promoting youth involvement and social engagement

# PROMISE: Promoting Youth Involvement and Social Engagement: Opportunities and challenges for 'conflicted' young people across Europe.

# Report on Value Gaps: Investigating links between youth participation and values, living conditions, and conflict

**Summary:** PROMISE used existing data gathered across Europe, analysing data both from a country-specific perspective, and at a European level to provide cross-national comparisons. This report discusses the different forms of societal participation and protest employed by youth (from low engagement / low activism to illegal protest activities), and how this relates to the efficacy of engagement (openness of authorities; and confidence in governments and political parties to listen to youth and respond to their concerns). Motivators, facilitators, and inhibitors for engagement are identified both in the immediate living conditions of the youth and in the larger societal context.

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## 1.1 Background and Aims of PROMISE

PROMISE explores the role of young people (aged 14 to 29 years) in shaping society; past, present and future. It addresses their engagement with social, environmental and political issues and the potential, across Europe, for youth involvement in positive social action and sustainable change.

Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, PROMISE focuses specifically on young people 'in conflict' with authority (and usually, therefore, in conflict with social norms), who are seen to be the most 'problematic' in terms of positive social engagement, often triggering negative and punitive responses from authority, in turn furthering marginalisation and stigmatisation. The negative effects of stigma and marginalisation reduce opportunities for young people to engage positively in social action, and as a result, much of the creativity, innovation and energy within these groups is directed away from positive social change. Such 'conflicted youth' present significant opportunities for change and should therefore be the prime focus of policy makers and practitioners. PROMISE will explore the opportunities and means for converting conflict into positive social achievement amongst conflicted youth across Europe. Our overall aim is to unlock the potential and 'promise' of Europe's youth.

The aims of PROMISE are:

- To provide a picture of the nature and extent of the multiplicity of young people's involvement in society, barriers and opportunities to participation and future potential for engaging in social change.
- To identify and analyse the particular conditions that encourage or prevent youth participation.
- To explain the nature of relationships that present barriers for socio-ecological transition in diverse groups of young people across Europe.
- To identify and analyse the unique context of conflicted youth that contributes to the creation of youth on the margins across Europe.
- To provide an analysis of normative responses to the conflicts young people face.
- To understand the role of gender in youth participation: specifically to understand the experiences of young women and girls and how this can be addressed.
- To understand the roles of generation, ethnicity, class and other areas of diversity in youth participation and how these can be addressed.

The objectives will be achieved through analysis of existing data, and through of new data collected in the ten participating countries.


PROMISE involves twelve partners in ten countries.

# Report on Value Gaps

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Throughout the text, and in the tables, country names are abbreviated as follows:
HR=Croatia; EE=Estonia; FI=Finland; DE-E=East Germany; DE-W=West Germany; GB=Great Britain; IT=Italy; PT=Portugal; RU=Russia; SK=Slovakia; ES=Spain.

# Report on Value Gaps

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Findings:*

- Across Europe, around 2008 to 2010, 38% of young people aged 18-29 were engaged or were ready to engage in legal activities, and 34% even in legal and illegal activities. 25% were engaged by discussing politics and keeping themselves informed. **Only 27% would engage in neither of these activities.**

- **Education is a clear enabler of social engagement**. In 23 of the analyzed 32 countries, those with the highest educational background are clearly more likely to engage. Exceptions to this rule are mainly the Scandinavian countries (where, however, both education and engagement levels are above average anyway).

- For activism, also a **lack of sufficient resources** can be a reason for lower social involvement. Low income is a key predictor of low activism. Other individual-level factors that foster higher engagement and activism profiles are socialization (discussion with parents at an early age), class (parental educational background) and trust in those around them. For activism, confidence in democracy is another important factor increasing participation.

- Country differences in participation seem to be conditioned on the national income level (GDP), the freedom of speech, the openness of the political system, the generational value differences, and the resources provided to youth in terms of educational, employment and welfare support – and, as a separate point, the level of support for disadvantaged youth.

*Policy recommendations:*

- **Discussions about societal topics at an early age** are conducive to higher engagement in later life even when resources are low. This gives importance to the role of the schools to strengthen political debate in the classroom and create a culture of participation.

- Even more than trust in political institutions, it is **trust in other people** that is able to increase political and social engagement. Social work that provides young people with enabling social relationships can be a good approach to improve personal trust levels.

- **Encompassing youth support** in all areas (education, employment, social) at least for the socially disadvantaged, and those facing multiple life challenges, seems crucial to enable those youth to make their voices heard.

# Report on multi-level analyses of youth participation: Investigating links between youth participation and values, living conditions, and conflict

## 1. Introduction

Even though all democratic countries guarantee de jure political equality, de facto large differences in representation arise (Schneider & Maksin, 2014). The young are a group that is often underrepresented. Firstly, this can be due to personal decisions to abstain from voting and other forms of social and political participation. But a second reason at the core of lower youth participation seems to be their limited resources or "endowments"[1] combined with limited political ambitions to include this group in societal decision-making, which results in their lower political interest, lower trust in democracy and lower feelings of political efficacy (Harris et al., 2010). Nonetheless, there is large variation in the level of youth social and political engagement across Europe (Pilkington and Pollock 2015) that persists when very different definitions of societal engagement, from private (individual action) to public (collective action), are being analysed (see Report on Values and Behaviours).

The relation between country-level factors and participation has been a focus of the political participation literature, which regards differences in amount and form of participation to be the product of specific political systems (political opportunity structures) (Dahl, 1971; Meyer 2004, de Moor 2016). While the scientific debate covers the relationship between social participation and institutions in depth, less attention has been paid to the differing access of particular groups. Young people have a special standing in the social system, as they are often considered as "citizens in the making" and are less likely to receive attention for their concerns due to their assumed limited experience. On the other hand, young people are also outsiders in the labour market (Bonoli, 2005) and limited social citizens (Chévalier 2016). More specific factors that can inform their social/collective action – apart from the political and social environment and cultural and historical backgrounds in general (Lipset, 1960, Inglehart 1997) – are therefore their socialisation (Grasso 2018) as well as their social positioning (Soler-i- Martí & Ferrer-Fons 2015) and the support provided to youth groups with less resources and smaller "systems of social capital"[2] (Raffo and Reeves, 2010).

It is the aim of this report is to explain the link between young people´s values, political ideas and resources and their propensity to engage in social activities that foster these goals. At the same time, we aim to take into account the societal potential for conflict stemming from generational differences in values, and to consider the impact of the political structure of a country, the degree of institutional social control (input possibilities) and the political

1 From a normative democratic theory, political participation should be "endowment-insensitive" (Teorell, 2006), meaning that the individual choice to participate should depend on ambitions, but not on "the circumstances within which individuals pursue their ambitions" (Kymlicka 1990).

2 An individualised system of social capital (Raffo and Reeves, 2010) is a dynamic, social, spatial, culturally, temporally and economically embedded group, network or constellation of social relations, that has the young person at the core of the constellation and that provides authentic opportunities for everyday learning. The concept emphasizes that education is not just a private undertaking but socially embedded into the local context and social surroundings.

opportunity structure offered to the youth (in the form of transition regimes from education to employment). This report therefore combines social participation, political opportunity and youth transitions theories (Chévalier, 2016, Soler-i-Marti 2015, Lee 2014) to account for the way in which institutions play a role in accumulating advantages or disadvantages for young people – an important factor influencing their agency and therefore also societal actions.

We aim to answer the following questions:

- How does a typical young person become engaged? Which enablers/inhibiters exist generally speaking?
- When does dissatisfaction turn into apathy and when into illegal action?
- How do country-specific settings influence social and political participation?

Societal engagement can be described as an array of dimensions or facets, including everything from private (individual) to public (collective) action (Adler & Goggin 2005). Building upon the results from the Report on Values and Behaviours, two forms of social engagement will be portrayed more closely here, firstly activism, and secondly standby engagement (Amnå and Ekman 2014). These forms of engagement were chosen because they reflect the two extremes that are traditionally said to distinguish youth´s relation to society with more risky and illegal actions on the one hand, and personal actions within a closely described sphere (Garcia-Albacete 2014) on the other hand.

For this report, we adopt a multi-level analysis approach that shows how far country differences in patterns of societal participation of young people aged 18-29 stem from different engagement cultures or from compositional effects (age, education and resources). We extended the analysis from the ten PROMISE countries to 44 or later 32 European countries (including the EU28, EFTA (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland), Russia and Serbia), as this will strengthen the analytical power of the multi-level model (see also Bryan & Jenkins 2016). The data stems from the European Value Study (EVS) and is complemented by country-level data from Freedom House, the World Bank, ILO, OECD and UIS UNESCO.

