same time, more than half think that the impact of the economic crisis on the job market has already reached its peak (Fig. 3.12). Such opinion is less characteristic for men and those aged 15-19 years (Fig. 3.13).


**Fig. 3.11 Do you have the feeling that young people have been marginalized by the economic crisis (%)**




**Fig. 3.12 What do you think about the impact of the economic crisis on the job market?**



**Fig. 3.13 "The impact of crisis on jobs already reached its peak", by age, gender, and place of living**




**Fig. 3.14 Direction things are going in Slovak Republic (%)**




About half of Slovakian youth are pessimistic regarding the direction things are heading in the Slovak Republic and in Europe, and less than 20% is optimistic about the direction taken by their country and in the EU (Fig.3.14, Fig.3.15). However, one third of Slovak youth was indecisive about the direction to which things are going at the national, and EU level.

Also, one third of Slovakian youth has negative expectations about the life of the future generation in the EU, and around 40% think that the situation for the next generation will not change much (Fig. 3.16).

**Fig. 3.15 Direction things are going in the EU (%)**




**Fig. 3.16 Do you think that life for the next generation in EU will be... (%)**




### 3.1.2 Perceived agency

**Fig. 3.17 "My voice counts in Slovak Republic"**




While around 60% of young people living in the Slovak Republic perceive their voices to be heard at the national level (59%), fewer people believe that they are heard at the European level (43%) (Fig. 3.17, Fig. 3.18). The opinion that youth voice counts at the national, as well as at the EU level, is less characteristic for women than men, and least likely to be expressed by the youngest ones (Fig. 3.19).

**Fig. 3.18 "My voice counts in EU"**




**Fig. 3.19 "My voice counts" by gender and age**






### 3.1.3 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.20 Are you satisfied with your life in general?**




Despite the negative evaluation of their country's situation, most Slovakian youth declare to be satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.20). While there are no gender and age differences in life satisfaction, satisfaction with life is less likely to be expressed by the unemployed (Fig. 3.21).

**Fig. 3.21 Young people satisfied with their life by gender, age, employment status**




**Fig. 3.22 Percentage agreement: "You have confidence in the future"**




More than two thirds of youth in the Slovak Republic are quite optimistic about the future (Fig. 3.22), and there are no differences regarding gender (Fig.3.23). This confidence in the future is the most characteristic for youth aged 15-19 years (Fig. 3.23).


**Fig. 3.23 Young people who have confidence in the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.24 How would you rate your personal job situation?**



**Fig. 3.25 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: your personal job situation will be...**




**Fig. 3.26 Evaluation on the current personal job situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




Around two thirds of youth in the Slovak Republic rate their personal job situation and the household's financial situation as good or very good (Fig. 3.24, Fig.3.27). The majority of young people consider that their personal job situation, as well as household financial situation will be the same in the near future (41%) or even better (33% job, 42%, household) while only a minority has pessimistic expectations regarding their personal job situations (13%) or household situation (14%, Fig.3.25, Fig.3.28). Positive evaluations of current and future situations are more characteristic for women and the youngest age group (Fig. 3.26, Fig.3.29).


**Fig. 3.27 How would you rate your household financial situation?**



**Fig. 3.28 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the financial situation of your household will be...**




**Fig. 3.29 Evaluation on the current household's financial situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




## 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.30 Trust in Law & Order institutions**




**Fig. 3.31 Young people who tend to trust in Law & Order institutions, by gender and age**




Among Law and Order institutions young people most frequently express trust in the army (59%), while about half express distrust in the police, as well as in the justice system (Fig. 3.30). Young people aged 25-29 appear to be the most critical of national Law and Order institutions, (Fig.3.31), while trust in Law and Order institutions is more characteristic for women than men (Fig.3.31). The majority of young people in the Slovak Republic do not trust political parties or the national parliament. Nevertheless, about half of young people trust the local public authorities and the EU (Fig. 3.32). Youth aged 25-29 appear to be the most critical towards all political institutions, while trust in political parties, local public authorities and the EU is more characteristic for women than men (Fig. 3.33).

**Fig. 3. 32 Trust in political institutions**




**Fig. 3.33 Young people who tend to trust in political institutions by gender and age**




### 3.3 Opinion on social issues

**Fig. 3.34. % of agreement on statements regarding migration**




**Fig. 3.35 Young people who agree with these statements by gender and age**



The large majority of Slovakian youth (around 70%) don't think that immigrants positively contribute to the Slovak Republic or that their country should help refugees (Fig. 3.34). Both those views are more characteristic for men than women (Fig.3.35).

Talking about the EU H2020 goals related to the environment, about half of Slovakian young people support these goals, while one fifth consider them too ambitious (Fig.3.36).

**Fig. 3.36 Do you find these H2020 goals... (%)**




## 4. Engagement and Social Change


In this section we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in the Slovak Republic. We adopt the concept of social and political engagement, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism and everyday engagement. In most of these cases questions are related to which forms of participation young people think are the most effective.

### 4.1 Civic engagement

**Fig. 4.1 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - civic engagement**




**Fig. 4.2 Young people who says that individual help of the most needy is one of the best way of participation by gender and age**



When asked about the best ways to participate in the public life of the EU, less than 20% of youth in the Slovak Republic mentioned membership of civic organizations, while about one third mentioned individual actions of helping the most needy (Fig. 4.1). There are no gender or age differences among youth in the Slovak Republic who consider joining civic associations as one of the best ways of participating in society (Fig.4.2). However, fewer men and fewer older respondents (25-29 years old) think that offering individual help to the most needy is the best way of participating in public life in the EU (Fig. 4.2).


## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Best ways of participating in the public life of EU -Formal traditional participation (%)**




One third of Slovakian youth, regardless of gender, think that voting is still one of the best ways of participating (Fig. 4.3, Fig. 4.4). This opinion is less prevalent among the youngest age group (Fig.4.4). Additionally, a small proportion think that joining a political party (10%) or a trade union (7%) are one of the best ways of participation (Fig.4.3).

**Fig. 4.4 Voting is one of the best ways of participation, by gender and age**




## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Attend demonstrations is one of the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU - Activism**




Only 13% of young people in the Slovak Republic mentioned participation in demonstrations as one of the best ways to make young people's voice heard (Fig. 4.5). This belief is less widespread among women and those 25-29 years old (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.6 Attending demonstrations is one of the best ways of participation by gender and age**



## 4.4 Everyday Engagement


**Fig. 4.7 What are the most important issues you are facing at the moment? (%) [max 2 answers]**



The most important issue for a quarter of young people in the Slovak Republic is the cost of living/ rising prices (Fig. 4.7). Other important issues faced by young people in the Slovak Republic include the education system, housing, financial situation in the household, living conditions, health and social security, and working conditions. Generally, it seems that young people are much less concerned with the general economic situation in the Slovak Republic and other social issues such as the environment, pensions, immigration, taxation, crime and terrorism.


The majority of Slovakian youth actively participate in daily life pro-environmental routines to protect their environment (Fig.4.8). Most of them sort waste (67%), have reduced their use of water/energy (48%), and have reduced their use of disposable items (41%) (Fig. 4.8).

**Fig. 4.8 Which of these steps have you taken personally to protect the environment?**




In general, Slovakian youth express little engagement with environment issues (Fig. 4.9). About one half shows low engagement (1-2 actions), just less than a half shows moderate engagement (3-5 actions), while high engagement (6-8 actions) is characteristic for only a few (3%). Moderate/high engagement is more characteristic for women and for the older age group (Fig. 4.10).

**Fig. 4.9 Engagement in environmental-friendly actions**




**Fig. 4.10 Moderate/high pro-environmental engagement by gender, age, place of living (%)**




Discussion of political matters is not very present in Slovakian youth conversation with their friends or relatives (Fig. 4.11). Only about 10% of youth discuss such matters frequently, and about half do it only occasionally. They equally often talk about local, national and European matters. Among the young people who often discuss politics, men are more involved than women in such talks on European matters, while the older ones talk more about national matters (Fig. 4.12).

**Fig. 4.11 How often do you discuss political matters with your friends or relatives?**



**Fig. 4.12 Youth who frequently discusses political matters by gender and age**





# Finland




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
Population	5.495.096
Population aged 15-29 years old	18.1%
Population aged 65 years old and above	20.8%
Birth Rate	10.1
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	5.7%

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
## 1. Standards of living in Finland<sup>13</sup>

Finland has sometimes been tagged as the “sick man of Europe”. However, the country seems to be slowly recovering from the global financial crisis of 2008-2010. In Finland, the gross national income (GNI) was 43800 (Fig. 1.1) in 2016 and unemployment rate remained at 8.6% in 2017 (Fig. 1.3). However, in 2017, the Finnish economy was still smaller than it was in 2008 despite the fact that regulations are rated as business-friendly (Fig. 1.2), the level of corruption is perceived as low (Fig. 1.4) and government effectiveness is rated highly (Fig. 1.5).


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP  
(current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index  
(1=most business-friendly regulations),  
2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of  
total labor force) (modeled ILO  
estimate), 2017**



**Fig 1.4 Corruption Perception Index -  
Transparency International (1 to 100;  
1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig 1.5 Government Effectiveness:  
Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very  
low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>13</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




The Freedom House evaluates the freedom of the press through 23 methodology questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. Finland was categorised as “free”, as it received 4 points out of 30 in each category (Fig. 1.6). Finland also ranks high in the Global Gender Gap Index for gender equality (Fig. 1.7). The share of people with tertiary education is among the highest in the EU at 43.1% (Fig. 1.8) and almost 9 people out of 10 use the internet (Fig. 1.9).


**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**



**Fig. 1.8 % of people with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**




## 2. Being young in Finland – young people’s condition in Finland

### 2.1 Demographic situation


Finland is an aging country. The proportion of young people among the whole population rose between 1960 and 1970 when the so-called baby boomers, who were born between 1945 and 1949, reached adolescence (Fig. 2.1). After that the birth rates have shown a steady downward trend. In the 1990s, the share of people aged 65 or more, surpassed that of youth aged 15-29, and the number of older people was nearly double that of the young by 2015.

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Finland, 1950 -2015:**  
proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years old and more




The ideal of (individual) independence is highly valued in Finland. Compared to other EU countries, young people leave home early, at the age of 20 (women) or 21 (men) on average (see Deliverable D3.1). So, while nearly half of 18 to 24-year-olds still live with their parents, the share of young people who still live with their parents drops dramatically to 6-7% for the 25 to 29 age group (Fig. 2.2).

**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old)**  
living with parents 2004-2016




## 2.2 Education & Labour market

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




In Finland, the share of young people with tertiary education is high and has been consistent throughout the past decade: around 43% of women and 27% of men have a university degree (Fig. 2.3). Overall, the share of early leavers from education and training (Fig. 2.4), and of young people aged 15-29 not in employment, education or training (NEET) (Fig. 2.5) have not changed much over the past decades. While the share of young women who left the education and training system early decreased from 10.8 in 1996 to 6.9 in 2016, the share of NEET young men increased from 3.7 to 5.6 between 2004 and 2016.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1996-2016)**




**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**




**Fig 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**



**Fig. 2.7 Young people at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**




**Fig. 2.8 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2000-2016)**




In 2008, the share of youth in employment was 84.4 and 73.7 for men and women respectively (Fig. 2.6). By 2017, the Finnish economy still had not recovered from the global financial crisis of 2008-2010. Young people with lower levels of education (levels 0-2) were affected particularly hard by the crisis: the unemployment rate of young people with lower levels of education rose from 10.8 to 18.4 between 2008 and 2010, and the share of unemployed youth with lower levels of education grew further between 2013 and 2015 from 17.6 to 23.1% (Fig. 2.8). The share of young people at risk of poverty or exclusion has remained around 20% since 2004 for both young men and women (Fig. 2.7).

