



promoting youth involvement and
social engagement

PROMISE: Promoting Youth Involvement and Social Engagement: Opportunities and challenges for ‘conflicted’ young people across Europe.

Collection of short comparative country reports – GERMANY

Summary: The full report presents a collection of standardised country reports from the ten partner countries involved in PROMISE. Using the most recent data available from macro-indicators and surveys, each country report provides a national baseline of the attitudes, activities and social involvement of young people. The macro-indicators used to describe the national context are used consistently throughout to allow comparison.

In particular, each country report provides an overview of the general ‘state of the country’s health’; the situation that young people face; how young people feel about their situation; and what, if anything, they are doing to change it.


We employ a concept of social and political engagement developed for PROMISE that includes four dimensions of engagement: civic activism, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement.

This report (Germany) should be read in conjunction with the Introduction and Appendices document. It was submitted to the EC as part of deliverable D9 (D4.3).

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Germany

	Population	82,667,685
	Population aged 15-29 years old	17.0%
	Population aged 65 years old and above	21.3%
	Birth Rate	9.0%
	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	14.9%

1. Standards of living in Germany¹

Among the PROMISE countries, Germany appears as one of the most reassuring economic contexts. This is not only because of the highest gross national income (GNI) of 49710 and of the lowest unemployment rate (3.8%), but also because the relatively friendly regulations can support the development of businesses in this country, together with one of the most moderate perceptions of corruption and a high perception of Government effectiveness, second only to Finland.

Fig. 1.1 GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$), 2016




Fig. 1.2 Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly regulations), 2017




Fig. 1.3 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), 2017




Fig. 1.4 Corruption Perception Index - Transparency International (1 to 100; 1= high corruption perceived), 2016






Fig. 1.5 Government Effectiveness: Estimate, 2014 (-2,5 to 2,5 -2,5=very low effectiveness perceived)



¹ Last available data. Sources: World Bank; Transparency International; Freedom House; Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum); Eurostat; OECDStats. See Appendix for detailed references.

Fig. 1.6 Freedom of the press (0=best, 100=worst), 2017



The Freedom House defines freedom of the press as “a media environment where coverage of political news is robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures”. According to these criteria, the German press is quite free (index score of 20).

Among the countries considered, Germany is one of those with the smallest gender gap (0.778) and ranks at the 12th position out of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report 2017, indicating a fair balance of opportunities for women and men.

Less than one-third of the active German population has a tertiary education, but almost nine out of ten use the internet, hinting at a smaller digital divide compared to the other countries.

Fig. 1.7 Global Gender Gap Index (0 to 1, 1= gender equality), 2017




Fig. 1.8 % People with tertiary education (25-64 years old), 2016






Fig. 1.9 Internet users (per 100 people), 2016



2. Being young in Germany

2.1 Demographic situation


Fig. 2.1 Demographic trends in Germany, 1950 -2015: proportion of people aged 15-29 years old vs 65 years old and more



Together with many other European countries, Germany is facing a severe demographic transition. Between 1970 and 1990 the share of young and old people was about the same (Fig. 2.1). Since 1990 the gap in the proportion of older and younger population has increasingly become more pronounced. In the aging German society of 2015, people older than 65 years are double in number to young people aged 15-24 years old.


The share of young people living with their parent(s) decreased by about ten percentage points in ten years (Fig. 2.2). In 2016, slightly more than one quarter of the youth aged 25-29 years old was still living with their family of origin.

Fig. 2.2 Percent of young people (18-29 years old) living with parents 2005-2016



2.2 Education & Labour market in Germany

Fig. 2.3 Percentage of Young people aged 25-29 with tertiary education (2004-2016) by gender



Since 2004, education at all levels has improved. Youth with a tertiary education steadily increased (Fig. 2.3), in particular in the case of women: today almost one-third of the females aged between 25-29 years have a university degree.

Compared to other European countries, Germany shows lower rates of school drop out (Fig. 2.4) and exclusion from the labour market and school system (Fig. 2.5).

Since 1999, the numbers of early school leavers decreased from 15% to 10% without relevant differences by gender. On the contrary, females seem to be more exposed than males to the risk of becoming NEET (Fig. 2.5). In any case, the NEET rate appears quite stable over time, with only a slight decrease for females.