Besides setting youth engagement into its social and political context, this type of analysis can help identify factors or settings that could contribute towards stronger forms of youth engagement, likely accompanied by higher self-efficacy and sense of self-control (Cotterell 1996, Smetana et al. 2006). While political and social engagement collectively forms just one part of agency displayed by young adults (Evans, 2002), it constitutes a very interesting point of analysis because of its impact on forming society and democracy.

The report will proceed as follows: Firstly, we will recap on today's youth participation in Europe and focus on activism and standby engagement. This will include a revision of the participation/engagement classifications that we derived in the Report on Values and Behaviours. Secondly, we will draw upon social psychological models to determine individual influences on youth participation linking to the social background, agency and efficacy and values as motivators for action. Thereupon, the country structure will be the focal point, with proxies for conflict potential (from generational value gaps), social control mechanisms, and opportunities arising from governmental input structures and the position conferred to youth in society. The report will close with a conclusion and recommendations.

# 2 Assessing youth participation

Young people´s engagement in current societies is – and perhaps always was – very complex, with new forms of participation emerging that are not directly state-directed but directed toward actors in the public, non-profit, and private sectors (de Moor 2016). Not only the targets of political and social involvement, but also the agencies (message carriers) and channels (forms of engagement) changed for younger generations (Norris, 2002). These trends are blurring the simplistic dichotomy of engaged versus disengaged. With the shift of focus to everyday participation and lifestyle politics, different shades of passivity and pre-political status become part of the picture (Amnå and Ekman, 2014), for an overview of recent developments in the definition of "social participation", see Report on Values and Behaviours. In this report, for defining social and political engagement we take the viewpoint of the deliberative model of democracy[3] (Habermas 1996, Elster 1998) and define participation not only as those activities aimed at influencing political decisions, but also include the opinion-formation and discussion of social issues. In our analysis, we focused on two specific activities: activism and standby engagement patterns.

## 2.1 Defining Activism and Standby engagement

Activism has been defined as all non-electoral ways of political and social participation that oppose government by means of "contentious or disruptive actions" (De Moor, 2016, p.5). In the Report on Values and Behaviours, we defined activism as encompassing two dimensions: forms of *radical protest activism* and *non-formal political activities*. The former also includes forms of illegal and violent activities and protests, including demonstrations, riots, or squatting in buildings and politically motivated unlawful acts on an individual basis (see also Ekman & Amnå 2012). The non-formal political activities comprise among others peaceful demonstrations, flash mobs, signing petitions or distributing leaflets (see also Busse et al, 2015). Activism has been called an "unconventional" form of political engagement; however it has become conventional in the way that in many societies it is nowadays often used to attain a political or societal goal. It can be state-oriented or, extending the first definition quoted above, directed at non-profit or private actors that cannot easily be reached by other means. Activism is, except for a few exemptions, a collective form of action. A precondition for participation in activism is therefore that an opportunity exists to take part, e.g. demonstrations have to be held in a reachable distance and information about such events have to be available. Political information can therefore be regarded as an enabler of activism.

In the Report on Values and Behaviours, we defined everyday engagement as encompassing standby engagement (interest in politics, talking about politics, and being informed about politics and social issues), and the propensity to take action in favour of these issues through lifestyle-related behaviour. In this report, we will focus on the narrower concept of 'standby' engagement, as it can be seen as a predecessor for activism and will therefore be able to reveal

[3] For an overview of a political philosophy-driven explanation of different models of social engagement, see Teorell, 2006.

more about the process of becoming engaged. Standby engagement is a recently defined form of social and political participation (Martín & van Deth 2007; Harris, 2010, Amnå & Ekman, 2012; Amnå & Ekman, 2014). It follows the idea of deliberative democracy that forming an opinion and discussions are vital to democratic exchanges (Habermas 1996, Elster 1998) and therefore interest in social issues, staying up to date about political developments and discussing with friends are regarded as part of social engagement. Moreover "cognitive mobilisation theory" (Norris 1999, Dalton 2008) argues that being strongly interested in politics and social issues will prepare individuals for future political action. These "monitorial citizens" (Hooghe and Dejaeghere, 2007) will however enter into action only if they feel that it is really necessary (e.g. after some kind of situational trigger). Staying passive in the public or collective context and showing lower levels of actual and manifest participation may thus be unrelated to 'private' engagement performed through acts in everyday life (Amnå & Ekman, 2014). Young people belonging to this group can therefore not be called apolitical, but rather pre-political.

Theoretically speaking, standby engagement could therefore be regarded as a predecessor or a necessary condition on which activism can be build, once the right personal triggers and opportunities occur. We will explore the specific measurement of standby engagement and activism and their relation in the following chapter to see in how far this holds true, and where the limits of the present analysis are for demonstrating this mechanism.

### 2.1.1 Looking Back: Summary of Findings from the Report on Values and Behaviours

The main outcome of the Report on Values and Behaviours was that the existing secondary data from the European Values Study support two classifications for separate aspects of participatory predispositions and behaviours of young people in the countries investigated in the PROMISE project. For that report, a latent class analysis (LCA) was conducted initially on EVS 2008 data of youth aged 18-29 years, revealing three consistent political classes of activism (low activity, legal activities and all activities) and four classes of everyday engagement (high vs. low concern, and belonging-based vs. situation-based types of moderate concern). Those classes were then replicated in completely independent analysis runs, and re-emerged when using 1999 EVS data. Moreover, a comparable structure (but with plausible differences in class sizes) was shown for the adult sub-samples of both the EVS 1999 and 2008 surveys. Further, these analyses gave good reason to believe that the substantive class structure (i.e., the importance of the survey items used to establish the classification) was comparable across the ten countries analysed. It was therefore decided to continue the subsequent analyses based on those two classifications. Two further candidates for describing participatory behaviours of youth could, in contrast, not be described with sufficient robustness based on the available data. These were 'civic engagement' and 'formal participation'. As those areas are also of lesser relevance to the general focus of the PROMISE project, they will not be investigated more closely in this report.

Substantively, the first of the latent classifications described in the Report on Values and Behaviours distinguished between individuals by their likelihood to choose particular forms or patterns of activist behaviours: 1. those with a low likelihood to engage in any form of activism; 2. those likely to engage in legal activism (petitions and demonstrations) only; and 3. those likely

to combine legal activism with illegal forms (petitions and demonstrations as before, but in addition wild strikes and illegal squatting). It is important to note that already those respondents with an expressed readiness to perform the particular kind of action, together with those who reported actually having done such actions, are counted as 'activists' here. In other words, the classification is not describing actual behaviours, but the readiness to perform such behaviours should the respondents feel it to be adequate. In particular, the class with 'legal and illegal activities' or in short 'all activities' is thus not indicating that all its members *have* committed legal offences, but rather that they would regard illegal activities as part of their personally legitimate action repertoire, should the circumstances require that. Collating the *potential* and the *actual* activists in the same classes seems necessary because of the opportunity-dependent nature of activism: if we only counted such persons as activists who reported having participated in actual actions, we would likely vastly underrepresent the readiness for such behaviours, just because demonstrations and strikes are such rare events that most of the young people would scarcely have had the occasion to ever participate in a demonstration or a strike.

Overall, the classification appears to represent two (ordinal) dimensions, which for part of the respondents can be combined: the first dimension is that of a general readiness to engage in activist behaviours, which is expressed in the contrast between the low activist class versus the other two classes. The second dimension is the readiness to also choose illegal forms of activism (but still not omitting legal ones), which is expressed in the contrast between legal activities versus all activities classes.

The second classification in the analysis (for the Report on Values and Behaviours) that proved to be methodologically stable, described various classes of 'everyday engagement'. This classification was composed of a list of items on two types of concern (geographical and social), of several items assessing the attention being paid to public affairs, and of two items that ask for actions that persons might take individually to contribute to improving societal issues (boycotting products, being ready to donate money for environmental measures). In this list of items that address a mixture of evaluative, cognitive, and behavioural dimensions, it was clearly the evaluative dimension relating to concern for others that dominated the resulting classification, whereas the items addressing attention to public affairs and everyday behaviours hardly contributed to distinguishing the classes. This LCA resulted in four classes, two of which we dubbed 'low' and 'high' concern, as those displayed either a uniformly low or high degree of concern across all the concern items. The other two classes we called 'situation-based' and 'belonging-based' concern, relating to the observation that respondents within these classes had a relative preference for *either* the rather wide and abstract concern expressions (humankind, Europeans, countrymen, people in region), *or* for the concern categories addressing socially close situations of need (elderly, sick & disabled, unemployed).