## 2.3 Health, well-being, and risk of marginalization


**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender (2004-2015)**



**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**



**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**




According to their self-report, a little more than two thirds of both young men and women in Finland perceive their health as good or very good (Fig. 2.9). Around 4% of young people aged between 15 and 19 years reported to have depressive symptoms, but the share was almost double that among older age groups (from 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 years) (Fig. 2.10). Compared to young people in other PROMISE project countries, suicide rates have been very high among Finnish and Estonian young men: in both countries it was around 30 per 100 000 inhabitants between 2000 and 2010 (Fig. 2.11). Crude death rate among young women has been lower at around 10 per 100 000 inhabitants.

## 2.4 Use of substances and crime


Compared to other EU countries, drug abuse in Finland is below average. In 2015, 3% of young women and 8.6% of young men reported to have used illegal drugs in the last month (Fig. 2.12). While for illegal drug use the difference between two genders is nearly threefold, there was almost no difference in the share of young people who reported to have consumed alcohol in the last month (57.7 and 58.5% among young men and women respectively)

The share of juvenile prisoners is considerably higher among young men than women: between 2008 and 2015, around 15 young men and 1 woman per 100 000 inhabitants were imprisoned (Fig. 2.13).

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... (2015)**



**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2008-2015) by gender**







### 3. What do young people in Finland think and feel?

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints

**Fig. 3.1 Perception of social climate**




**Fig. 3.2 State of services**




Young people in Finland perceive the social climate as positive or neutral (Fig. 3.1): they believe that most people are helpful, try to be fair and can be trusted. They also feel that the state of education and healthcare is good (Fig. 3.2), and are satisfied with the way democracy works in the country (Fig. 3.4). Around one third of young people in Finland are also satisfied with the economy and the government. More than 90% of 15-29-year-olds also feel safe to walk alone in the local area after dark (Fig. 3.3). More people among women, adolescents and young adults, those who are economically disadvantaged and living in big cities, suburbs or smaller cities admitted to feeling unsafe compared to others.

**Fig. 3.3 Feeling unsafe to walk alone in local area after dark by gender, age, economic condition and place of residence**




**Fig. 3.4 Satisfaction with ...**




### 3.1.1 Finland's situation

### 3.1.2 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.4a Satisfaction with life**




**Fig 3.5 Self-reported happiness**



A vast majority of young people in Finland feel satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.4a) and happy (Fig. 3.5) (approx. 88%). There is not any noticeable difference between genders, but people in the youngest age group (15-19 years old), those whose economic condition is good, and young people living in a country village or countryside, are more satisfied with their life and are feeling happier than their counterparts (Fig. 3.6).


The ongoing migration from rural to urban areas limits educational and leisure-time opportunities for young people in places with diminishing population, “forcing” families to move to bigger cities, even despite having strong emotional ties to rural areas (see Deliverable D3.1). However, the share of young people who are happy and satisfied with their lives, is the highest among those who remain at the countryside (97.6% and 96.3% respectively).

**Fig. 3.6 Satisfaction with life and happiness by gender, age, economic condition and place of residence**



### 3.2 Relation with authority


**Fig. 3.7 Opinion on the inclusiveness of the political system by gender, age, economic condition and place of residence**




Nearly half (49%) of young people in Finland believe that the political system is not very inclusive: that the system allows people to have a say in what the government does, only very little or not at all. Nearly one third (30.5%) also believe that people have very little or no influence on politics. Young men, 15-19-year-olds, economically well-off and young people living in big cities believe that the political system is more inclusive than their counterparts (Fig. 3.7).

The majority (72.8%) of young people in Finland have high trust in the law and order institutions (the legal system and the police) (Fig. 3.8) and the share of young people who trust these institutions remains rather constant among different sub-groups (Fig. 3.9). On the other hand, only 27.2% of young people in Finland have high trust in political institutions (the parliament, politicians, political parties and the European Parliament). Trust in political institutions is also significantly lower among older age-groups (20-24 and 25-29-year-olds).

**Fig. 3.8 Trust in political and law & order institutions**




**Fig. 3.9 High trust in political and law & order institutions by gender and age**




### 3.3 Opinion on social issues


**Fig. 3.10 Opinion on the occurrence of climate change**



**Fig. 3.11 Opinion on the factors causing climate change**




**Fig. 3.12 Opinion on causes of climate change by gender, age and place of residence**



Nearly all (95%) young people in Finland believe that the climate is changing (Fig. 3.10). Majority of young people (64%) also believe that climate change is caused entirely or mainly by human activity (Fig. 3.11). More than 10% of young men, 25-29-year-olds and young people living in big cities believe that climate change is caused entirely by human activity (Fig. 3.12).


**Fig. 3.13 Opinion on equality and social inclusion by gender, age and economic condition**




Finland has relatively strong equality legislation and gender equality ideals were intertwined with the welfare project from its early days (see Deliverable D3.1). This can be seen in high levels of agreement with statements regarding equality and social inclusion: approximately 90% of young people in Finland - and 100% of young people in poor economic conditions who participated in the survey - disagree with the statement that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce (Fig. 3.13). Also nearly 90% of young people in Finland believe that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. The statement that for a fair society differences in the standard of living should be smaller, received less support – from 65% of young people in Finland.

73% of young people in Finland also see that immigrants enrich the cultural life of the country (Fig. 3.14). However, only about one third (36 and 38%) believe that migration is good for the economy and that immigrants make Finland a better place to live.

**Fig. 3.14 Opinion on immigrants and migration, by gender, economic condition and place of residence**




**Fig. 3.15 Opinion on migration**



Immigration on a larger scale started at the beginning of the 1990s and intensified the discussions concerning multiculturalism, racism and the “ethos of equality” (see Deliverable D3.1). Despite a surge in xenophobic and social-conservative party politics, young people in Finland seem to be rather welcoming of immigrants as more than 60% of young people would allow many or some immigrants to come and live in Finland (Fig. 3.15).

73% of young people in Finland also believe that granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members to the country (Fig. 3.16). The share of those who support more generosity in judging asylum applications was lower, as was the share of those who disagree with the statement that asylum seekers are not in real fear of persecution in their own countries.

**Fig. 3.16 Opinion on refugees by gender and age**




## 4. Engagement and social change (What do young people do?)


### 4.1 Civic engagement

The younger generation's lack of interest towards (party) politics and societal activities is a recurrent concern in Finland (see Deliverable D3.1). More than one third of young people (35.2%) in Finland feel that they take part in social activities less than their peers (Fig. 4.1). However, nearly one third (31.6%) have taken part in voluntary work in a civil society organisation or association during the last year.

**Fig 4.1 Taking part in social activities**




**Fig. 4.2 Worked in a civil society organisation or association in the last 12 months**




### 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Voting in last national election**




**Fig. 4.4 Would vote for Finland to remain member of the European Union or leave**





**Fig. 4.5 Formal political participation**




Political activity (voting and interest towards party politics) among young people in Finland has decreased significantly in the last half century (see Deliverable D3.1). Nearly one quarter of young people (almost one third of those eligible to vote) in Finland did not vote in the last national election (Fig. 4.3). 1.7% of young people worked in a political party or action group and 9% contacted a politician or government official in the last year (Fig. 4.5).

Majority of young people in Finland feel positive about the country being a part of the European Union and would vote for Finland to remain in the EU (Fig. 4.4).


### 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.6 Activism**



Political activism (signing petitions, taking part in lawful demonstrations) is not very common in Finland. More than 40% of young people had signed a petition during the last year (Fig. 4.6). Women, older age groups (20-24 and 25-29-years old) and those whose economic condition is not good were more likely to do so (Fig. 4.7). However, only 6% of young people took part in a lawful public demonstration during the last year, which could be partly explained by relatively high satisfaction with the economy and the government (see part 3.1.1) or the belief that people have very little or no influence on politics (see part 3.2).

**Fig. 4.7 Signed a petition in the last 12 months , by gender, age and economic condition**






#### 4.4 Everyday engagement


Similarly to political participation, interest in party politics has declined among young people in Finland since the 1950s. According to self-report, nearly half (49.5%) of young people are quite or very interested in politics (Fig. 4.8). However, in rural areas, share of those who are interested in politics, is considerably lower.

**Fig. 4.8 Interest in politics: share of quite or very interested, by gender, age and place of residence**




Majority of young people in Finland are concerned about climate change, especially women, younger age group (15-19-year-olds) and young people living in big cities (Fig. 4.9). More than half of young people in Finland also feel personal responsibility to reduce climate change and more than two out of three would take steps to accomplish that: buy the most energy efficient home appliance and do things to reduce energy use (Fig. 4.10).


**Fig. 4.9 Concern about climate change, by gender, age and place of residence**



**Fig. 4.10 Taking action against climate change: share of people who ...**




**Fig. 4.11 Consumer participation and life-style**



Around one third of young people in Finland (37% and 35% respectively) have boycotted certain products, and posted or shared something about politics online in the last year (Fig. 4.11). Wearing campaign badges and stickers is not particularly popular – a quarter of young people had done that in the last year. Doing those things is more popular among older age group (25-29-year-olds) compared to the younger ones, and women compared to men.

The majority of young people spend between 11 minutes and 1 hour following news about politics and current affairs (Fig. 4.12). The share of those who spend more than one hour a day following news is highest among young men, and people in the oldest age group (25-29-year-olds).

**Fig. 4.12 Time spent in a day to follow news about politics and current affairs, by gender and age**



# Estonia




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Population	1.316.481
Population aged 15-29 years old	17,9%
Population aged 65 years old and above	19,2%
Birth Rate	10,6
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	15,4%

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
## 1. Standards of living in Estonia<sup>14</sup>

Estonia's economic situation is still suffering from the 2008 crisis juxtaposed to a long period of political instability.


The gross national income (GNI) is 28920 but 7,3% of the labor force is currently unemployed.

Estonia is a business-friendly country, although it has a perceived high corruption index.


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>14</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




**Fig 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures.” According to these criteria, Estonia’s press is relatively free (16). Estonia’s Gender Gap Index is 0,73 with 1 meaning highest possible gender equality.

Estonia has a high share of population with tertiary education (38,9%) and internet users (87,2%).

**Fig. 1.8 Percentage of people with tertiary education (25-64 years old), (in 2016)**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), (in 2016)**




## 2. Being young in Estonia

### 2.1 Demographic situation

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were more people aged 15-24 than aged 65 or over living in Estonia. As in many European countries, this pattern was overturned in about 1995, due to both a fall in the number of young people and also an increase in the number of older people.