Fig. 2.4 Early leavers from education and training by gender (1999-2016)




Fig. 2.5 Percentage of NEET aged 15-29 (2004-2016)





Fig. 2.6 Youth (25-29 years old) employment by gender (2000-2016)



Less than 20% of men and less than 25% of women are unemployed. Except for a slight decline in 2004-2005, the youth employment rate is quite stable both for men and women (Fig. 2.6).

However, those with lower educational attainment are more exposed to the unemployment risk than those with higher degrees (Fig. 2.7). Between 2003 and 2009, the unemployment rate among those with less than lower secondary education, increased from 15,8 to 27.8 (peak in 2006). Only 3% of those with tertiary education are unemployed.

Nevertheless, the rate of young people at risk of poverty or exclusion increased from 22% in 2005 to 25% in 2013, with females more affected than males since 2006.

Fig. 2.7 Youth unemployment rate (25-29 years old) by educational attainment (2002-2016)






Fig. 2.8 Young people's at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate by gender (2004-2013)



2.3 Health and well-being

Fig. 2.9 Percentage of young people who perceive their health as good/very good by gender and age groups (2005-2015)



German youth progressively reported better health conditions (Fig. 2.9). Males were more likely than females to perceive their health as good or very good.

Females also manifest current depressive symptoms more than males (Fig. 2.10), except in the older group (25-29 years old). The youngest females (15-19 years old) were the subgroup that reported these symptoms more than the other age groups (9.8%). Even if more females are reporting more depressive symptoms and are less positive in indicating their health conditions, females commit suicide four times less than males (Fig. 2.11), with trends relatively stable over time.

Fig. 2.10 Percentage of youth with current depressive symptoms by gender and age group (2014)





Fig. 2.11 Crude death rate per hundred thousand inhabitants by suicide of young people (2000-2010)



2.4 Use of Substances and Crime²

In 2015 (Fig. 2.12) about seven out of ten of German young people reported to have drunk alcohol in the last month, without significant differences between genders. More males tended to smoke tobacco (32.2%) than females (21.6%). The number of males who admitted having used illegal drugs in the last month are almost double the number of females.

Since 2013, the number of juvenile prisoners have steadily decreased (Fig. 2.13). The biggest group, aged 21-30 years old, decreased by 18% , those aged 18-21 years dropped by 26%, and the youngest group (14-18 years old) decreased by 23%.

Fig. 2.12 Percentage of aged 15-29 who in the last month used... (2015)





Fig. 2.13 Convicted prisoners by age group, 2013-2016



² Data for Juvenile prisoners in Germany are not available in the international sources adopted for the other countries (Eurostat/UNODC), we therefore use figures from Statistisches Bundesamt (https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Justice/Tables_/ConvictedPrisoners.html).

3. What do young people in Germany think and feel?


This section aims to provide an overview of German young people's perception and evaluation of the current situation in their country and how they feel in such context. German youth seems to be quite satisfied with the society they live in. The context of opportunities provided by the German system probably help them to reach their personal goals and feel quite satisfied with their life.

Generally speaking, their relation with authority does not appear particularly problematic: most of the young people have high trust in institutions, with the notable exception of political parties and the politicians, but they tend to perceive a good level of personal political efficacy.

3.1 Perception of opportunity and constraints

3.1.1 Germany situation

Fig. 3.1 Perception of the social climate



A measure of perception of the social climate (Fig. 3.1), builds upon the position towards three statements* and shows that most young German people cannot clearly define whether they live in a positive social climate or not. However only a few of them perceive it as negative, and about one out of four think that it is positive. This is particularly true for men, for those without a migration background, and those who live in country villages (Fig. 3.2).

*“Most people can be trusted” (vs “you can’t be too careful”);
 “Most people try to take advantage of you” (vs “Most people try to be fair”);
 “Most of the time people are helpful” (vs “Most people are mostly looking out for themselves”)

Fig. 3.2 Young people perceiving a positive social climate - by gender, migration background and place of living





Fig. 3.3 Rate of the status of education and health services in Germany nowadays (%)



Most young people rate as 'good' the state of the health services and almost half consider the state of education in Germany to be 'good' (Fig. 3.3). Taking these two services together (Fig. 3.4), males, the youngest respondents, young people with migration backgrounds, and those living in small villages, are most likely to rate them positively.

Fig. 3.4 Young people rating "Good" the state of services in Germany by gender, age, migration background and place of living





Fig. 3.5 Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark



More than seven young people out ten feel safe when they are alone in their local area after dark (Fig. 3.5). However, the share of those who feel unsafe (Fig. 3.6) is mainly composed of females; young between 15-19 years old; those with no migration background; and those living in the suburbs or in small towns.