### 2.1.2 Revisiting the Dependent Variables: Standby engagement and Activism

This section will briefly introduce the new analyses that yielded the partly revised dependent variables for the multi-level regressions described later.

One reason for revisiting the classifications is that we wanted to exploit the possibility of including all European countries into the analyses, which on the one hand should provide more robust and generalizable estimates for the classes in the ten PROMISE countries, and on the other hand should allow us to judge whether any of the PROMISE countries are exceptional compared to the rest of Europe, with regard to participation behaviours of their youth. There are 47 regionally distinct sub-samples in the EVS 2008 data, which will be statistically treated as context-level units in the estimation of the latent classes.[4] The sample size at the individual level (i.e., the number of young respondents up to the age of 29, summed up across all countries) is 14,307. So the average sample size for each regional youth sub-sample is at around 300 cases. The high number of 47 context-level units mandates an adaption of the specification of the LCA models. Whereas for the earlier LCA done on the ten PROMISE countries we used a multi-group approach, we now switch to a true multi-level specification, where differences in estimated parameters between countries are treated as coming from a random distribution. This allows for treating many more countries, but it excludes formal tests of parameter equivalence between countries. Since a sufficient degree of equivalence was already confirmed for the ten PROMISE countries, we believe that assuming a similar degree of equivalence for the whole set of European countries is defensible for our purpose.




**Figure 1.** Latent Class profile for activism items among the young in EVS 2008

Looking first at activism, the class structure in the European-wide sample (see Figure 1) appears to be similar to that found in the country analyses (see the Report on Values and Behaviours). The average class sizes are different between the PROMISE country set and the full European country list for the 'low' and 'legal' classes (20% vs. 33% and 46% vs. 38% respectively), but similar for the 'all activities' class (34% vs. 33%).

4 Note that the subsequent analyses presented in sections 3 ff. use a lower number of context-level units, because the limited availability of context-level data for about a dozen countries prevents their inclusion in the multi-level regression models.

Figure 2 displays the class size estimates per country. Comparing these estimates for each PROMISE country across the original and the new analyses (not shown in detail) reveals that the estimates are not identical, but largely similar. In particular, the class size relations across countries remain by and large intact in spite of the somewhat different statistical approach.




**Figure 2.** Latent Class distributions for activism across countries in young sub-sample of EVS 2008

The Russian Federation still stands out for its high share of the low activity class, whereas e.g. Finland and Croatia are again in the all-European top group of countries with high shares of the all and legal activities classes. Looking at the overall picture in Figure 2, it appears that the internal heterogeneity between the PROMISE countries (marked with [P] in the figures) is similar to that found across all of Europe.

Turning to what we previously called standby engagement, the situation is no longer that of a straightforward replication of the analyses done for the Report on Values and Behaviours as we stated above. For the subsequent regression analysis, which aims at identifying drivers for participatory dispositions and behaviours, it is analytically not useful to work with a dependent variable that is in itself a mixture of motivations and behaviours. Rather, we now focus on the behavioural side of the item battery. In keeping with the idea of narrowing the measured concept towards 'standby' behaviours and excluding actual activities, we also dropped the two items on the everyday participatory activities of boycotting products and being ready to give up income for environmental purposes. This is supported by the observation that in a tentative replication of the original classification for the full European country set, the remaining three items clearly displayed more discriminatory power than they did in the previous analyses (done in the Report on Values and Behaviours) only for the PROMISE countries.

As Figure 3 shows, the new classification exclusively rests on the subjective importance of politics and the political information behaviour (regular consumption of political news and discussing politics).




**Figure 3.** Latent Class profile for standby engagement among the young in EVS 2008

The LCA divided respondents into two classes that appear in a clear order corresponding to the likelihood of reporting a high value on all the items. The classification thus expresses mainly a single ordinal dimension of intensity of engagement, and we dubbed the classes "low engagement" and "high engagement". The quantitatively clearly dominant class is that of low standby engagement with 75% across European countries, with the other 25% showing

moderate to high engagement. Interestingly, even in the high engagement class it is only around 35% per cent of young people who frequently discuss politics with other people. This is consistent with an understanding of standby engagement as a personal disposition that by its nature is not (yet) collectively organized and only weakly embedded in social networks.

Visual inspection of Figure 4, which displays the country-specific class distributions, reveals no evident pattern over the countries, so identifying possible common factors on the country level will be left for the multilevel regressions.




**Figure 4.** Latent Class distributions for standby engagement across countries in young sub-sample of EVS 2008

### 2.1.3 The relation between activism and standby engagement

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, theoretically speaking, standby engagement can be regarded as a first step into activism, or even as a necessary condition on which activism is build. We would assume that from among the numerous young people that are staying informed and talking about politics, a certain percentage is taking the leap into activism if the right personal triggers and situational conditions are there; and that among the standby engaged a much higher percentage is engaged in activism than among the non-standby engaged. However, in this report, the analysis of the motivational relation between standby engagement and activism is restricted, because we are using a conceptualisation of activism that is in itself also "latent": We are not only measuring actual behaviours to describe 'activism', but we also include young persons in the activist classes for whom activism activities are subjectively considered part of their legitimate action repertoire. In contrast to that, our measure of standby engagement is largely comprised of self-reports about actual behaviours (news reading and discussing politics) and thus not only attitudinal. So the empirical measure for activism is in essence much 'softer' and wider than that for standby engagement, with the counter-intuitive result that the activist groups are larger than the standby group (see Figure 5).




Note: Areas in the various objects are only roughly indicative of the relative class sizes. The grey box indicates "all social participation activities" of which we only measure a few, mostly political actions. Those 27% who would never engage are clearly outside the orange boxes, but some of them will probably still be engaged in some other form.

**Figure 5:** Relationship between standby engagement and activism.

Accordingly, in the statistical analysis, the relation does not hold as strongly as theoretically suggested. Of those standby engaged, 75% are engaged in activism, while of those not standby engaged, only 60% are engaged in one of the activism types. The Pearson correlations (for the sake of simplicity, across all countries) between activism and standby engagement still have the expected directions: -0.17 with low activism, 0.3 with legal activism, and 0.14 with legal & illegal activism.

Nonetheless, Figure 6 shows that those young people who are standby engaged have in most European countries a higher likelihood to also be also engaged in activism[5]. From this, we can conclude that standby engagement is a supportive mechanism that can engender activism – as it is conceptualised in this report – but is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for it. In fact, there are more young people who engage without (currently) using deliberative elements in their daily lives.

5 Note, however, that it is strictly speaking impossible to disentangle if the information and discussions were sought by individuals because of a prior interest in engaging or if alternatively the information was part of the cause for their actions.




**Figure 6:** Comparison of activism rates among youth groups 1) engaged in standby activities (orange) and 2) those not engaged in standby activities (blue). Source: own calculation, EVS 2008.

## 2.2 Pathways to different engagement profiles

Inspired by 'purposive action theory' (Coleman 1986) and Evan's (2002) theory of 'bounded agency', we started from the assumption that citizens engage in collective and individual action because they expect positive effects (of whatever kind: emotional, moral, material, individual, collective) from these actions. Actions are thus informed by their anticipated consequences both for the actor and for relevant others. However, subjective (personal) ideas can sometimes prevail over objective rationality: "Actors have a past and imagined future possibilities, both of which guide and shape actions in the present" (Evans, 2002). Especially individuals with a negative self-portrayal and low feelings of efficacy can therefore be less likely to resort to rational protest activities. It is important to note that this requires looking not only at all kinds of individual motivations, but also at 'objective' elements of the physical, material, and social situation that may be facilitators or inhibitors or restrictions to certain paths of action.

In the case of political engagement, a change in political outcomes and social change is often the objective of engagement (van Zomeren et al., 2008). In this perspective, social groups with e.g. originally poorer representation (those who can gain most) could be highly inclined to engage, under the strong condition that they avail of the necessary resources and subjective efficacy. But also those who already have a good position, which they feel to be endangered in some way, should have a high likelihood to engage, because for them the availability of action resources and thus a good chance to achieve success often is a lesser issue. But next to collective benefits, also a latent "inner need to express opinions and identities" has to be present and was identified e.g. in the (FP7) MYPLACE qualitative interviews as a frequent motivation to participate in demonstrations (Pilkington and Pollock 2015). This emotional dimension has been termed "political consciousness" (Morris 1992). Another motivation for engagement can be selective incentives (Bäck et al, 2011) that participants derive directly from taking part / forming part of a group. This group membership can also be established through sharing the same knowledge base and therefore might be a mechanism particularly important for standby engagement.