**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Estonia 1950-2015: proportion of people aged 15-24 years old vs 65 years old and more**



Source: UNDP - World Population Prospects, the 2017 Revision

The percentage of young people living with their parents has remained fairly steady since 2005, with a slight fall in the number of those aged 25-29 living with their parents.


**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2005-2016**



Source: Eurostat 2018


## 2.2 Education & Labour market

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




In Estonia, tertiary education amongst women (aged 25-29) has been higher than men for many years (Fig. 2.3). By 2016, the number of women with tertiary education was double that of men: 26% of men and 50% of women had achieved that level of education. Whilst young men drop out of education more frequently in general, (Fig. 2.4), the share of those with NEET status is higher amongst girls (Fig. 2.5). This may be related to women giving up work as well as education when having children. There are about 4-5% of young men with NEET status, 3% in 2016, whilst the proportion of women with the same status reached 16%, but levels have remained relatively steady, with minor fluctuations, over the years since 2004.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1999-2016)**




**Fig. 2.5 Estonia - Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**




**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)**



**Fig. 2.7 Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)**



**Fig. 2.8 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**



The majority of young people aged 25-29 have started work: 86% of men and 65% of women. Women's lower participation rate may again be related to having children (the average age of women giving birth to the first child is 28,0 years).

Between 2006-2009 less than 20% of young people were on the borderline of poverty/exclusion, this increased to 25% after the global economic crisis, and decreased to 22% in 2013; the gap between two genders is minimal.

Fig. 2.8 demonstrates that unemployment threatens youngsters with lower level of education more than those with upper- or post-secondary and tertiary education. It is encouraging to see that the unemployment rates for the the two groups with non-tertiary education have reduced steadily since 2010.




## 2.3 Health and Well-being

Half of Estonian young people consider their health to be good/very good, with men judging their health more highly (Fig. 2.9).


Females, and younger females in particular, experience symptoms of depression more than males (Fig. 2.10). After their 25<sup>th</sup> birthday, men overtake women in such complaints.

Crude death rate is much higher amongst men (Fig. 2.11).

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**




**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)**



## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime

**Fig. 2.12 - Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... ( 2015)**




The most common substance used by young people is alcohol. Men between 15-29 years of age consume all substances (in the survey) more than women (Fig. 2.12).


Young men make up the majority of juvenile prisoners (Fig. 2.13).

In 2010, police, the border guard and migration services merged resulting in a considerable increase in the number of police personnel (Fig. 2.14).

**Fig. 2.13 - Juvenile Prisoners Per hundred thousand inhabitants (2008-2015) by gender**



**Fig. 2.14 - Total Police Personnel at the National Level , Rate per 100.000 inhabitants**



### 3. What do young people think in Estonia?

The following part of the overview is based on the data from the European Social Survey. 20% of the respondents from the Estonian sample (364 in total) have a migratory background, 51% were employed and 37% in education, whilst 5% were unemployed. 23% of the young live in the countryside, 35% in larger towns and 41% in suburban areas or small towns. 93% of the respondents do not consider themselves to belong to any group discriminated against in the country.


The level of education of the youth is as follows: the majority of the young people have upper secondary education (58%), 31.3% have lower secondary or advanced vocational education, 5.5% have tertiary education and 5.2% have less than lower secondary education. Most of the Estonian young people consider their economic situation to fit the description „coping“ (55,8%). 29.2% consider themselves to live „comfortably“, and 15% find their lives to be „difficult“ in these terms.

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints


##### 3.1.1 Estonia's situation

Young people's satisfaction with the situation they are living in can be gleaned from their judgement on the economy, government and democracy, although their satisfaction is the lowest regarding the work of the government. Their replies indicate that they are mostly satisfied with the practice of democracy in the state.


**Fig. 3.1 Economy**



**Fig. 3.2 Government**




**Fig. 3.3 Democracy**




Those finding themselves in a difficult economic situation are the least satisfied; but also, twice the number of men (23%) than women (12%) are dissatisfied. Those whose level of education is either lower secondary/advanced vocational or upper secondary are more dissatisfied, whilst those with tertiary education are rarely dissatisfied. Those whose economic situation is difficult are also more negative about the social climate, safety and personal wellbeing.


**Fig. 3.4 'Rather / Very much satisfied'**




**Fig. 3.5 'Not satisfied' - by education**



**Fig. 3.6 'Not satisfied' - by background**




**Fig. 3.7 'Not satisfied' - by income**




### 3.1.1.1 Social climate

Young people were asked to assess the social climate in their country by choosing (i) whether they felt that most people can be trusted, or needed to be careful; (ii) that most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair; (iii) that people mostly look out for themselves, or try to be helpful. Based on those responses, a score was calculated on whether the social climate was seen as positive or negative. The majority - 78% - of respondents came out as neutral; 16% tended to judge the social climate as more positive than negative. Those with migration background had more negative views (13,5%), whilst those with no such background veered towards more positive views (17,2%). Other characteristics (economic status, place of living, education or belonging to a discriminated group) had no effect on those assessments.

**Fig. 3.8 Social climate**




**Fig. 3.9 Social climate perceived as tending to be negative**




### 3.1.1.2 Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark

Estonian youth judge safety to be high in their community; 81% of the young feel safe. The main feature that increased the feelings of lack of safety was the economic status of the young person: 46% of those in a difficult financial situation did not feel safe. Also, living in a larger town lessens feelings of safety, and 25% of the inhabitants of such places did not feel safe. 70% of the members of discriminated groups felt safe.

**Fig. 3.10 Feeling 'safe' - by migration background**




**Fig. 3.11 Feeling 'unsafe' - by financial circumstances**




### 3.1.3 Personal situation

Most Estonian youth are satisfied with their lives, with no major difference between genders, migration background or place of living. The most satisfied young people being those with a tertiary education, and the least satisfied being the unemployed and those living in difficult financial situations.


**Fig. 3.12 Unhappy - by gender**




**Fig. 3.13 Unhappy - by background**




**Fig. 3.16 Unhappy - by income**




**Fig. 3.17 Unhappy - by place of living**



**Fig. 3.14 Unhappy - by education**




**Fig. 3.15 Unhappy - by employment status**




## 3.2 Relation with Authority

Only 11-13% of Estonian young people trust the politicians and political parties. European Parliament is the most trusted political institution. Although the young have considerable trust in police (65%), the legal system deserves somewhat less (52%) trust. Men and those not from a discriminated group report higher trust.

**Fig. 3.18 High Trust in Institutions**




**Fig. 3.19 High Trust in Law&Order**




### 3.2.3 Trust in Institutions

Young people with lower education and better economic status have greater trust in politicians, although those with lower education, on the other hand, do not believe that the existing political system allows people to have influence on politics. The reason for such views may combine lack of knowledge on how to influence politics with an adequate assessment of earlier experiences, as well as the lack of political, economic and social capital for participating in politics in a meaningful and impactful way.


**Fig. 3.20 High Trust in Legal System Institutions - by socio-demographics**




**Fig. 3.21 High Trust in the Police**




**Fig. 3.22 High Trust in the Police**




**Fig. 3.23 High Trust in Parliament**



**Fig. 3.24 High Trust in Politicians**




**Fig. 3.25 High Trust in the European Parliament**




### 3.2.4 Perceived agency


**Fig. 3.26 Political systems perceived as allowing people to have influence**




**Fig. 3.27 Political system perceived as allowing very little or no influence**




**Fig. 3.28 Young people's opinion about political system...**




**Fig. 3.29 Political system that allow people to have a say in what government does**



**Fig. 3.30 Political systems that allow people to have a say in what government does**



**Fig. 3.31 Political systems that allow very little / no say ...**






### 3.3 Opinions on Social Issues


#### 3.3.3 Thoughts about climate change

Only a very small number of the young do not think climate change is happening (7%). 47% consider this to be mostly or only caused by human activity and 43% think that changes are caused by both human activities and natural alterations.


**Fig. 3.32 Do you think world's climate is changing**




**Fig. 3.33 The "world's climate is definitely changing", by gender, migration background, place of living**



**Fig. 3.34 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (%)**




**Fig. 3.35 "Climate change caused mainly by human activity", by gender, migration background, place of living**




### 3.3.4 Thoughts about equality

Whilst overall, there is a general agreement that men and women should be treated fairly on the job market, 10% of the young agree or agree strongly that “Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce”. Many more women (86%) disagree with this statement than men (69%).

**Fig. 3.36 Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce**




**Fig. 3.37 Tend to disagree with "men should have more right to job than women when job are scarce"**




One third of the respondents could not decide whether they agreed or not with the statement “for a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small”. However, 44% of the young agreed or agreed strongly, and 26% disagreed or disagreed strongly.

**Fig. 3.38 For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small**




**Fig. 3.39 Tend to agree with "for fair society, differences in standard of living should be smaller"**




Tolerance towards gays and lesbians is notably higher amongst women and in towns/suburban areas. Only 12% of the youth disagree that gay/lesbian people should be able to live as they wish.

**Fig. 3.40 Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish**




**Fig. 3.41 Agree with "gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish"**




### 3.3.5 Thoughts about immigration

The topic of immigration has also left many young people unclear about its effects on the country – 47% have no opinion on whether immigration is bad or good for the country. The rest are divided almost equally between the view that immigration is good for the country's economy (27%) or bad (26%).


**Fig. 3.42 Position towards immigration: country's economy (%)**



**Fig. 3.43 Migration is generally bad for country's economy**




**Fig. 3.44 Position towards immigration: country's cultural life (%)**




The majority (44%) are also unsure whether the immigrants enrich or undermine the country's cultural life; however, 32% do have a more positive take on this effect, whilst 23% are fearful of the undermining of cultural life.

**Fig. 3.45 The country is a better/worse place to live (%)**




**Fig. 3.46 Immigrants make country better place to live**



Generally, those who think migration might make the country a better place to live (18%) are outnumbered by those with the opposite view (25%), with the majority, again, not having a view either way (58%). Whilst gender and migratory background appear to have little effect on such views,


**Fig. 3.47 Immigrants enrich country's cultural life**




those coming from the countryside tend to have more negative views on the cultural effects and markedly worse views on the general effects of migration, with only 6% of the young people from there believing in migration making the country a better place to live.

Young people do not believe that the current migrants are in grave danger and think that government should not be generous when judging applications for the refugee status.


**Fig. 3.48 Most refugee applicants are not in real danger ...**




**Fig. 3.49 Agree "most refugee applicants not in real danger ..."**




**Fig. 3.50 The Government should be more generous with refugees ...**



**Fig. 3.49 Disagree with more generosity for refugees ...**




**Fig. Agree "granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members"**




## 4 Engagement and social change (What do young people do?)

### 4.1 Activism

**Fig. 4.1 Young people who...**




**Fig. 4.2 Signed a petition in past 12 months**




Only a very limited number of the young participate actively in political action, with women more involved than men. 17% of the young have signed a petition over the last 12 months and 4% have participated at a public demonstration. Considering the small number of demonstrations in Estonia, this might be the reason behind the relatively low level of activism. The young are most active in posting and sharing on politics online (28%).