Fig. 3.6 Young people who feel unsafe when walking alone in local area after dark by gender, age, migration background, place of living (%)





Fig. 3.7 Satisfaction with the situation in the country (%)




Thinking about the current situation in Germany, young people appear quite satisfied. In particular (Fig. 3.7), most of them are satisfied with the state of the national economy and the way democracy works in Germany. However, they report less satisfaction with the national government.

Fig. 3.8 shows that the more satisfied are men, the youngest subgroup, those with a migration background, and young people living in big cities.


Females and those aged 25-29 years old report being less satisfied with the overall situation of the country.

Fig. 3.8 Young people rather/very much satisfied with the situation in Germany - by gender, age, migration background, place of living




3.1.2 Personal situation

Fig. 3.9 Youth's satisfaction with life as a whole



Considering their personal situation, young people living in Germany appear very satisfied (Fig. 3.9) and happy (Fig. 3.11), probably also as a reflection of the good opportunities allowed by the state of the economy of the country and the overall picture of stability and fairness (see section 1).

Fig. 3.11 Youth's happiness



In the perspective of the opportunities to get resources to achieve their personal goals (and then being satisfied and happy), the breakdown for the socio-demographic characteristics is quite similar to the extent of satisfaction with life as a whole (Fig. 3.10) and the feeling of happiness (Fig. 3.12). Men, young people aged less than 24 years old, those without a migration background, and who live in country villages, are more likely to report these positive feelings.

Fig. 3.10 Young people rather or very much satisfied with life by gender, age, migration background, place of living






Fig. 3.12 "happy" young people by gender, age, migration background, place of living



3.2 Relation with authority

3.2.1 General opinion on institutions

Fig. 3.13 Political system allows people to... (%)



In line with their perceptions (Fig. 3.7) about how democracy works in their country, most of the young people in Germany think that the political system allows people to have an impact on political matters (Fig. 3.13).

However more than one-third do not perceive this kind of personal political efficacy.

Fig. 3.14 Young people who think that the political system allows people to have influence on politics only very little or not at all






Fig. 3.15 Young people who think that the political system allows people to have a say in what government does only very little or not at all



Looking at this latter group, men, those with a migration background and those living in country villages tend to perceive the possibility of influencing politics less than others (Fig. 3.14). However, only age appears to make some differences in perceptions of opportunities to have a say on what the government does. Interestingly, those who can already vote are less likely to perceive this efficacy (Fig. 3.15).

3.2.2 Trust in institutions

Fig. 3.16 Trust in political institutions (%)



While institutions like the German and the European parliaments still have the trust of most German youth (40% of young people trust them highly), politicians and political parties are the most critically evaluated (Fig. 3.16): only 20% of youth have high trust in them.

Considering a synthetic measure of trust in these four political institutions, Fig. 3.17 shows that youth with lower trust in political institutions are mainly composed of men, the oldest age group, those without a migration background, and those who live in big cities.

Fig. 3.17 Youth with low trust in political institutions by gender, age, migration background, place of living






Fig. 3.18 Trust in Law&Order institutions (%)



About seven out of ten of young Germans express high trust in the police and the legal system (Fig. 3.18). This high trust in law and order institutions is a common trait among German youth without relevant difference by sociodemographic characteristics, except gender and migration background. The composition of the share of those who have lower trust in such institutions presents a slight majority of men and people without a migration experience (Fig. 3.19)

Fig. 3.19 Youth with low trust in Law&Order institutions by gender, migration background



3.3 Opinion on social issues

Fig. 3.20 Do you think world's climate is changing? (%)





Fig. 3.21 Young people who think that "world's climate is definitely changing", by gender, age, migration background, place of living



German youth are reasonably aware of climate change. Most of them believe that the world's climate is definitely changing (Fig.3.20) and this is caused by human activity (Fig. 3.22). Such consciousness is more strongly established among women and those without a migration background. Differences by age and place of residence are not remarkable in terms of climate change awareness (Fig. 3.21). However more young people aged below 24 years old, compared to older respondents, and those with no migration background, believe the causes of this process are mainly due to human activity (Fig. 3.23).