These general considerations make clear that a person can be in any of the action profiles or classes due to multiple reasons, i.e. knowing *what* a person does may reveal little information on *why* they do it. In Hirschman's (1970) famous framework of citizens who are dissatisfied with government, citizens have three response choices. They can choose exit (shown through a negation of the situation by withdrawal), or voice their concern through complaints, protest or lobbying and other forms of engagement, or remain loyal (accepting even unwanted change). Exit, but also loyalty, could be therefore linked to low activism; both loyalty and voice to legal activism; and only voice to illegal activism. "Depending on the specific configuration of trust and involvement, political apathy, conventional political activity, or political protest will result" (Zmerli & Van Meer, 2017, p.229). Thus, it is possible that a person in the 'low activism' or 'low engagement' classes is simply content with her or his social and political situation, so lacks motivation, but they could also be "apolitical" (apathy) or "disgusted with politics" (alienation), or he or she feels to have too low personal resources (efficacy) to contribute to a change. Moreover, it is possible that persons currently withdrawn from politics used legal and/or illegal action previously but felt ignored by the authorities (Clark, Golder and Golder 2017). For the debate on youth involvement, often a political disaffection with the way democracy works has

been found, while a willingness of youth to express their concerns remains (Harris et al. 2010, Pilkington and Pollock 2015).

A legal activism profile, in which a citizen adopts just legal actions, can be linked to a duty-based citizenship idea but it is also a profile that is more likely to be adapted by persons who have too much to lose (e.g. a higher social position) to engage in illegal behaviours. As illegal activism often implies a stronger physical effort (Garcia-Albercete, 2014), individuals without good health or stamina are also more likely to prefer legal action.

Lastly, illegal action has been shown to imply two different things too: first a sign of an increased repertoire of socially, but not legally, acceptable actions for ordinary citizens, and secondly an expression of dissatisfaction with those governing the country by more marginal groups who might not care that much about social acceptance (Painter-Main 2014). Illegal action is therefore more likely when citizens want to highlight a societal problem that needs to be addressed. This is also confirmed by the fact that political knowledge is strongly related to the intention to participate in illegal activism (Reichert 2016). Even though most young people reported in the study of Hooghe & Oser (2015) that it is important to obey the law to be a good citizen, they understood defending human rights or protecting the environment to be just as important. Drawing attention to a high-salience issue can therefore be a reason to use all forms of activism.

For standby engagement, the theoretical discussion has just begun. From the low-key character of the activities, it could be expected that individuals need fewer resources (in particular in terms of income) in order to carry them out. Education, which often goes hand in hand with a higher familiarity of political processes, would on the other hand be a helpful precondition for standby engagement.

## 2.3 Individual determinants of youth activism and standby engagement

Prior studies on political participation identified different factors as important determinants of participation. The civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995) emphasises the role of education and socialisation. It observes that people with less socio-economic resources are often less likely to express their political voice. Additionally, it recognises an important influence of values and ideology, as more liberal individuals are more likely to challenge the status quo (see also Dalton 2008). On the other hand, the cognitive mobilisation model sees the dissatisfaction with the institutions as a key individual factor influencing the kind of participation (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013)[6]. According to this theory, also an important relationship between standby engagement and protest exists because individuals with higher level of political interest and information are more likely to become dissatisfied and protest.

6 Moreover, the structural availability model (Passy 2001) and the social capital model of social participation (Putnam 1993) emphasize strongly the role of organizational membership and social networks, as those enable a quick distribution of information. As in our conceptualization of social engagement (see the Report on Values and Behaviours), organizational membership is already part of social engagement, we do not model these factors separately.

Specific studies focussing on the participation of youth (Pilkington and Pollock 2015, Amnå and Ekman 2014, Harris 2010) added to these general factors the individual position within the youth transition (living at home, employment status) and stressed the importance of efficacy beliefs for this age group.

In the following, the impact of the social background, efficacy and values on the activism and engagement profile will be portrayed more closely. Thereupon, different moderators within this relationship will be examined and a first hypothesis concerning these individual-level variables will be presented.

### 2.3.1 Social background

The social background forms one of the key predictors of collective action. Resources are needed to take part in the democratic dialogue, in the form of information and political knowledge (Reichert 2016), but also in the form of general education and income (e.g. for travelling to demonstrations and meetings). The socialisation theory of Bourdieu expects that the social position of an individual (or a group) influences the material, cultural and other resources available to them. Those resources can then be utilised to participate in society and to respond to political or social opportunities (Verba et al, 1995) and they are also key in formulating and vocalising demands. Persons with lower education, lower income and other social disadvantages therefore tend to participate less in politics (Schneider & Maksin, 2014). Socialisation plays another important role (Grasso, 2018). Those young people who grew up with political discussions at home, for example, were shown to have more articulated political views (Pilkington & Pollock, 2015). In general, young people, while often being equipped with low financial resources, show higher education resources than older generations (cohort effect) and are often having more time at their disposal than working-age people (age effect) (Garcia-Albercete 2014).

### 2.3.2 Efficacy & Agency

Efficacy beliefs are, following Bandura´s social cognitive theory (1977), personal judgements about “the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of one's life”. Efficacy beliefs can be conceptualized as a composite of contingency and competence beliefs. Contingency beliefs are beliefs in the probability that certain actions will affect outcomes in particular ways. Competence beliefs are the beliefs people have about their capabilities to act in ways that will produce the probable outcomes (Evans 2002). Youth is an important phase for the formation of efficacy as it is formed by interpreting experiences and observations and emerges from positive reinforcement, much of which may be crystallized during youth’s socialization (Lee, 2010; Velasquez& LaRose 2015). Awareness of one’s own resources and independence are important in making individuals believe in their ability to voice their own opinion and beliefs, monitor political and societal processes and support social movements. Young people in an involuntary dependency situation (having to live at home, being unemployed, not being able to earn own money) will be less likely to have a feeling of mastery. Such “[p]eople who lack a sense of such mastery are likely to nurture feelings of distance and alienation that lead them to withdraw from

any kind of political engagement" (Vecchione et al 2014)[7]. Efficacy beliefs are a key driving force of agency, referring to the process that make young people actors of social change, as they define a person´s "capacity to imagine alternative possibilities" and "to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment" (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). On the other hand, "bounded agency" (Evans 2002) will be the result of limited efficacy beliefs.

### 2.3.3 Values and political consciousness

Values, although hard to define and operationalize, have often been identified as motivators for action. Parsons (1937) speaks of values as the "ultimate rationale of action", while Schwartz (1992) calls them "normative standards to judge and to choose among alternative modes of behavior". The importance of values for social engagement is also reflected in the social psychology literature (see e.g. Ryan & Deci 2000; Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017). The young have often been described as the natural agents of societal value change (Mannheim, 1928), which would mainly occur through cohort replacement. This reasoning is especially clear in the post-materialism debate (Inglehart, 1977, Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Inglehart (1971; 1977; 2008) noted that at least until the end of the last century, materialist values were typically diffused among older generations, in contrast with younger generations who tend to express post-materialist views. The change of values towards post-materialism and liberalism[8] is important because it is said to imply a change in the concept of citizenship (Dalton 2008), from a duty-based to a critical, yet action-based form of citizenship (Norris 2002, Dalton 2008). Post-materialism, underpinned through reflexivity, makeability and individualization, is thus likely to lead to different lifestyles and forms of participation of the youth, that can foster a potential for societal conflict, and is itself more critical of established rules and structures.

7 Next to individual efficacy beliefs, also collective efficacy beliefs exist (trust in the capabilities of a collective actor or group), which determine the likelihood of collective action according to the "group efficacy approach" (Hornsey et al 2006, Lee 2010).

8 This trend towards post-materialism and liberalism in youth is underpinned by three more general cultural tendencies: reflexivity, makeability and individualization (Ziehe 1982): Reflexivity: different from the previous generation with a lack of knowledge about what is going on in society, current young generations know "too much". Often this knowledge arrives as "secondary experience", mediated by television and social media. Makeability: much more flexibility and self-definition of lifestyle, habits, consumer culture, practices than in the past (also related to more permeable societal guidelines and rules), leading to a pluralization of life choices. Individualization: decisions are now made on an individual basis and values increasingly formed by personal choices and preferences (Ester, Braun & Mohler, 2006). Both success and blame are therefore attributed solely to the personal choices. As high aspirations are not always reachable, this creates frustration and anguish in young people.