**Fig. 4.3 Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months**



**Fig. 4.4 In past 12 months...**




**Fig. 4.5 Posted or shared anything about politics online past 12 months**




## 4.2 Formal political participation

65% of the young admit that they are not interested in politics, and this is reflected in the voting statistics. Only 43% of the young voted at the last elections, 25% are not eligible to vote. Voting activity is highest in towns.


**Fig 4.6 Worked in an organisation or association last 12 months**




**Fig. 4.7 How often would you say to take part in social activities?**




**Fig. 4.8 Did you vote in the last national election?**




**Fig. 4.9 Voted in the last national election**



**Fig. 4.10 Are you interested in politics?**




**Fig. 4.11 Quite/very interested in politics**




### 4.3 Everyday Engagement

The majority of young people in Estonia are quite or very worried about climate change; females and those living in the cities being the most worried. Most try to do things to reduce energy use, the most pro-active being females and those with no migration background. Almost two-thirds of youth feel some responsibility towards trying to reduce climate change, those feeling the most responsible living comfortably.


**Fig. 4.12 Worried about climate change**




**Fig. 4.13 Very/extremely worried about climate change**




**Fig. 4.15 How likely to buy most energy efficient home appliance**




**Fig. 4.14 Do things to reduce energy use**



**Fig. 4.16 Personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change?**



**Fig. 4.17 Feel responsibility to reduce climate change**





# Russia




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Population	144.342.396
Population aged 15-29 years old	19,5%
Population aged 65 years old and above	13,8%
Birth Rate	13,3
International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	8,1%


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## 1. Standards of living in Russia<sup>15</sup>


The economic situation in the Russian Federation remains stable after a sharp decline of GNI in 2013. The crisis led to the fact that GNI in Russia in 2016 was close to that of 2009 and the lowest among the PROMISE countries. The rate of unemployment in 2017 was 5.3%, which is quite low compared with other countries. At the same time, economic crises in Russia are rarely accompanied by partial or full release of labour resources (due to the complexity of dismissal on the part of the employer and serious losses that employers must bear in connection with such dismissals under labour law). Therefore the unemployment rate in Russia can rarely be seen as a good indicator of the intensity of economic crises. Most often, other strategies of adaptation to various economic transformations are chosen: a reduction in wages or a reduction in working hours. In addition, it should be clarified that a large segment of the Russian economy is in the gray zone (33.72% for 2015)<sup>16</sup>, which in many ways makes it difficult to monitor the economic situation in the country (in the labour market in particular).

Russians, in comparison with the residents of other PROMISE countries, particularly strongly feel corruption, as well as most critically assess the effectiveness of the current government (Fig. 1.5). The average value of government effectiveness estimated for Russia during 2016 was, as usual, negative: -0.41 points (with a minimum of -0.73 points in 1998 and a maximum of -0.11 points in 2014).


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**



**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**




<sup>15</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats

<sup>16</sup> Medina L., Schneider F. Shadow Economies Around the World: What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years?. – 2018. P.74 [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3124402](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124402)


**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index -  
Transparency International (1 to 100;  
1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness:  
Estimate, 2016 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very  
low effectiveness perceived)**




**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best,  
100=worst), 2017**




**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to  
1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




**Fig. 1.8 Percentage of people with  
tertiary education (25-64 years old),  
2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100  
people), 2016**



**Fig. 1.10 CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita), 2014**



Russia is among the PROMISE countries with the lowest level of gender equality (Fig. 1.7). In the Global Gender Gap Report 2017 Russia occupies the 71st place in the overall ranking out of 144 countries<sup>17</sup>.

Considering the issue of freedom of the press/media, as one of the basic characteristics of an open civil society, comparing with other PROMISE countries, the Russian Federation in 2017 has the worst position. (Fig. 1.6). However, Russian citizens are active users of the Internet, which can become an alternative source of information (Fig. 1.9). And Russia takes the first place with the amount of people with higher education (Fig. 1.8).

<sup>17</sup> The Global Gender Gap Report 2017 (Insight Report)P.8 [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GGGR\\_2017.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf)


## 2. Being young in Russia

### 2.1 Demographic situation

According to the UN demographic classification for 2015, Russian society falls into the category of "ageing"<sup>18</sup>; the share of people over 65 years was 13.5%. A serious decrease in the share of the young population in 1990 practically equalized the proportions of the young and elderly population of the country. So, the period from 2010 to 2015 was marked by serious changes in the age structure of Russian society, and as a result, in 2015 the percentage of the elderly population exceeded the number of young people by 2.9%.


One of the most notable effects of the demographic transition for Russia was the increase in the age of marriage (Fig. 2.3). According to the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, the average age of marriage for men in 1990 was 27.5 years - against 31.5 years in 2016, and for women 23.6 years in 1990 - against 27.6 years in 2016<sup>19</sup>. Parallel to this, there is a high rate of young people living with their parents (and other relatives). The strategy of delayed maturation is typical not only for the modern youth of the Russian Federation. Similar trends can be seen among a number of other developed countries.

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Russia 1950-2015: proportion of people aged 15-24 years old vs 65 years old and more**



20

**Fig. 2.2 Persons who live together with youth at the age of 18-30 years, (%) (2016)**



21


18 The proportion of people over 65 years old exceeds the threshold of 7% of the total population of the country.

19 Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Marriages and divorces in the Russian Federation "The average age of marriage in the Russian Federation" [http://www.gks.ru/free\\_doc/new\\_site/rosstat/smi/prez\\_love0707.pdf](http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/rosstat/smi/prez_love0707.pdf)

20 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition. <http://www.un.org/en/index.html>

21 Public "Opinion Foundation" <http://fom.ru/>

**Fig. 2.3 Age-specific marriage rates of young men and women (the number of marriages per 1000 population)**




22

## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Russia

Traditionally, the proportion of Russians achieving a tertiary education remains quite high (Fig. 1.8), and consistently women more often than men receive higher education. In 2016, the percentage of young women with a higher education exceeded the number of men of the same age group by 16.2%. Despite this fact, high gender inequality is still present in Russia (Fig. 1.7).

**Fig. 2.4 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education by gender (2008-2016) (%)**



23

According to the World Economic Forum <sup>24</sup> (2016), over the past 10 years the Russian Federation has reduced its ranking by 26 positions in the Global Gender Gap Index. This situation affects the wage level. According to Russian Federal State Statistics Service data for 2015, the average women's salary in all sectors of the economy is lower than that of men: the ratio of women's wages to men's is 72.6 in all sectors of the economy. Moreover, a higher education is not always associated with a high level of income and the position that a person will occupy after graduating from the university. The level of income will be determined rather by the sphere of the economy and the position held, rather than by the qualification level of the specialist

22 Zakharov S. V. Marriages and divorces in contemporary Russia // Demoscope Weekly. – 2015. – №. 625-626. – P. 1-5. Author's calculations based on the data presented in the Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2013. Moscow: unpublished data of Russian Federal State Statistics Service.


23 Data of the "Russian Monitoring of the Economic Situation and Health of the NRU HSE"

<https://www.hse.ru/rms/reg>


24 Gender equality index // World Economic Forum URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/>

Almost a quarter of young people who are employed in Russia in 2016 have a higher education degree. In number they are almost equal to those in work holding a general secondary education (Fig. 2.6). This may be caused by the progressive increase in the proportion of University graduates since the 2000s, which is associated with the prestige of higher education in Russian society and the simultaneous stigmatization of people with secondary education as insufficiently motivated to get an education of good quality. In this regard, there is an increase in the segment of highly qualified specialists in the labour market of the Russian Federation. At the same time, the proportion of working youth with an incomplete secondary education has remained practically unchanged for the last 20 years, and there is a shortage of workers in the labour market


**Fig. 2.5 Early leavers aged 18-29 from education and training by gender (1994-2016) (%)**




**Fig. 2.6 The level of education of working youth under 25 (1994-2016) (%)**



**Fig. 2.7 Percentage of employed young people aged 25-29 in the total employment structure of Russia**




**Fig. 2.8 Percentage of applicants aged 25-29 in the total unemployment structure in Russia**



25 Labor and employment in Russia. 2017: Statistical compendium / Russian Federal State Statistics Service – V.78 M., 2017. - 261 pp. P. 43

26 Labor and employment in Russia. 2017: Statistical compendium / Russian Federal State Statistics Service – V.78 M., 2017. - 261 pp. P. 77

**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of low-income youth at the age of 16-30**




27

## 2.3 Health and well-being

In general, the majority of Russian youth rate their health as good or very good, but there are some differences in the assessments of young women and men (Fig. 2.10).

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of young people (15-29 years old) who perceive their health as good/very good by gender (1994-2016) (%)**



28


In 2016, males tend to be 6.4% more optimistic about their health than females and they are 4.2% less likely to experience depression (Fig. 2.12). However, young men are more likely to commit suicide (Fig. 2.11). Even considering the fact that the number of suicides among males is decreasing in comparison with the previous years, the difference between female and male mortality due to suicide remains significant and in 2016 composes 12.1%. For young women, the mortality rate per 100 000 people due to suicide remains stable.

27 Russian Federal State Statistics Service. "Inequality and poverty". The distribution of the number of the poor in terms of age and sex groups (based on a sample survey of household budgets)  
[http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat\\_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/poverty/#](http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/poverty/#)

28 Data of the "Russian Monitoring of the Economic Situation and Health of the NRU-HSE"  
<https://www.hse.ru/rlms/reg>




**Fig. 2.11 Suicide death rate among 10-19 year olds**  
deaths per 100,000 average relevant population




29

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of youth 15-29 years old with current depressive symptoms by gender group (2016) (%)**



30

**Fig. 2.13 Life satisfaction (1994-2016) (%)**



The level of life satisfaction among young people in Russia has increased by 35.3% over the past 20 years (Fig. 2.13), which may be due both to Russia's overcoming the long socio-economic crisis of the 1990s caused by the collapse of the USSR and institutional restructuring in the country, and to generational changes in Russian society.


## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime

In 2016, more than half of young people in Russia consumed alcohol at least once per month. Among young women this indicator is slightly lower, but also remains quite high (Fig.2.14). In Russia, there are no official statistics on the rate of drug use. In the optics of medical statistics, assessing the proportion of people with drug addiction, you can see only a gradual reduction in the number of officially registered patients. However, this indicator cannot fully represent the existing picture of drug use in the country, at least for reasons of high mortality among drug users outside medical records.