Fig. 3.22 Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (%)




Fig. 3.23 Young people who think that "Climate change caused mainly by human activity", by gender, age, migration background, place of living




Fig. 3.24 Opinion on social issues - equality (%)





Fig. 3.25 Young people who agree with "gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish"



Together with the concern for the environment and climate change, social equality appear as another important issue for German youth. About nine out of ten think that gay and lesbian couples should be free to live life as they want (Fig. 3.25), and eight out of ten are against the idea that men should have more job opportunities than women when jobs are scarce (Fig. 3.27). In this respect, the more conservative are men, the older age group, and those who have a migration background.

About six out of ten think that, for a fair society, the differences in standard of living should be smaller (Fig. 2.26). The differences by sociodemographic characteristics are lightly remarkable considering age and migration background. The oldest and those who did not experience migration express more support for this statement.

Young people who have a bad opinion of immigration are in the minority. Half of German youth think that immigration enriches the country's cultural life (Fig. 3.28) and the German economy (Fig. 3.29), and more than one third took an intermediate position on these aspects. Nevertheless, German youth appear a bit more tentative when expressing a position about whether, in general, immigration makes Germany a better place to live (Fig. 3.30).

In all these three aspects, the group who has a positive view on immigration is mainly composed of men, older than 25 years, and (more surprisingly) people living in big cities (Fig. 3.31 to Fig. 3.33).

Fig. 3.26 Young people who agree with "for fair society, differences in standard of living should be smaller"







Fig. 3.27 Young people who disagree with "men should have more right to job than women when job are scarce"




**Fig. 3.28 Position towards
immigration: country's cultural life
(%)**




**Fig. 3.29 Position towards
immigration: country's economy (%)**




**Fig. 3.30 Position towards
immigration: country is a
better/worse place to live (%)**




**Fig. 3.31 Young people who think
that immigrants enrich country's
cultural life**



**Fig. 3.32 Young people who think that
migration is generally good for
country's economy**



**Fig. 3.33 Young people who think
that immigrants make country
better place to live**



German youth are fairly open when talking about the “quantity” of allowed immigrants. However, when the immigrant belongs to a different ethnic group from the German native, the welcoming attitude is a bit colder (Fig. 3.34).

Looking at the refugees’ situation, only about one-third think that Germany should be generous when judging applications for refugee status (Fig. 3.35). In this respect, the most remarkable differences are by place of living (Fig. 3.36): those living in the big cities tend to be much more supportive than those living in the suburbs and villages, and probably have more direct experiences of such a situation. However, about 60% of German youth think that, once the refugee status is granted, refugees should be allowed to bring their close family members to live with them. There are no remarkable differences among the young people supporting this view.

Fig. 3.34 Position towards immigration: Allow many/few immigrants




Fig. 3.35 Opinions towards the refugees' situation (%)





Fig. 3.36 Young people who think that granted refugees should be entitled to bring close family members



4. Engagement and Social Change

In this section, we provide information about young people's social and political engagement in Germany. We adopt the concept of social and political engagement as defined in D4.1, including aspects of civic engagement, formal political participation, activism, and everyday engagement.

4.1 Civic engagement

About one-third of the young respondents recently worked in a civic society organisation (Fig. 4.1). Males, those aged 20-24 years old, those without a migration background and those living in big cities, tend to be slightly more engaged in such organisations than others (Fig. 4.2)

Fig. 4.1 Have you worked in a civic society organization in the last 12 months?





Fig. 4.2 Young people who worked in a civic society organization



In relation to their ability to get involved in social activities (Fig. 4.3), half of the young respondents estimated that they take part in social activities at a similar level to their peers, while one-third perceive themselves as less engaged. The rest, estimating themselves to be more socially involved, are mainly composed of men, those older than 25 years old, those without a migration background, and those living in big cities (Fig. 4.4), suggesting that the structure of opportunities and access to resources to engage and activate young people's potential is not homogeneous.

Fig. 4.3 Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say to take part in social activities?






Fig. 4.4 Young people who take part in social activities more than their peers




4.2 Formal political participation

Fig. 4.5 Have you voted in the last national election?



Almost half of the young respondents were not eligible to vote at the time of the data collection (Fig. 4.5). The majority of those entitled expressed their vote in the last national election. However, thinking about the possibility of voting for leaving/remaining in the EU, only 1.4% would not express their opinion (Fig. 4.7), and the vast majority would cast a pro-Europe vote.

Fig. 4.7 Would vote for Germany to remain member of European Union or leave? (%)



Young people living in the peripheries and in small towns or country village perceive national politics as something distant from them: their formal political participation is in fact lower than young people living in big cities (Fig. 4.6).