### 2.3.4 Moderators

Young people's personal views on society and government – expressed in generalised trust[9], trust in political leaders and government and external efficacy – influence their decisions to actively express themselves on matters of concern, or, indeed, to turn their disaffection into withdrawal from society. We therefore understand them to be moderators of the patterns of social engagement.

External efficacy in relation to the state plays a key role. It refers to "citizens' perceptions of the state's responsiveness" (de Moor 2016). The state's responsiveness will firstly depend on its willingness and secondly on its ability to change (a dimension that is reduced within structures of multi-level governance). In the case that citizens perceive their government to have a relatively open and accessible structure, they will consider participation to be more effective, and as a result have a higher likelihood to participate (Karp & Banducci, 2008). In case that they consider their government to be less responsive, they will be less likely to engage and more likely to either withdraw or use illegal activism options.

Trust is particularly emphasised by the social capital model (Putnam 1993). It confirms that trust developed during interactions on a personal level can translate into social, political and economic engagement. While the relationship between social trust and withdrawal is thus clear, the link to a preference of legal or illegal activism is more ambiguous. Trust can create a feeling of safety, strengthening illegal activism but likewise decrease the acceptance of harm to others.

Satisfaction with political institutions, which describes the agreeableness with current political leaders, their politics, policies and ideas, is linked to a low (or legal) activism pattern, as expressed before in the description of Hirschman's model. It makes illegal activism less likely. Dissatisfaction with institutions, on the other hand, was often linked to high degrees of political participation and activism. However, empirical findings are less consistent in a cross-country comparative approach (Linde & Ekman, 2003). Youth have been found to be more likely to feel critical of government and be less satisfied with its actions. Often this has been attributed to their higher education, and lower level of duty-based citizenship (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).

*Hypothesis 1: On generational value gaps:*

*Youth with values more distant from the societal mainstream will be more likely to engage in legal activism. They will be even more likely to engage to express their opinion and feel represented in legal ways when they have trust in democracy and society as a whole and/or mistrust only specific actors within the system, such as government or party politics. When they, on the other hand, have less trust in democracy and society, they are more likely to withdraw from "mainstream" society altogether, leading to either low or illegal activism, and potentially also to low standby engagement.*

9 For young people, the standard measure of social trust is less likely to give information about the young person's generalized trust in society and more likely to reflect experiences from a much more restricted personal sphere (Gunnarson 2018). In the following, "social trust" should therefore be rather interpreted in terms of "trust developed in close social surroundings" or "enabling relationships".

# 3 The context´s influence on youth participation – conflict, control and opportunities

The social and political engagement of young people is necessarily rooted in the structural context of the country in which they were socialised (Pilkington and Pollock, 2015, Grasso, 2018). Societal conditions impose meaning and they influence the way these young people understand their reality (Reimer 1988). From reviewing PROMISE country reports (Report on Values and Behaviours), we identified eight key contextual areas, influencing the propensity to engage on an individual level. These are: 1) historical elements (importance of historical social movements), 2) presence of state control, 3) presence of youth subcultures, 4) relation between generations, 5) feelings about social change (e.g. youth feeling hit by problems caused by previous generations), 6) the societal view on youth (presentation in a risk-centred way, stigmatization), 7) youth policies and the marginality of youth as a social position, and 8) the youth's socio-economic position (see also Annex 2). In our analysis we will try to boil down the wide array of factors influencing social involvement by focussing on four main factors: conflict between generation, state control, state policies and the position of youth in society.

## 3.1 Conflict – the generational value gap

The conflict dimension addresses the following questions: To what extent do young people across Europe hold values and attitudes that differ from older generations in relation to social engagement and social change? And to what extent can young people´s values and attitudes be described as innovative and progressive? Given that values are a generic key dimension motivating behaviour, explicit differences are likely to result in conflict, if the gap between positions cannot be reconciled on another level. From the value gap, we can infer information about any latent or openly enacted conflict between generations, besides more manifest conflict areas such as problematic labour market access for the young. As has been noted by Reimer (1988): "where distrust may be found toward earlier solutions, new formations [and protest] may offer an alternative". And in fact, it has been found that protest activism is associated with the closeness of political ideas to the family: the further a young person's ideas are from his or her family's, the more politically active a young person is (Pilkington and Pollock, 2015).

Also, the fact that the older generation, with its higher financial and societal resources, is more likely to influence the direction of politics (Vanhuysse 2014) can increase the conflict potential of value gaps. Therefore, high generational value differences (or in general differences between the youth´s values and those defined as mainstream and adopted in national policies) are likely to lead to political and social action and involvement of the young.

*Hypothesis 1b: On generational value gaps:*

*In countries with a higher generational value gap (greater conflict potential), youth will be more likely to adapt a more engaged activism profile and be more standby engaged.*

## 3.2 Control - Political setting and the level of state authority

The influence of the political setting on levels of engagement and activism is a well-researched item in social activism literature and, especially, in political opportunity literature (Eisinger 1973; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1996). Recently, political opportunity theory was also applied to everyday engagement (Christensen 2011, De Moor 2016). Political opportunity theory holds that individuals are more inclined to engage in action, the more likely it is that this political or social action will be able to influence the political context and bring about the intended goal (Opp 2009, Lee 2012). The amount and form of social and political participation is therefore depending on a state's[10] : 1) relative openness of the political system for input from citizens, 2) stability of political alignments, 3) level of social control and repression, and 4) the presence of strong allies within government or civil society for a cause (McAdam 1996). These four factors broadly describe the input structure of a state. The output structure on the other hand refers to the system's ability to decide on and implement policies (van der Heijden 2006). Next to the fixed opportunity setting, also temporary opportunities such as elections, crises, or increased media coverage of certain topics can increase the likelihood of engagement. The input and output structures are likely to differ according to the conflictuality of the topic, the form of political engagement and the position of the claimant (Meyer, 2004). For youth, the input structure is therefore possibly different from persons of older age and with a higher societal standing. Especially in countries in which a high stigmatization and presentation of youth in a risk-centred group is occurring, a lower openness of the political structure to youthful claimants can be expected. Unfortunately, we can only measure general political openness in our analysis.

*Hypothesis 2: On political structure:*

*In countries with a higher political openness, youth will be more likely to adapt a more engaged (but mostly legal) activism profile. For standby engagement, no strong effect of openness is expected, as it is mostly indirectly influenced by the political structure.*

The level of state control and repressions forms another important factor that has been already analysed within the political opportunities theory (McAdam 1996). Social control can be directed firstly at other institutions and bodies (such as the press), but also at individuals directly through severe sanctions for illegal actions. Both ways of social control are influencing the likelihood to participate in protest activism, however through different logics. While in the first case, the information availability will be restricted through governmentally controlled output from state and non-state institutions (Djankow 2003)[11], in the second case the personal costs that might be incurred when using legal but also illegal forms of activism will rise, disincentivizing alternative

[10] However, the degree to which the political setting predefines the likelihood of activism also depends on the degree of sovereignty of the country on a specific subject, the more global or local the issue at hand, the less national political opportunity structures will be predicting the degree of engagement (Tilly 2004).

11 Another strand of research analyses how social media is influencing the relationship between state restriction, political information and political activism (see e.g. Shirky 2011). This will however not be included within the analysis, as we have no information on social media use of respondents. Here, the mechanisms leading to engagement could however be very different ones.

forms of protest[12]. In general, protests occur when the government allows for a space of toleration, meaning that the politically active persons are neither in a position of advantage or dependency from the state, nor so completely repressed as to prevent them from voicing their concerns (Meyer 2004). We therefore assume a curvilinear relationship between activism and social control:

*Hypothesis 3: On social control:*

*In countries with a higher social control, youth will be more likely to adopt an illegal activism profile, until a certain point when the cost of using illegal action becomes too high. Contrarily: low activism should firstly be increasing with higher social control and after a point decreasing. Standby engagement is likely to be influenced particularly by governmental control of other institutions, such as the press. Restricted availability of politically unfiltered information is likely to decrease standby engagement.*

## 3.3 Opportunities – Political opportunities and the position of youth in society

For understanding different practices of youth engagement, youth's position within society and the support provided to vulnerable youth groups also has to be considered. Youth's social position and the way young people are treated and supported by public and private institutions are likely to determine their expectations and to influence their individual practices and collective action.