<sup>29</sup> UNICEF Monitoring the situation of children and women in Europe and Central Asia (Russian Federation Country Data, 1989-2015) <http://transmonee.org/country/russian-federation/>


<sup>30</sup> Data of the "Russian Monitoring of the Economic Situation and Health of the NRU-HSE" <https://www.hse.ru/rlms/reg>

**Fig. 2.14 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... (2016) (%)**




31

**Fig. 2.15 Morbidity of the population with drug addiction per 100 000 people (medical statistics)**



32

**Fig. 2.16 Number of persons held in juvenile detention centres by gender, and General data on minors in pre-trial detention(thousands))**



33

31 Data of the "Russian Monitoring of the Economic Situation and Health of the NRU-HSE" <https://www.hse.ru/rlms/reg>

32 Russian Federal State Statistics Service. "Health care" Drug addiction among the population (Data of the Ministry of Health of Russia, calculation of Russian Federal State Statistics Service) [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat\\_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/healthcare/#](http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/healthcare/#)

33 Russian Federal State Statistics Service. « Law violation». The number of persons held in prisons (at the end of the year; thousands of people) [http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat\\_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/infraction/#](http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/infraction/#)


### 3. What do young people in Russia think and feel?

#### 3.1 Perception of opportunity and constraints


##### 3.1.1 Russia and European situation

According to ESS data, 19,8% of Russian youth claim that the social climate in the country is negative (Fig. 3.1). Such perception is significantly more widespread among young people aged 25-29 (24,7%), as well as among those who, at the time of the survey, defined themselves as "unemployed". But the majority of respondents (69,9%) were not able to clearly describe the social climate in Russia and have selected the middle position (neither positive nor negative).


**Fig. 3.1 Perception of the social climate in Russia**



**Fig. 3.3 State of services in country**




**Fig. 3.2 Significant differences for different groups of young people regarding the perception of the social climate in the Russian Federation (%)**




Regarding safety assessment in the Russian Federation, the majority of young people (aged 15-29) believe that they are safe (Fig. 3.5). But in the overall proportion of those who do not feel safe (17,6%), females prevail. They are significantly more likely to feel unprotected (22,1%) compared with males (13,7%) (Fig. 3.4).


**Fig 3.4 Safety assessment in the country (%) (sex distribution)**



**Fig. 3.5 Safety assessment in the country**




**Fig. 3.4a Significant differences for different groups of young people with respect to the Safety assessment in RF (%)**




More than 80% of young people are satisfied ('to some extent', and 'rather/very much') with the situation in the Russian Federation (Fig. 3.6). The majority of those who are not satisfied, are those aged 25-29 and who feel that their financial situation is 'difficult' (Fig. 3.7).

**Fig. 3.6 Satisfaction with the situation in the country**




**Fig. 3.7 Significant differences for different groups of young people regarding the assessment of the situation in the country (%)**




Almost half of young people from Russia are 'to some extent' satisfied with the work of democracy in the country, although 27.4% are completely satisfied and 20.4% completely unsatisfied. In general 79.2% of respondents, one way or another, support the democratic development of Russia (Fig. 3.8)

**Fig. 3.8 Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Russia?**




The majority of young respondents consider themselves happy people (Fig.3.7a). Among them, students feel themselves happy significantly more often than others (65.2%). About one third of unemployed people consider themselves unhappy (Fig 3.8a).


**Fig. 3.7a How happy are you?**



**Fig. 3.6a How satisfied with life as a whole**




**Fig. 3.8a How happy are you? (%)**  
(distribution by employment status)




## 3.2 Relation with authority

### 3.2.1 General opinion on institutions


**Fig. 3.9 Political system allows people to have a say in what government does**




**Fig. 3.10 Those who believe that political system allows people to have a say in what government does only very little or not at all (%)**



**Fig. 3.11 Political system allows people to have influence on politics**




**Fig. 3.12 Those who believe that political system allows people to have influence on politics only very little or not at all (%)**




### 3.2.2 Trust in institutions: Law&order; and political institutions (not civic society)

Only 10.9% of young people have trust in the country's political institutions. A few more express (21.4%) trust in the institutions of law and order. However there is a decrease in the level of trust with the increase in the age of the respondents for both indicators (Fig 3.14, Fig 3.16). This may be caused by the fact that at the age of 18 young people are formally included in the political life of the country, have the right to vote and to participate in elections, in protests and actions, to join parties, etc. The older respondents become, the higher level of legal awareness and personal socio-political experience is observed. In general, we can say that young Russians have only partial trust in state structures. These institutions function in Russia largely without the basic support of the population and without the active participation of young people in their activities. As the data demonstrate almost half of the respondents cannot form a clear attitude to these structures (trust only to some extent: 48.7% and 51.7%).


**Fig. 3.13 Trust in political institutions in Russia**




**Fig. 3.14 A descriptive portrait of young people who show a low level of trust in the political institutions of the FR (%) (age, occupation, income)**



**Fig. 3.15 Trust in Law&Order institutions**



**Fig. 3.16 A descriptive portrait of young people who show a low level of trust to the institutions of the legal order of the FR (%) (age, occupation, income)**




### 3.3 Sustainable values (opinions on social issues)


#### 3.3.1 Environment

According to the results of the survey in Russia 81.6% of respondents to some extent feel climate change. Among the many factors relevant to the assessment of climate change the type of settlement in which informants live is significant. People living in villages (25%) feel more than others the change in climate, while more than a third (35.3%) of residents of large cities do not notice climate change at all. The larger the settlement is, the more often respondents mention such a factor of influence on the environment as "human activity"


**Fig. 3.17 Do you think world's climate is changing?**




**Fig. 3.19 Do you think world's climate is changing? (significant differences by type of settlement) (%)**



**Fig. 3.18 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both**




**Fig. 3.20 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (significant differences by type of settlement) (%)**



### 3.3.2 Equality/Social inclusion

As mentioned above, contemporary Russia is the country with a high level of gender inequality (Fig 1.7). Thus, 32.5% of young respondents more or less agree with the statement that «Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce» (Fig. 3.21). Among those who, on the contrary, do not agree with this statement, there are significantly more women, 51.9% (Fig. 3.23). It is also important to note that a third of the respondents (33.1%) expressed their *strong* disagreement with the statement that «Gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish», another 23.4% noted that LGBT people *probably* do not have this right. In general, this indicates a fairly high level of homophobia in Russia.

**Fig. 3.21 human rights and gender tolerance in Russia (%)**



**Fig. 3.22 People who agree/strongly agree that gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (%)**



**Fig. 3.23 People who disagree/strongly disagree that men should have more right to job than women when jobs are...**




### 3.3.3 Migration

The migration experience, or its absence, as well as age, significantly affects young people's attitudes toward migrants.


**Fig. 3.26 Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants**

- immigrants undermine country's cultural life
- middle position
- immigrants enrich country's cultural life



**Fig. 3.27 Immigration bad or good for Russian economy**


- migration is generally bad for country's economy
- middle position
- migration is generally good for country's economy






Respondents in the 25-29 age-group, were significantly more likely than younger respondents to believe that migrants negatively affect the economic and cultural life of the country and the living conditions in general (Fig. 3.25). At the same time those with a migration experience tend to be more loyal to migrants. With the statement that “immigrants undermine a country's cultural life”, being significantly more expressed by young people without a migration experience (36,6%). Students (24.8%) significantly more often believe that “migration is generally good for our country's economy” (perhaps because they are more mobile than employed or unemployed informants), while the opposite view is held by unemployed young Russians (40.6%). Almost half of unemployed young people (46.9%) are also confident that ‘immigrants make the country a worse place to live’. 40% of the respondents with an experience of migration agree with the statement "Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status", and almost the same number (47.8%) of the respondents without the experience of migration expressed their disagreement with this statement. In turn, 60.6% of respondents with experience in migration supported the idea that "Granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members", which is a significantly higher proportion than young people without such experience (39.7%).


**Fig. 3.28 Immigrants make country worse or better place to live**




**Fig. 3.24 Attitudes towards migrants in Russia (%)**



**Fig. 3.25 The ratio of young Russians to some migration effects: extreme values by age groups (%)**



**Fig. 3.29 Support of migrants' rights by young Russians (%)**




## 4. Engagement and Social Change

In this section we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Russia. We adopt the concept of social and political engagement as defined in D4.1, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement. In most of the cases, questions relate to the forms of participation that young people think are the most effective.


### 4.1 Civic engagement

The civic engagement analysed in this section is operationalised as subjective assessment of participation in different types of social activity and voluntary work.

**Fig. 4.1 Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months (%)**




**Fig.4.2 -Compared to other people of your age, how often do you take part in social activities (%)**




The majority of young people (54.9%) believe that they have the same level of participation as their peers (Fig. 4.2). However, based on the formulation of the question, it is difficult to evaluate this level: is it high or low? Is this majority active or passive? 27.1% of respondents define themselves as more active participants in social activities comparing with others, however only 6.4% of young people actually volunteer in organisations (Fig. 4.1). Based on what we can conclude that "systemic" civic engagement (as it is operationalised in this section) is not a common practice in Russian society. However, political actors try to involve young people in the voluntary movement in different ways. At the same time, the presence of a migration experience has a significant impact on civic engagement: migrants are less likely to be involved in various manifestations and are less willing to identify themselves with the majority.

**Fig.4.3 Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities by migration background (%)**




## 4.2 Formal political participation

When considering the participation of young people in "official/institutionalised" political life (political participation), it can be noted that among young people from 15 to 29 years 29.8% took part in the elections (if we exclude minors from the sample <sup>34</sup>, who do not have the right to vote under the legislation of the Russian Federation, the number of active voters will increase to 38%) (Fig 4.4).



As shown in figure 4.5, the probability of participation in elections correlates with the employment status of respondents: young employees are almost twice as active as students or unemployed people, which indicates the interrelations of political and economic activities - young people begin to be more actively involved in the political processes at the time of entering the labour market and gaining their own source of income and independence.




In Russia, there are also several other opportunities for young people to participate in formal political life: become a member of youth divisions of political parties or participate in the projects of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (through youth councils and governments), supported by regional (local) authorities and designed to involve young people in political life. However, according to the ESS, only about 3% of young Russians interacted with official political structures: 3.5% worked in political parties, 3% interacted with politicians and authorities in working processes.


<sup>34</sup> Adulthood in Russia comes at the age of 18

### 4.3 Activism

Activism in this report is defined as a participation in various kinds of political ‘informal’ actions: signing petitions, participation in demonstrations. Such actions are more attractive for young people compared with participation in institutionalized politics: almost twice as many young people participated in demonstrations as in the work of political parties. During 2016, petitions were signed by 11% of the total number of Russian youth, while 6.7% of young people participated in protests and demonstrations (Fig.4.6). However, we cannot argue that political activism is widespread among Russian youth.



**Fig.4.7 - Activism by gender, migration background and membership of a group discriminated against in this country (%)**




At the same time, as it follows from figure 4.7, young women tend to demonstrate their position more actively than young men. In addition, people with a migrant experience and representatives of different discriminated minorities participate in such actions more often. As noted in section 4.1, migrants feel less involved in civic processes.

### 4.4 Everyday Engagement


Everyday engagement, operationalised through an interest in politics, consumer participation and environmental worries, is more common in Russian society than direct (formal and informal) participation in political events. Thus, 38.1% of young people are interested in politics. Among them people with a migrant experience and members of discriminated groups are more interested in politics compared with other young people (Fig. 4.8).

**Fig.4.8 - Interested in politics by gender, migration background and membership of a group discriminated against in this country (%)**




Only 14.6% of respondents are very worried about climate change, however almost half of young people are ready to change their behaviour for more responsible and conscious actions (Fig.4.9): 31.3% feel personal responsibility for minimizing harmful emissions into the atmosphere, 32.5% are constantly taking measures to reduce energy consumption, and 48% are ready to buy more energy-efficient electrical appliances, 28.4% are sure that they could consume less energy than they do at the moment. The most active in this activity are again the people with the experience of migration (Fig.4.13)

**Fig.4.9 - Worried about climate change (%)**




**Fig.4.13 - Caring about the environment by social features (%)**




About 10% of young people posted information on political topics online (Fig 4.10). Migrants and members of discriminated communities were again the most active in consumer participation (Fig. 4.12).