Other forms of formal political participation, including working in political parties and directly contacting politicians (Fig. 4.8), are experienced by very few young people.

Fig. 4.6 Young people who voted for the last national election by gender and place of living (%)





Fig. 4.8 In the last 12 months, have you...? (%)



4.3 Activism

About one-third of the youth signed petitions and half of them also took part in lawful demonstrations (Fig. 4.9).

Signing a petition appears a more viable option to express their position (in support of, as well as against, something) for women, youth aged more than 25, those living in big cities and those without a migration background (Fig 4.10).

Fig. 4.9 In the last 12 months, have you... ? (%)




Fig. 4.10 Young people who signed petition





Fig. 4.11 Young people who taken part in lawful demonstration



On the other hand, taking part in activities which leads young people to expose their standpoint more evidently, is something engaged in more by: men, those aged between 20-24 years old, and by those with a migration background. Most of the demonstrations usually take place in the heart of the big cities, so it could be more difficult for young people living in villages located far from the cities to take part in such activities (Fig. 4.11).

4.4 Everyday Engagement

Expressing an interest in politics split the German youth in two: half of the young people were not interested and the other half were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ interested (Fig. 4.12). Men, those older than 25 years old, youth with a migration background, and those living in big cities, express interest in the topic “politics” more than the others (Fig. 4.13).

Fig. 4.12 How are you interested in politics?





Fig. 4.13 Young people quite/very interested in politics



Environmental issues appear relevant for most youth. For example, less than 15% of the young respondents are not worried about climate change (Fig. 4.14).

Fig. 4.14 How worried about climate change are you? (%)






Fig. 4.15 Young people who is very/extremely worried about climate change



In particular, women, those aged 20-25 years old, youth with a migration background, and those living in big cities are more worried about this issue (Fig. 4.15). The difference by gender is quite significant and indicates that females tend to be more concerned than males about this aspect.

In line with their concern about the environment, more than half of German youth feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change (Fig. 4.16).

Fig. 4.16 To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to reduce climate change? (%)



Almost seven out ten of them would buy the most energy efficient home appliances (Fig. 4.17), do things to reduce their energy use (Fig. 4.18), and are quite confident to be able to use less energy than they do now (Fig. 4.19). Women, those older than 25 years of age, and those living in big cities or their suburbs, tend to be more engaged in these forms of everyday engagement (Fig. 4.20, Fig. 4.21). The other subgroups are confident that they could use less energy than now and do more to reducing climate change (Fig. 4.22).

Fig. 4.17 How likely to buy most energy efficient home appliance




Fig. 4.18 How often do things to reduce energy use



Fig. 4.19 Confidence in using less energy than now




Fig. 4.20 Young people who would buy most energy efficient home appliance (%)




Fig. 4.21 Young people who do things to reduce energy use




Fig. 4.22 Young people confident that could use less energy than now





Fig. 4.23 In the last 12 months, have you... (%)



The young respondents also expressed other forms of everyday engagement.

Political online activity and political consumption appear as the most practiced forms of engagement (Fig. 4.23).

Almost four out of ten young people had posted or shared something about political matters online. The main differences, in this case, are by gender and migration background: females and youth who experienced migration find it easier express their positions online (Fig. 4.25).

Boycotting products (Fig. 4.24) is less likely by very young people, but women appear as the most critical consumers. In both cases, those living in big cities tend to be more engaged in these activities.

A small group of young people (about one in ten) express their political view by wearing or displaying badges and stickers (Fig. 4.23). (The small size of this group does not allow any meaningful breakdown by sociodemographic characteristics).

Fig. 4.24 Young people who boycotted certain products (%)





Fig. 4.25 Young people who posted or shared anything about politics online



Although half of German young people said they were not interested in politics (Fig. 4.12), in their daily life they express political opinions and follow political activities with quite an assiduity.

Less than two out of ten of them spend less than ten minutes a day following current political issues. More than four out of ten spend between 11 and 30 minutes, and about one-quarter reads, watches, or listens to political news for more than half an hour a day.

The main differences in this form of participation are by gender, age, and migration background (Fig. 4.27), with males, those older than 25 years old, and youth who experienced migration following the political news more than females, the youngest, and native Germans.

Fig. 4.26 Time spent in a day to follow news about politics, current affairs (watching, reading, listening)





Fig. 4.27 Young people who spend more than 30 minutes a day for following political news



Project Identity

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