In general, youth transitions to adulthood have become prolonged and fragmented in all Western European countries, leading to a situation in which a dependency situation (due to low personal income or unemployment) can last until the late-30s (combined with other aspects of adult autonomy)[13]. Youth in most welfare states are not treated as having the same citizenship status as older people in the same situation (Chévalier 2016), as their financial support is often left with their family and not taken over by the state (whose policies are oriented towards "standard biographies", which do not include youth unemployment). Moreover, the difficulty to enter segmented labour markets is combined with difficult conditions (unpaid internships or very low paid work, atypical employment, no longer-term or permanent job options). Societies differ however in how they structure this transition (Schwanitz 2017) and in the support they offer for different youth groups (Lee 2014, Thévenon 2015).

The levels of state support strongly influence the youth trajectories and life chances (Schwanitz 2017), but also the perceived efficacy of youth[14]. The available resources and efficacy beliefs

12 In the analysis "freedom of the press" will be used to analyse the statement on social control. Freedom of the press is an institutional form of social control, but it will also serve as a proxy to test the effect of personal social control on activism, given the high correlation between the two concepts.

13 Youth trajectories also differ by social class (Lee 2014, Buchman & Kriesi 2011). For young people from families with less academic and financial resources, just slightly above half of the age group proceed to higher education (the transition described by "emerging adulthood" studies), transitions from education to direct labour market entry (in the form of employment or unemployment), alternative education, and various forms of non-market activity (including care responsibilities and family formation) being just as common (Carcillo et al. 2015)

14 This is even more so the case in an increasingly individualized world, in which blame is sought in personal decisions, rather than in structural problems (Bauman, 2001, Wyn, 2015)

then in turn can influence the social participation, as has been widely explored within the policy feedback effect literature (Pierson 1993, Campbell 2012, for specific studies on social policies, see Kumlin 2004, Alber & Kohler 2009, Anderson 2009, Ferragini 2017, Shore 2019)[15]:

While there are several studies focused on youth transition regimes and their classification (Walther 2005, Thévenon 2015[16], Chévalier 2016[17]), the analysis of their influence on social participation has so far only been explored in the MYPLACE project (by Soler-i-Martí & Ferrer-Fons 2005). Soler-i-Martí and Ferrer-Fons (2015) identified transition schemes based on the degree of exposure to risk, the length of young people's pathways to adulthood and the welfare state's generosity and age-orientation. They divided countries into four clusters depending on their score of the youth transition scheme18 and found that in societies with a higher centrality of youth, a tendency towards institutional participation and protest action prevails, while in those societies with lesser centrality of youth, youth showed greater passivity along with more illegal forms of protest (Soler-i-Martí and Ferrer-Fons, 2015). They thus provided first evidence in their study of 12 European countries of the fact that the structural support to youth accounts for the different participation of young adults in Europe (Soler-i-Martí and Ferrer-Fons, 2015). Notably, the logic of this centrality-argument is parallel to the earlier hypothesis about political openness or restrictiveness, but now looking at the action resources of the youth provided by a given society and not at the openness (or lack thereof) for such actions. We will see if we can confirm this finding using a slightly different conceptualisation of youth transition schemes for 32 European countries.

*Hypothesis 4: On youth transition schemes.*

*In countries with a more inclusive youth transition scheme, youth will be less likely to adopt a low or illegal activism profile and will be more engaged in legal and standby engagement activities.*

15 "Because public policies can tangibly influence the level of politically relevant resources that citizens possess – such as money, free time and skills – they can affect the political and civic behaviour of target populations in an apparently direct manner" (Campbell, 2012)

16 Thévenon (2015) focuses on the support to vulnerable youth and divides between a conservative (Keeping in the family), a liberal (Becoming a financially responsible adult) and a social-democratic model (Becoming an independent citizen).

17 Chévalier (2016) has written the so far most extensive review of youth welfare regimes. He distinguishes between "social citizenship" and "economic citizenship" to form a classification of European youth regimes. Social citizenship refers to financial freedom of the youth (right to claim state support), while economic citizenship refers to the organisation of the labour market entrance to the youth, which he divides between "skills for all" and "skills for the best" strategies (based on the skill and educational inequalities within the training and educational system). He identifies four clusters of youth citizenship:

- denied youth welfare citizenship (limited benefits, limited education): ES, PT, FR, IT, BE, GR
- second class (individualized benefits, limited education): UK, IE
- monitored citizenship (limited benefits, open education access): DE, AT, LU
- enabling citizenship (individualized benefits, open education access): SE, FI, DK, NL

18 High centrality of youth: Scandinavia and Germany, second-highest centrality of youth: UK and Baltics, lower centrality of youth: Eastern Europe, lowest centrality of youth: Mediterranean countries

Figure 7 visually summarizes the various hypothesized relations between individual and country-level effects on standby engagement and activism.




**Figure 7:** Model of social and political engagement determinants

## 4 Methodology

The analysis was carried out using a multilevel model for 32 countries, using European Values Study (EVS) data collected during the time period 2008-2010. The EVS uses representative multi-stage random samples[19]. These data were chosen because the present report directly builds on the results from the Task 4.1 as reported in the "Report on values of the young and according participation behaviours: European Report level 2". Through the Task 4.1 we obtained the patterns of social and political engagement that we aim to explain in the current Report. Upstream, the decision of using EVS data was made upon the exploration of all the cross-sectional survey data available for the ten countries involved in the PROMISE project. We considered also the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD-2) as an additional potential source of data, as suggested in the review of the first Periodic Report of the PROMISE project, but this source would not be compatible with the analyses of this report because of country coverage (Croatia, Slovakia, and Great Britain are not surveyed in ISRD-2), and different age-range of the youth sampled - in ISRD-2 the respondents are 12-15 years old, while the age range at which PROMISE aims is from 14 to 29 years.

At the project workshop held in Rome (February 2017), the partners involved in this work package agreed with the proposal of expanding the analyses to a broader sample, including all

19 More detailed information can be found on the EVS website (http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/).

the available countries, in order to enhance their statistical power and provide an additional overview of the European countries.

## 4.1 Sample

The countries included in the analysis are the EU28 (minus Cyprus and Malta), plus EFTA countries (Island, Norway and Switzerland), plus Russia and Serbia.

**Table 1**: Sample: youth between 18-30 years of age

| country | N | % male | % female | % low ACT | % legal ACT | % all ACT | % high standby |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AT | 316 | 45,3% | 54,7% | 35.2% | 25.4% | 39.4% | 32,4% |
| BE | 266 | 51,1% | 48,9% | 21.6% | 38% | 40.4% | 27,1% |
| BG | 252 | 40,1% | 59,9% | 52.6% | 29.6% | 17.8% | 24,6% |
| CH | 188 | 51,6% | 48,4% | 26% | 41.6% | 32.4% | 26,4% |
| CZ | 350 | 55,1% | 44,9% | 29% | 36.8% | 34.2% | 12,8% |
| DE-E | 150 | 48,7% | 51,3% | 19.5% | 45.4% | 35% | 37,2% |
| DE-W | 143 | 49,7% | 50,3% | 22.6% | 36.9% | 40.5% | 41,7% |
| DK | 205 | 49,8% | 50,2% | 13.2% | 26.3% | 60.6% | 48,2% |
| EE | 266 | 45,5% | 54,5% | 50% | 27% | 23% | 15,8% |
| ES | 302 | 46,0% | 54,0% | 21.6% | 35.7% | 42.7% | 22,5% |
| FI | 170 | 47,1% | 52,9% | 17.5% | 44.6% | 37.9% | 19,9% |
| FR | 237 | 47,3% | 52,7% | 6.1% | 38.3% | 55.6% | 45,3% |
| GB | 223 | 39,0% | 61,0% | 42.8% | 27.3% | 29.9% | 23,4% |
| GR | 247 | 45,7% | 54,3% | 42.7% | 37.8% | 19.5% | 33,9% |
| HR | 408 | 41,4% | 58,6% | 15.6% | 30.8% | 53.7% | 15,5% |
| HU | 368 | 52,7% | 47,3% | 67.9% | 24.2% | 7.9% | 14,2% |
| IE | 217 | 44,7% | 55,3% | 31.3% | 35.8% | 32.9% | 21,7% |
| IS | 174 | 54,0% | 46,0% | 10.9% | 48% | 41.1% | 41,9% |
| IT | 300 | 49,7% | 50,3% | 11% | 49.6% | 39.4% | 43,1% |
| LT | 330 | 46,1% | 53,9% | 31.9% | 51.2% | 16.9% | 11,9% |
| LU | 640 | 49,4% | 50,6% | 15.4% | 43% | 41.6% | 38,6% |
| LV | 352 | 41,5% | 58,5% | 40.3% | 37.9% | 21.8% | 17,1% |
| NL | 109 | 53,2% | 46,8% | 33.6% | 34.4% | 32% | 29,7% |
| NO | 211 | 47,4% | 52,6% | 14.4% | 57.7% | 27.9% | 33,3% |
| PL | 381 | 45,9% | 54,1% | 36.6% | 31.4% | 32% | 19,0% |
| PT | 189 | 46,6% | 53,4% | 42.5% | 32.4% | 25.1% | 25,2% |
| RO | 287 | 43,6% | 56,4% | 63.4% | 29.4% | 7.2% | 13,2% |
| RS | 321 | 44,9% | 55,1% | 32.8% | 30.5% | 36.7% | 19,0% |
| RU | 344 | 36,9% | 63,1% | 68.3% | 21.7% | 10% | 27,2% |
| SE | 165 | 46,7% | 53,3% | 15.1% | 51% | 33.9% | 30,4% |
| SI | 252 | 50,4% | 49,6% | 25.9% | 28.7% | 45.4% | 5,9% |
| SK | 131 | 42,7% | 57,3% | 51% | 39.2% | 9.8% | 10,2% |
| Total | 8494 | 46,6% | 53,4% | 32% | 35.8% | 32% | 25,9% |