**Fig.4.10 - Consumer participation (last 12 months), %**




**Fig.4.12 - Consumer participation by social features (%)**




One third of young people (31.6%) spend 10-30 minutes per day studying the political news agenda, while another 22.7% consumenews for less than 10 minutes a day. A further half of young people (45.7%) spend more than 30 minutes a day consuming the news. Social characteristics that significantly affect the interest in daily reading of the political news have not been identified.

**Fig.4.11 - news time spent in a day to follow news about politics, current affairs (watching, reading, listening), %**



# Croatia


	Population	4.170.600
	Population aged 15-29 years old	17,9%
	Population aged 65 years old and above	19,3%
	Birth Rate	8,9
	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	13,6%




## 1. Standards of living in Croatia<sup>35</sup>

Croatia's economic situation is still suffering from the 2008 crisis. While the gross national income (GNI) is among the lowest (22930\$) (Fig.1.1), the percentage of the labour force that is currently unemployed (11,5%) (Fig.1.3) is among the highest within the PROMISE project countries. Also, unfriendly business regulations (score 51) makes doing business hard (Fig.1.2). Perceived corruption is quite high (score 49) (Fig.1.4), and the Government's effectiveness is rated relatively low (score 0.5) (Fig. 1.5).


**Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016**




**Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017**




**Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017**



**Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016**




**Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)**




<sup>35</sup> Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat ; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

**Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017**




**Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017**




The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”. According to these criteria, the freedom of Croatian press was perceived among the worst (index of 41) within PROMISE project countries (Fig.1.6). Croatia’s Gender Gap Index is 0,71 which places Croatia among the PROMISE project’s countries with greater gender inequality (Fig.1.7) and ranks at the 54th position out 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report, 2017. Among the PROMISE project’s countries, Croatia has a medium share of population with tertiary education (23%) and of internet users (73%) (Fig. 1.8, and Fig.1.9).

**Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016**



**Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016**



## 2. Being young in Croatia


### 2.1 Demographic situation

In around 1995 the share of the youngest and oldest of the population in Croatia swapped. Between 1950 and 2015, the share of youth between 15 and 24 years old dropped from 18,7% to 11,9%, while the percentage of people older than 65 increased from 7,9% to 18,7% in the same time-period. So nowadays, those older than 65 years represent one fifth of the Croatian population (Fig. 2.1).


The percentage of people aged 18-24 and of people aged 25-29 living with their parents in Croatia is very high (94,1% and 74,5 % respectively) (Fig.2.2).

In the past 12 years the share of youth aged 25-29 years old who still live with their parents increased by almost 10 percentage points (Fig.2.2).

**Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Croatia 1950-2015:**  
proportion of people aged 15-24 years old vs 65  
years old and more




**Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old)**  
living with parents 2010-2016



## 2.2 Education & Labour market in Croatia

**Fig. 2.3 Percentage of young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender**




There was an increase in the percentage of youth completing tertiary education in Croatia between 2004 and 2016, especially among women. Today more than 45% of women between 25-29 years old have a university degree in comparison to 27% of men (Fig.2.3).


The percentage of young people leaving education early has slightly declined since 2002, although even then this figure was low at less than 10% (Fig.2.4).

Over time, the share of young women and men who are not in employment, education or training (NEET) fluctuate, but in general it is higher among women than men. Over the past twelve years there has been a rise in the percentage of NEET men from 4% to 7%.


**Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (2002-2016)**




**Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)**



**Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2002-2016)**



**Fig. 2.7 Croatian youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)**




Currently, approximately 60% of women and 70% of men aged 25-29 years are employed in Croatia (Fig.2.6). In the period from 2002 to 2016 the situation did not change much, except for a slight decrease in the men's employment rate after the economic crisis of 2008.

In the same period, youth with the lowest education were the most affected by widely fluctuating unemployment rates; so in 2016 almost 50% of these young people were unemployed. Among those with secondary and tertiary education, unemployment rates are lower but still a matter of concern (around 17.5%), although unemployment rates were quite stable between 2002 and 2016 (Fig.2.7).


About one third of Croatian youth are at risk of poverty. The trends for both genders are quite similar (Fig.2.8).

**Fig. 2.8 Croatian youth at risk of poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2010-2013)**



## 2.3 Health and well-being

**Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2010-2015)**




Croatian youth who perceive their health as good or very good increased from about 48% in 2010 to about 58% in 2015. This increase was similar among women and men (Fig. 2.9).


In 2014, around 3% of women aged 20-24 and 0,5% of men aged 25-29, reported current depressive symptoms.

Between 2002 and 2010 the suicide rate per hundred thousand inhabitants (Fig. 2.11) was quite stable among women, while among men the suicide rate declined from 20 to 15 per hundred thousand. Generally, this rate was four times higher for men than for women.

**Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)**




**Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2002-2010)**



## 2.4 Use of Substances and Crime


In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about 63% of the Croatian youth admitted to having consumed alcohol in the last month, about 40% of them smoked tobacco, and 13% used illegal drugs. Men tended to use tobacco at an approximately equal level to women, but for alcohol, and especially illegal drugs, men tended to use more than women.

**Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... ( 2015)**



Between 2010 and 2015 the rate of male juvenile prisoners somewhat increased (from 7.5 to 12 per hundred thousand), while the rate of female juvenile prisoners stayed low and pretty much the same (around 2 per hundred thousand) (Fig. 2.13). In the case of young men, the peak of imprisonment rate was 19 per hundred thousand in 2013 (19).

**Fig. 2.13 Juvenile prisoners per hundred thousand inhabitants (2010-2015) by gender**





### 3. What do young people in Croatia think and feel?

This section aims to provide an overview of the young Croatians' perceptions and evaluations about the current situation in their country, and how they feel in such context.


Youth in Croatia are mainly not satisfied with the way democracy works in the country, they rated negatively the national economy and employment situation, consider they have been at least in some way marginalized by the economic crises, and they are not convinced that the overall situation will change in the near future. Also, they consider that the education system in Croatia is not very well adapted to the real needs of the labor market. Croatian youth express distrust in Law and Order institutions (with the exception of the Army), as well as in political institutions, and think that things are going in the wrong direction at the national, as well as at the European level.

Despite those critical evaluations of the Croatian context, young people appear quite satisfied with their personal life, mostly perceiving that their voices are heard at the national and at the European level, and are optimistic about their personal futures.


#### 3.1.1 Croatian and European situation

About two thirds of young respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in Croatia, regardless of gender (Fig. 3.1). Young people aged 25-29 years old show the highest level of dissatisfaction (Fig.3.2).

**Fig. 3.1. Are you satisfied with the way democracy works in Croatia?**




**Fig. 3.2 Young people not satisfied with democracy in Croatia by gender and age (%)**







**Fig. 3.3 How would you rate the situation of the Croatian economy**



**Fig. 3.4 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the Croatian economy will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.5 Evaluation on the current Croatian economy and expectations for the future by gender and age**




In line with the poor economic situation in Croatia (see Fig. 1.1 to 1.5 in the section 1” Standards of living”), the huge majority of Croatian youth, regardless of gender and age, rate the national economy and employment situation negatively (81%, 85% respectively, Fig. 3.3, Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.6, Fig. 3.8). While half of Croatian youth think that the economic and employment situation will not change in the next year, a quarter of them are optimistic, and a quarter of them are pessimistic in this regard (Fig. 3.4, Fig. 3.7). Youth aged 20-24 years old appear the most skeptical about positive changes regarding the economic and employment situation (Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.8).


**Fig. 3.6 How would you rate the employment situation in Croatia?**




**Fig. 3.7 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the employment situation in Croatia will be...**



**Fig. 3.8 Evaluation on the current Croatian employment, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.9 Do you think that in Croatia the education system is adapted or not to the current world of work? (%)**




Regardless of gender and age, more than 50% of Croatian youth consider that the education system in Croatia is not adapted to the needs of the labour market (Fig. 3.9, Fig. 3.10).

**Fig. 3.10 "The education system is not well adapted to the current world of work", by gender and age**




More than two thirds of Croatian youth feel that young people in Croatia have been, at least to some extent, marginalized by the economic crisis (Fig.3.11). At the same time, more than half think that impact of the economic crisis on the job market did not yet reach the peak (Fig. 3.12). Such opinion is less characteristic for men and those aged 20-24 years (Fig. 3.13).


**Fig. 3.11 Do you have the feeling that young people have been marginalized by the economic crisis (%)**




**Fig. 3.12 What do you think about the impact of the economic crisis on the job market?**




**Fig. 3.13 "The impact of crisis on jobs already reached its peak", by age, gender, and place of living**



**Fig. 3.14 Direction things are going in Croatia (%)**




**Fig. 3.15 Direction things are going in the EU (%)**




Most Croatian youth are pessimistic regarding the direction things are heading in Croatia and in Europe. Even 59% of them consider that things are going in the wrong direction at the national level (Fig.3.14), while 39% think the same at the European level (Fig.3.15). But, about one fifth are optimistic about the direction taken by their country, and about a third in the case of the situation in the EU. Also, one third of Croatian young people have positive expectations about the life of the future generation in EU, while almost half think that situation for the next generation will not change much (Fig. 3.16).

**Fig. 3.16 Do you think that life for the next generation in EU will be... (%)**




### 3.1.2 Perceived agency

**Fig. 3.17 "My voice counts in Croatia"**




Regardless of gender young people living in Croatia mostly perceive that they are heard at the national (75%) and at the European level (65%) (Fig. 3.17, Fig. 3.18, Fig. 3.19). At the same time the opinion that youth voice counts at the national level is least characteristic amongst the youngest (Fig. 3.19).

**Fig. 3.18 "My voice counts in EU"**




**Fig. 3.19 "My voice counts" by gender and age**




### 3.1.3 Personal situation

**Fig. 3.20 Are you satisfied with your life in general?**




Despite the negative evaluation of their country's situation, most Croatian youth declare to be satisfied with their life (Fig. 3.20). Satisfaction with life is most frequent among younger and those still in education, while there are no gender differences in life satisfaction (Fig. 3.21).

**Fig. 3.21 Young people satisfied with their life by gender, age, employment status**




**Fig. 3.22 % agreement: "You have confidence in the future"**




More than two thirds of young Croats, regardless of gender, are also quite optimistic about the future (Fig. 3.22), and there are no differences regarding gender. This confidence in the future is least characteristic for youth aged 20-24 years (Fig. 3.23).


**Fig. 3.23 Confidence in the future by gender and age**




**Fig. 3.24 How would you rate your personal job situation?**



**Fig. 3.25 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: your personal job situation will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.26 Evaluation on the current personal job situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




Around 60% of young Croats rate their personal job situation and the household's financial situation as good or very good (Fig. 3.24, Fig.3.27) while only a small percentage consider that their job or household financial situation will be worse in the near future (3%, 10% respectively, Fig.3.25, Fig.3.28). Positive expectations for the future are less characteristic for men and those aged 20-24 years old. (Fig. 3.26, Fig.3.29).