*Note: ACT: Activism profile, EDE: standby engagement profile.*

These countries were chosen as they are included in the EVS data and offer sufficient comparable information on the macro level (accessible from international sources).

The total number of youth in the analysis is 8,494, with national samples ranging from 130 to 640 young people, with a slightly higher share of women in most countries. Among the included countries, Denmark shows the highest number of youth engaged in all forms of activism (with more than 60%), followed by France, while Norway, Lithuania and Sweden have most people engaged in legal activism. Low activism is particularly prevalent in Russia and Hungary (both 68%). For standby engagement, the high engagement profile is most often found in Denmark, France and Italy (with 48-43%), and least often in Slovakia and Slovenia (with 6-10%).

## 4.2 Multilevel model

Multilevel models are an extension of regression models that are commonly used for hierarchical data, i.e. for situations in which different units of observation are nested within each other. Through a multilevel model we are able to identify significant predictors, both at the individual and contextual level, and to explain to what extent the variance we may find at individual level is due to the country characteristics (Hox and Kreft 1994; Hox 2002; Snijders, Bosker, and Bosker 1999). Multilevel models account for the correlated error-terms present in clustered data (due to the correlation of observations) which violate the i.i.d. assumption of regression analysis (that states that variables have to be: independent and identically distributed – i.i.d.).

Multilevel analysis does so by allowing intercepts and slopes of household-level data to vary across the regional and state parameters (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). Without this specification, the standard errors of the higher-level parameter effects, in this case the effects of the country level, would be biased downward. The model for activism was constructed with the Stata-command for generalised structural equation models (gsem), using Stata15 and the binary model for standby engagement using xtmelogit.

The analysis of standby engagement presents less statistical difficulties as it presents a binary dependent variable. The only adaption done for standby engagement was to calculate average marginal effects for a better representation of coefficients. For the three-fold division of activism, however, a multi-nominal multi-level model was adopted. Even though a ranking of the categories is conceptually possible, the proportional odds assumption, which assumes that the coefficient can describe the change from a lower to a higher category for multiple cuts (Williams 2016) does not hold. Moreover, it is in any case our purpose to look at different activism profiles, and not at “more or less” activism.

The multinomial logistic regression can address these multiple unordered outcomes and calculates the probability of choosing one outcome category over the probability of choosing the base category (Agresti, 2007). We decided to choose legal activism as the base or reference category, to understand the predictors explaining illegal activism and withdrawal. The coefficients presented are logs of the probability of the category divided by the probability of the

base category, called relative-risk ratios (StataCorp 2017). (For further explanation of the multi-nominal multi-level model, see Steele 2013.) These risk ratios should be interpreted as multivariate descriptions and correlations and are not apt to indicate the causal relation. Therefore, mechanisms of engagement cannot be directly deduced from them.

## 4.3 Operationalisation

The individual-level variables were retrieved from the EVS 2008 data. To control for the social position of youth, we could draw on information on income, education, as well as the educational background of the parents and the political socialisation (political discussions at age 14 with parents). The individual position within the youth transition is operationalized by activity status, the experience of unemployment within the last 3 years and by (not) living with the parents or grandparents. Internal efficacy is determined by the feeling of control over the own life, and external efficacy by the satisfaction with the way democracy works within the country. Lastly, the personal need for societal change is assessed by the score on the post-materialism index, as well as social trust and the trust in government and political parties (see Table 2).

**Table 2**. Operationalisation of individual-level variables

| Concept | Indicator | Coding |
|---|---|---|
| Dependent variables: Preferred form of participation | | |
| Activism (ACT) | ▪ Illegal and legal activities<br>▪ legal activities<br>▪ low activity | Class codes from LCA on<br>▪ signing petitions (e025),<br>▪ attending demonstrations (e027),<br>▪ participating in unofficial strikes (e028),<br>▪ occupying buildings (e029) |
| Standby engagement profile (EDE) | ▪ High engagement<br>▪ Low engagement | Class codes from LCA on<br>▪ Importance of politics (e023),<br>▪ discuss politics (a062),<br>▪ read about politics (e150) |
| Indep. variables – indiv. level | | |
| Social position | ▪ Sex<br>▪ Age<br>▪ level of education<br>▪ highest education level attained mother/father<br>▪ socialisation<br>▪ citizenship | ▪ 1: male, 2: female (x001)<br>▪ 1: 18-21 years, 2: 22-25 years, 3: 26-29 years (x003)<br>▪ ISCED level (x025r): 1: lower, 2: middle, 3: higher education<br>▪ ISCED level (v004e) : 0: don´t know, 1- lower, 2- middle, 3- upper<br>▪ Political discussions at home at age 14 with mother/father(v012, v016): 1: "Yes" 2: "To some extent" 3: "No"<br>▪ 0: foreign, 1: national (g005) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Individual position within the youth transition | ▪ activity status | ▪ 1: employed (dependent, self-employed, military service)<br>▪ 2: care-taker and other<br>▪ 3: student,<br>▪ 4: unemployed |
| | ▪ experience of unemployment (longer than 3 months) | ▪ 0 – No, 1 – Yes (x037_01) |
| | ▪ living independently | ▪ 0 – No, 1 – Yes (X022_03A, X022_04A) |
| Resources for action & opportunities | ▪ Monthly income | ▪ Income brackets (x047b): 0: Missing, 1: 0-500 Euro, 2: 500-1000 Euro, 3: 1000-1500 Euro, 4: 1500-2500 Euro, 5: > 2500 Euro |
| | ▪ Location | ▪ 0: Rural (below 20.000), 1: urban (above 20.000) (x049a) |
| Individual efficacy & agency | ▪ External efficacy | ▪ satisfaction with the way democracy works in this country (e110) : 0: "Don´t know" 1:"Very satisfied", 2: "Rather satisfied", 3:"Not very satisfied", 3:"Not at all satisfied" |
| | ▪ Internal efficacy | ▪ feeling of control over own life (a173): from 1:"not at all" to 10:"a great deal" |
| Perceived need for social change | ▪ Value structure | ▪ postmaterialism aims of the country in next 10 years (Y002):1: materialist, 2: mix, 3: post-materialist |
| | ▪ perceived conflict | ▪ trust in people (a165): 0: don´t know", 1: "people can be trusted", 2: "rather be careful"<br>▪ trust in political parties (E069_12): 0 "Don´t know", 1: "A great deal" 2: "Quite a lot", 3: "Not very much" 4: none at all""<br>▪ trust in national government (E069_11): 0 "Don´t know", 1: "A great deal" 2: "Quite a lot", 3: "Not very much" 4: none at all" |

Macro level variables were retrieved from Freedom House, the World Bank, ILO, OECD and UIS UNESCO. The generational value gap was constructed based on generational differences in the post-materialism indicator after having analysed multiple other options (see Annex 1). This proxy for generational value presents most significant conflict lines between generations across the 44 European countries and the generational gap seems to be most closely related to the other divides, as it correlates highly with gender issues and parental values (but also with objective conditions such as GDP). Social control was controlled for by using the freedom of press index from Freedom House and the functioning of the government index was used to assess the accountability of the political structure. Similar to Soler-i-Marti (2015), we constructed a youth transition regime variable to understand in how far the societal position of youth is influencing their practices (see Annex 3). Different from their index, we also included a dimension on educational quality and inequality using outcomes from the PISA scores. The index created shows an internal consistency of 0.83 (alpha) (see Annex 4).