**Fig. 3.27 How would you rate your household financial situation?**



**Fig. 3.28 What are your expectations for the next 12 months: the financial situation of your household will be... (%)**




**Fig. 3.29 Evaluation on the current household's financial situation, and expectations for the future by gender and age**




## 3.2 Relation with authority

**Fig. 3.30 Trust in Law & Order institutions**




**Fig. 3.31 Young people who tend to trust in Law & Order institutions, by gender and age**




Among Law and Order institutions young people most frequently express trust in the army (67%), about half express trust in the police while only one third express trust in justice (Fig. 3.30). Youth aged 25-29 appear to be the most critical toward national Law and Order institutions, (Fig.3.31), while women have more trust in the police than men (Fig.3.31). The majority of youth in Croatia do not trust political institutions, especially political parties (Fig. 3.32). Nevertheless, about half of youth trust the EU. Youth aged 25-29 appear to be the most critical toward the national parliament (Fig.3.31, Fig.3.33), while the youngest have more trust in local public authorities and the EU than older ones (Fig.3.31, Fig. 3.33).

**Fig. 3.32 Trust in political institutions**




**Fig. 3.33 Young people who tend to trust in political institutions by gender and age**



### 3.3 Opinion on social issues

**Fig. 3.34 Percentage of agreement with statements regarding migration**




While the majority of Croatian youth (71%) don't think that immigrants positively contribute to Croatia (Fig. 3.34), at the same time the majority of them agree (68%) that their country should help refugees.


Both those views are more likely to be expressed by men than women (Fig.3.35).

In relation to the EU's H2020 goals related to environment, a large share of the Croatian youth (about 64%) support these goals (Fig.3.36).

**Fig. 3.35 Young people who agree with these statements by gender and age**



**Fig. 3.36 Do you find these H2020 goals... (%)**






## 4. Engagement and Social Change


In this section we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Croatia. Our concept of social and political engagement includes aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement. In most of the cases, questions aim to unpack the forms of participation that young people think are the most effective.

### 4.1 Civic engagement

**Fig. 4.1 Best ways of participating in the public life in EU - civic engagement (%)**




**Fig. 4.2 Young people who says that joining associations/NGOs and individual help to the most needy are one of the best way of participation by gender and age**



When asked about the best ways to participate in the public life of the EU, more than one third of youth in Croatia mentioned membership in civic organizations, and one third mentioned individual action to help the most needy (Fig. 4.1). There are no gender or age differences among youth in Croatia who consider that joining civic associations is one of the best ways of participation (Fig.4.2). However, fewer men and fewer older respondents (25-29 years old) think that individual help to the most needy is the best way of participating in public life in the EU (Fig. 4.2).


## 4.2 Formal political participation

**Fig. 4.3 Best ways of participating in the public life of EU -Formal traditional participation (%)**




One third of Croatian youth think that voting is still one of the best ways of participating, regardless of age and gender (Fig.4.3., Fig. 4.4). Additionally, 18% of Croatian youth think that joining a political party is one of the best ways of participation, while only 9% think the same for joining trade unions. Fig.4.3.

**Fig. 4.4 Voting is one of the best ways of participation, by gender and age**




## 4.3 Activism

**Fig. 4.5 Attend demonstrations is one of the best ways of participating in the public life in the EU - Activism**




Less than a fifth of the young people in Croatia mentioned the participation in demonstrations as one of the best ways to make young people's voice heard (Fig. 4.5). This belief is less spread among women and those 20-24 years old (Fig. 4.6).

**Fig. 4.6 Attending demonstrations is one of the best ways of participation by gender and age**



## 4.4 Everyday Engagement


**Fig. 4.7 What are the most important issues you are facing at the moment? (%) [max 2 answers]**



Less than half Croatian youth actively participate in daily pro-environmental routines to protect their environment (Fig.4.8). Most of them sort waste (49%), reduce disposable items (42%), and reduce use of water/energy (35%) (Fig. 4.8).


The most important issue for about 40% of youth in Croatia is rising prices and the cost of living. (Fig. 4.7). Young people also mentioned the education system, unemployment, working and living conditions, as well as the financial and economic situation in the country as factors of concern. Generally, it seems that youth in Croatia are mainly concerned with economic aspects of their lives and education while other social issues such as taxation, terrorism, the environment, crime, and pensions are important only for a small number of young people in Croatia.

**Fig. 4.8 Which of these steps have you taken personally to protect the environment?**




Regarding the number of different environment-friendly actions, we can see that, overall, Croatian youth do not engage fully with environmental activities. (Fig. 4.9). About one half have low engagement (1-2 actions) and the other half show moderate engagement (3-5 actions), while high engagement (6-8 actions) is characteristic for only a few (2%). Moderate/high engagement is equally characteristic for both genders and for all age groups (Fig. 4.10).

**Fig. 4.9 Engagement in environmental-friendly actions**




**Fig. 4.10 Moderate/high pro-environmental engagement by gender, age, place of living (%)**




Discussion of political matters are not very present in Croatian youth conversation with their friends or relatives (Fig. 4.11). Only about 10% of youth discuss such matters frequently, and about half do it only occasionally. They equally often talk about local, national and European matters. Among the young people who often discuss politics (Fig. 4.12), men are more likely than women to be involved in such talks on all matters, while the youngest ones are the least involved in such talks.

**Fig. 4.11 How often do you discuss political matters with your friends or relatives?**



**Fig. 4.12 Youth who frequently discusses political matters by gender and age**



## Appendix 1 – Variables and Data sources

### 1. Data sources of section 1

Indicator	Description	Source		Day of access
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars based on the 2011 ICP round.	DataWorldBank	<a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data">http://databank.worldbank.org/data</a>	10.01.2018
Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations)	Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 190, with first place being the best. A high ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business operation. The index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 topics covered in the World Bank's Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators.	DataWorldBank	<a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data">http://databank.worldbank.org/data</a>	10.01.2018
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)	Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.	DataWorldBank	<a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data">http://databank.worldbank.org/data</a>	10.01.2018
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) (0-100, 0=highly corrupted, 100=highly clean)	The score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).	Transparency International	<a href="http://www.transparency.org/">http://www.transparency.org/</a>	10.01.2018
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.	<a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home</a>	<a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home</a>	10.01.2018

Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst)	Freedom House rates countries according to their freedom of the press. This indicator is a score out of 100 (where 0 means totally free) and it is the average of scales regarding newspapers, televisions and other media. The level of press freedom in each country and territory currently comprises 23 methodology questions and 132 sub-questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points is allotted for a freer situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment. A country's final score (from 0 to 100) represents the total of the scores allotted for each question. A total score of 0 to 30 results in a press freedom status of Free; 31 to 60 a status of Partly Free; and 61 to 100 a status of Not Free.	Freedom of the Press	<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017</a>	10.01.2018
Global Gender Gap Index (0-1, 1=equality)	The Global Gender Gap Index examines the gap between men and women in four fundamental categories (subindexes): <i>Economic Participation and Opportunity</i> , <i>Educational Attainment</i> , <i>Health and Survival</i> and <i>Political Empowerment</i> . The synthetic index goes from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a situation of parity between men and women (no gap). On the contrary, 0 means a deep gap between the female and male conditions.	World Economic Forum	<a href="https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017">https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017</a>	10.01.2018
% People with tertiary education (15-64 years old)	Population with tertiary education is defined as those having completed the highest level of education, by age group. This includes both theoretical programmes leading to advanced research or high skill professions such as medicine and more vocational programmes leading to the labour market. The measure is percentage of same age population.	Eurostat (OECD for Russia)	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/data-base">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/data-base</a> <a href="https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/adult-education-level.htm">https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/adult-education-level.htm</a>	10.01.2018
Internet users (per 100 people)	Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any location) in the last 3 months. The Internet can be used via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc.	DataWorldBank	<a href="http://databank.worldbank.org/data">http://databank.worldbank.org/data</a>	10.01.2018

## 2. Data sources for Section 2

Indicator	Source	Link	Day of access
Youth unemployment by educational attainment level (25-29 y.o.)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Self-perceived health (15-29 y.o.)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Current depressive symptoms -only in 2014 (15-29 y.o.)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Crude death rate by suicide of young people by gender (15-29 y.o.)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (15-29 y.o.)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Prevalence, Youth – types of drugs use amongst young people (15-24 y.o.)	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)	<a href="http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/">http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/</a>	11.01.2018
Juvenile Prisoners, All Crimes -(Male/Female)	Eurostat, 2018	<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database">http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database</a>	11.01.2018
Police officers (number of police officer out of 100 inhabitants)	UNODC, United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime	<a href="https://data.unodc.org/">https://data.unodc.org/</a>	11.01.2018

## 3. Variables for country reports based on ESS 2016 (Estonia, Finland, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom)<sup>36</sup>

### 3.1 Demographics

		Variable name	Recoded in
Gender	Gender	gndr	
Migration background	Born in country	brncnr	
	Father born in country	facnr	Origin (Migration background)
	Mother born in country	mocnr	
Age	Age of respondent, calculated	Agea	15-19, 20-24; 25-29
Settlement	Place of residence (big city, small town..)	domicil	urban

<sup>36</sup> ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

## 3.2 Variables for Section 3

		Labels	Variable name	Recoded in	make crosstabs with
3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints	3.1.1 Country Situation	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	ppltrst	Perception of social climate	soclim
		Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair	pplfair		
		Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves	pplhlp		
		State of education in country nowadays	stfedu	State of services in country	statserv
		State of health services in country nowadays	stfhlth		
		Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark	aesfdrk	safety	safety
		How satisfied with present state of economy in country	stfeco	Satisfaction with the situation in the country	saticountry
		How satisfied with the national government	stfgov		
		How satisfied with the way democracy works in country	stfdem		
		How satisfied with life as a whole	stflife		satlife
3.2 Relation with authority	3.1.2 Personal situation	How happy are you	happy		hap
	3.2.1 General opinion on institutions	Political system allows people to have a say in what government does	psppsgva		nosay
		Political system allows people to have influence on politics	psppipla		noinfl
	3.2.2 Trust in institutions: Law&order; and political institutions (no civic society)	Trust in country's parliament	trstprl	Trust in political institutions	poltrust
		Trust in politicians	trstplt		
		Trust in political parties	trstprt		
		Trust in the European Parliament	trstep		
		Trust in the legal system	trstlgl	Trust in Law&Order institutions	lawtrust
		Trust in the police	trstplc		



3.3 Sustainable values (opinions on social issues)	Environment	Do you think world's climate is changing	clmchnng	clmchnng
		Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both	ccnthum	ccnthum
	Equality/Social inclusion	Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce	mnrctjrb	nomanpr
		For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small	smdfslv	fair
		Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	freehms	free
	migration	Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	imsmetn	
		Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	imdfetn	
		Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	impcntr	
		Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	imueclt	cult
		Immigration bad or good for country's economy	imbgeco	econm
		Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	imwbcnt	place
		Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status	gvrfgap	gen
		Most refugee applicants not in real fear of persecution own countries	rfgfrpc	app
		Granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members	rfgbfml	fam

### 3.3 Variables for Section 4

Domain	Sub-dimensions	questions	ESS 2016
4.1 Civic engagement	Proxy for general engagement:	Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?	sclact
	Voluntary work	Worked in another organisation or association last 12 months	wrkorg
4.2 Formal political participation	Electoral participation	Voted last national election	vote
		Would vote for [country] to remain member of European Union or leave	vteurmb
	Being active within, doing voluntary work for, or donating money to, a political party or campaign activity Contacting organizations, politicians or civil servants	Worked in political party or action group last 12 months	wrkprty
		Contacted politician or government official last 12 months	contplt
4.3 Activism	Non-formal political activities	Signed petition last 12 months	sgnptit
		Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months	pblmnm
4.4 Everyday engagement	Stand-by engagement		
	*Interest; importance given to politics	How interested in politics	polintr
	*Concern for politics and social issues	How worried about climate change	wrcmch
		To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change?	ccrdprs
	*Propensity to take action in favour of social/political issues	How likely to buy most energy efficient home appliance	eneffap
		How often do things to reduce energy use	rdcenr
	Lifestyle-related politics	How confident you could use less energy than now	cflsenr
	*Consumer participation & *Clothes and other ref. lifestyle:	Boycotted certain products last 12 months	bctprd
		Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months	badge
		Posted or shared anything about politics online last 12 months	pstplnl
		News about politics and current affairs, watching, reading or listening	nwspol

## 4. Variables for country reports based on Eurobarometer (Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain)<sup>37</sup>

### 4.1 Demographics

			recoded in
Gender	Gender	d10	
Age	AGE EXACT	d11	15-19, 20-24; 25-29
Settlement	Domicil	d25	(not used, unless relevant)

### 4.2 Variables for Section 3

Dimensions	Topic	Label	EB87.3 (2017)	85.1OVR (2016)
3.1 Perception of opportunity/constraints	3.1.1 Country and European situation	DEMOCRACY SATISFACTION - COUNTRY	qa17a	
		SITUATION: NATIONAL ECONOMY	qa1a_1	
		EXPECTATIONS: ECONOMIC SITUATION	qa2a_2	
		SITUATION: EMPLOYMENT COUNTRY	qa1a_5	
		EXPECTATIONS: EMPLOYMENT SITUATION	qa2a_4	
		CNTRY		
		MARGINALISATION OF YOUTH DUE TO CRISIS		qa5
		CRISIS JOB MARKET IMPACT - PHASE APPRAISAL (crisis is over/not)	qc1	
		EDUCATION SYSTEM WELL ADAPTED TO LABOUR		qa2
		DIRECTION THINGS ARE GOING - IN (OUR COUNTRY)		d73_1
		DIRECTION THINGS ARE GOING - IN THE EU		d73_2

<sup>37</sup> European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6863 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12847](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12847); European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2016): Eurobarometer 85.1OVR (April 2016). TNS opinion [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6696 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12642](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12642)

		LIFE FOR THE NEXT GENERATION in Europe	qd10	
	3.1.2 Perceived agency	MY VOICE COUNTS - IN (OUR COUNTRY)		d72_2
		MY VOICE COUNTS - IN THE EU		d72_1
	3.1.3 Personal situation	LIFE SATISFACTION	d70	d70
		EXPECTATIONS: LIFE IN GENERAL	qa2a_1	
		SITUATION: JOB PERSONAL	qa1a_3	
		EXPECTATIONS: PERS JOB SITUATION	qa2a_5	
		SITUATION: FINANCIAL HH	qa1a_4	
		EXPECTATIONS: FINANCIAL SITUATION HH	qa2a_3	
		STATEMENTS: HAVING CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE	qd11_8	
3.2 Relation with authority	3.2.1 Trust in institutions	TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: JUSTICE / LEGAL SYSTEM	qa8a_1	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: POLICE	qa8a_2	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: ARMY	qa8a_3	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL PARTIES	qa8a_5	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: REG/LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES	qa8a_6	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT	qa8a_7	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: NATIONAL PARLIAMENT	qa8a_8	
		TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: EUROPEAN UNION	qa8a_9	
3.3 Sustainable values: Opinions on social issues		STATEMENTS: IMMIGRANTS CONTRIBUTE A LOT	qd11_3	
		STATEMENTS: COUNTRY SHOULD HELP REFUGEES	qd11_6	
		Opinions on EU Goals	qb1_3; qb1_4 qb1_5	

### 4.3 Variables for Section 4

Sub-dimensions		Label	EB87.3 (2017)	85.1OV R (2016)
4.1 Civic engagement	Membership in civic society organizations	PARTICIPATION IN EU: JOIN ASSOC/NGOS		qa7.6
	Voluntary work	INDIVIDUALLY HELP MOST NEEDY		qa7.7
4.2 Formal political participation	Membership in traditional political organization	PARTICIPATION IN EU: JOIN POLITICAL		qa7.2
	political parties, trade unions, etc.	PARTICIPATION IN EU: JOIN TRADE UNION		qa7.4
	Electoral participation	PARTICIPATION IN EU: VOTE IN ELECTIONS		qa7.1
4.3 Activism	Non-formal political activities	PARTICIPATION IN EU: DEMONSTRATIONS		qa7.5
4.4 Everyday engagement	Stand-by engagement	IMPORTANT ISSUES PERS: crime; economic situation, inflation, taxation, unemployment, terrorism, housing, financial situation household, immigration, health & social security, pensions, working conditions, living conditions	qa4a.1 to qa4a.15	
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: BUY LOCAL PRODUCTS		qa8.1
	Lifestyle-related politics	ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: SORT WASTE		qa8.2
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: INSULATE HOME		qa8.3
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: REDUCE USE OF WATER/ENERGY		qa8.4
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: CHANGE TRANSPORT MODE		qa8.5
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: REDUCE DISPOSABLE ITEMS		qa8.6
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: AVOID SHORT-HAUL FLIGHTS		qa8.7
		ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION: LESS CAR USE		qa8.8
	Talk about politics	POLITICAL DISCUSSION - NATIONAL MATTERS		d71a_1
		POLITICAL DISCUSSION - EUROPEAN MATERS		d71a_2
		POLITICAL DISCUSSION - LOCAL MATTERS		d71a_3
		PARTICIPATION IN EU: DEBATE ON EU INSTITUTIONS		qa7.8
		WEBSITES		

## Appendix 2 - Sample information

### 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of country samples - Reports based on ESS 2016<sup>38</sup>

ESS 2016	Gender			Age (%)		
	N	Male	Female	15-19 years old	20-24 years old	25-29 years old
Germany	505	53,4	46,6	36,8	33,7	29,5
Estonia	364	51,9	48,1	28,0	29,4	42,6
Finland	345	50,4	49,6	29,3	31,9	38,8
United Kingdom	197	42,5	57,5	28,1	33,6	38,4
Russian Federation	425	53,5	46,5	20,5	32,7	46,8

ESS 2016	Living in... (%)		
	big city	suburbs or small city	country village or countryside
Germany	16,3	46,3	37,4
Estonia	35,2	41,5	23,3
Finland	26,4	49,9	23,8
United Kingdom	16,7	71,8	11,5
Russian Federation	43,1	40,4	16,5

ESS 2016	Employment status (%)					Household's economic situation (%)			
	employed	student	unemployed	other	missing	Living comfortably	Coping	Difficulties in paying bills	missing
Germany	38,9	46,7	4,7	4,1	5,6	47,5	42,5	7,6	2,4
Estonia	50,5	36,3	4,7	7,4	1,1	30,5	55,2	14,3	0,0
Finland	34,2	49,9	7,5	7,0	1,4	28,7	54,8	14,8	1,7
United Kingdom	45,3	36,2	9,4	8,3	0,7	43,7	39,7	13,6	3,0
Russian Federation	51,6	31,3	7,5	9,3	0,2	7,4	50,7	34,8	7,1

ESS 2016	With migration background (%)	Member of a group discriminated against in this country (%)
Germany	29,8	8,3
Estonia	20,3	7,4
Finland	10,7	13,0
United Kingdom	25,4	18,7
Russian Federation	8,7	6,2

<sup>38</sup> ESS Round 8: European Social Survey Round 8 Data (2016). Data file edition 1.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC.

## 2. Sociodemographic characteristics of country samples - Reports based on EB2016/17<sup>39</sup>

EB2016	Gender (%)			Age (%)			Living in... (%)		
	N	Male	Female	15-19 years old	20-24 years old	25-29 years old	Rural area or village	Small/middle town	Large town
Italy	345	51,3	48,7	29,3	32,6	38,1	9,0	65,2	25,8
Spain	327	50,9	49,1	30,8	32,2	36,9	50,2	29,5	20,3
Portugal	304	51,5	48,5	29,1	36,9	34,0	37,9	35,6	26,5
Slovakia	324	50,5	49,5	26,6	32,9	40,5	38,0	43,2	18,8
Croatia	438	51,0	49,0	22,7	39,3	38,0	19,4	54,7	25,9

EB2017	Gender (%)			Age (%)			Living in... (%)		
	N	Male	Female	15-19 years old	20-24 years old	25-29 years old	Rural area or village	Small/middle town	Large town
Italy	141	53,7	46,3	24,5	40,4	35,1	13,6	57,6	28,8
Spain	150	50,1	49,9	30,6	34,6	34,8	53,0	27,5	19,5
Portugal	192	48,2	51,8	29,3	35,8	34,9	53,0	27,5	19,5
Slovakia	132	51,6	48,4	34,1	32,0	33,8	44,9	39,1	16,1
Croatia	210	48,7	51,3	18,7	44,6	36,7	46,8	37,1	16,2

EB2016	Employment status (%)				Difficulties in paying bills last year (%)			
	student	employed	unemployed	other	Most of the time	From time to time	Almost never/never	Refusal (SPONT.)
Italy	59,9	28,1	12,0	0,0	11,6	44,2	37,1	7,1
Spain	45,8	35,1	19,1	0,0	9,9	26,8	60,5	2,7
Portugal	43,1	40,1	16,9	0,0	19,2	43,9	32,4	4,5
Slovakia	39,3	45,2	13,7	1,8	4,4	23,1	65,0	7,5
Croatia	38,9	34,5	26,4	0,2	11,2	45,2	41,1	2,5

EB2017	Employment status (%)				Difficulties in paying bills last year (%)			
	student	employed	unemployed	other	Most of the time	From time to time	Almost never/never	Refusal (SPONT.)
Italy	55,2	23,4	21,4	0,0	14,3	30,2	43,4	12,1
Spain	38,9	41,3	19,3	0,4	15,9	26,2	56,3	1,6
Portugal	41,8	49,3	8,9	0,0	16,1	28,6	52,0	3,2
Slovakia	42,5	36,4	20,3	0,8	5,5	21,0	68,8	4,8
Croatia	39,0	43,2	17,5	0,3	13,2	43,0	41,2	2,7

<sup>39</sup> European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6863 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12847](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12847); European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2016): Eurobarometer 85.1OVR (April 2016). TNS opinion [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6696 Data file Version 1.0.0, [doi:10.4232/1.12642](https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12642)