**Table 3**: Operationalisation of country-level variables

| Concept | Indicator | Source | Expected effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Societal conflict | ▪ Post-materialism gap | The association of the post-materialism index with the dichotomous generation (young vs. adult) variable, expressed by Cramer's V | on low ACT: **-**<br>on legal ACT: **+**<br>on all ACT:**+**<br>on SBE: + |
| Political structure | ▪ Functioning of government | Freedom House scale from 0 (worst) to 12 (best): based on accountability of government, openness and transparency, 2008 | on low ACT: **-**<br>on legal ACT:+<br>on all ACT: **-**<br>on SBE: **/** |
| Social control | ▪ Freedom of press | Freedom House scale ranges from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free): based on laws and regulations, political pressures and controls, economic influences and repressive actions, 2008 | on low ACT: **-***<br>on legal ACT: **-**<br>on all ACT:**+***<br>on SBE: **-**<br>***a curvilinear function is expected** |
| Youth transition schemes | Scale from 0 (low youth empowerment) to 100 (high youth empowerment). Index with an alpha of 0.83 including: | | on low ACT: **-**<br>on legal ACT: **+**<br>on all ACT: -<br>on SBE: + |
| | ▪ Employment | ▪ Share of youth not in education, employment or training, total (% of youth population), ILO (2008-2010)<br>▪ Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24), ILO (2008-2010) | |
| | ▪ Education | ▪ Educational quality: Pisa reading scores, OECD (2009)<br>▪ Educational inequality score: slope of the socio-economic gradient from the Pisa reading scores, OECD(2009) | |
| | ▪ Welfare State | ▪ Public social expenditure on child and family benefits (excluding health) (in % of GDP) (ILO, 2010/11)<br>▪ Government expenditure on education (in % of GDP) (UIS UNESCO, 2008-2010) | |
| | ▪ Length of Youth transition | ▪ Average age of grownup children (16-50) living with parents (EVS data, 2008-2010) | |

*Note: ACT: Activism profile, SBE: standby engagement profile.*

# 5 Results

Table 4 shows the output from the two multinomial multi-level analyses for activism and standby engagement. We are using 'legal activism' and 'low standby engagement' as the base categories of the dependent variables against which the other outcomes are compared. Wald tests were carried out subsequently per variable for activism, in order to check whether there is a statistically significant effect of all categories of a predictor variable on the dependent variable (as opposed to significance for individual contrasts between categories, which depends on the specific contrast being tested). The micro-level results in Table 4 were obtained while controlling for the macro-level explanatory factors visible in Table 6 and 7. Note that showing the estimated parameters in different tables is only done for ease of presentation.

In Table 5, a separate estimation is shown, for which we included the value-conflict indicator and its interaction terms. As the individual value-conflict indicator would be obscuring the effect of variables on the political level (in particular for the generational value gap), it was excluded from the first calculation but is portrayed here to show the information on the social and political engagement of those "conflicted youth" who show highly different ideas from the societal mainstream.

## 5.1 Individual determinants of the activism profiles

### 5.1.1 Socio-demographic determinants

In the following, we want to depict the common characteristics that make it more likely that a young person is engaged in standby activities or in legal or legal and illegal activities. In Table 4, we see the individual characteristics of those more or less engaged. Some interesting observations can be made concerning their social upbringing, education and transitional experiences.

Firstly, those young people who are engaging in standby activities were born to parents with higher educational level. The social surrounding thus seems to be important, while the location (urban or rural) or the migration background did not matter. The same holds for activism; here parental education decreases the low engagement profile and increases the likelihood to engage in all kinds of activism.

Looking at the social background, we see for those engaged in standby engagement that the importance of own education supersedes the effect of parental education. But the highest difference is shown in standby engagement levels between those young people who used to discuss political matters at home with either father or mother when aged 14, and those who did not. Those who discussed, grow up having a 20% higher chance of being standby engaged; even occasional political debates show a distinguishable effect from those never debating politics. Moreover, the feeling of efficacy matters for standby engagement, even though the proxy used (feeling of control over own life) is not a very strong one. In the case of activism similar factors play a role, but the effect is more differentiated due to the three-fold division of the activism category. Own education is strongly related to low activism but it is not related to an increase in the legal and illegal activism profile. Different from standby engagement, the effect of the

parental education stays strong for activism when the educational level of the young person is controlled for. Also for activism, a high effect of the political socialisation through political discussions with parents is visible. Political socialisation is linked to a strong decrease in the use of legal and illegal activism, and to a lesser degree to a decrease in low activism. It therefore seems important that young people are familiarised with political processes to be making use of legal ways to voice their demands.

Table 4 shows that the transitioning into employment, and the risks and chances this entails, has moreover strong influences on the likelihood of young people to engage. This is at least true for the likelihood of engaging in activism, while for standby engagement past or current unemployment and income position show no effect. For activism, likewise the dependency status, shown through living with parents or past unemployment shows no effect. Yet, the activity status forms an important division between groups of young people, with students being more likely to engage than all other groups. All other groups are not only less likely to engage at all, but also less likely to engage in legal and illegal activities. A much more important resource than time seems to be money, however. For activism, a gradual decrease of low activism with higher income is observed. The kind of activism activity (legal or legal and illegal) is however not divided by income-group.

**Table 4**: Individual level determinants of activism profiles

| | | ACTIVISM | | ENGAGEMENT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | All activism (Ref. legal activism) | Low activism (Ref. legal activism) | Standby Engagement (Ref. low) |
| | | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) |
| Sex | Female (ref. male) | -0.302** (-5.69) | 0.134* (2.53) | -0.048** (-4.86) |
| | *_cons* | 0.187** (5.15) | | |
| Nationality | National (ref. foreign) | 0.127 (1.32) | 0.170+ (1.76) | 0.013 (0.68) |
| | *cons* | 2.344** (36.59) | | |
| Age group | 22-25 years of age (ref.:18-21) | -0.094 (-1.45) | 0.074 (1.15) | 0.022+ (1.73) |
| | *_cons* | -0.036 (-0.82) | | |
| | 26-29 years of age (ref.:18-21) | -0.045 (-0.70) | 0.041 (0.63) | 0.055** (3.68) |
| | *_cons* | -0.035 (-0.80) | | |
| Activity status | Employed (Ref. student) | -0.225** (-3.79) | 0.228** (3.64) | -0.025+ (-1.90) |
| | *_cons* | 0.570** (13.74) | | |
| | Housework (Ref. student) | -0.718** (-5.82) | 0.584** (5.72) | -0.037 (-1.62) |
| | _cons | -1.388** (-18.72) | | |
| | Unemployed (Ref. student) | -0.111 (-1.12) | 0.433** (4.42) | 0.015 (0.72) |
| | *_cons* | -1.208** (-17.48) | | |
| Dependency | experience of unemployment | 0.092 (1.54) | 0.086 (1.45) | -0.004 (-0.37) |
| | *cons* | -0.963** (-23.29) | | |
| | living at home | 0.017 (0.32) | 0.003 (0.06) | 0.003 (0.25) |
| | *_cons* | 0.207** (5.63) | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income | no income information (Ref.0- 500 €/month) | 0.217* (2.41) | -0.484** (-5.95) | -0.039* (-2.13) |
| | _cons | 0.675** (11.21) | | |
| | 500 - 1000 €/month | 0.084 (0.84) | -0.239** (-2.69) | -0.022 (-1.20) |
| | _cons | 0.153* (2.30) | | |
| | 1000-1500 €/month | 0.162 (1.52) | -0.626** (-6.18) | -0.004 (-0.18) |
| | _cons | -0.131+ (-1.82) | | |
| | 1500-2500 €/month | 0.325** (3.15) | -0.725** (-7.16) | -0.025 (-1.26) |
| | _cons | -0.075 (-1.06) | | |
| | 2500 € /month and more | 0.103 (1.06) | -1.128** (-11.67) | -0.030 (-1.48) |
| | _cons | 0.339**(5.29) | | |
| Education | Secondary education (Ref. Lower education) | 0.129+ (1.80) | -0.258** (-3.86) | 0.023+ (1.79) |
| | _cons | 1.128** (23.45) | | |
| | Tertiary education | 0.089 (1.05) | -0.455** (-5.55) | 0.086** (4.84) |
| | _cons | 0.180** (3.18) | | |
| Social background | Parents with middle education (Ref. with low education) | 0.148* (2.22) | -0.030 (-0.48) | 0.010 (0.76) |
| | _cons | 0.508**(11.37) | | |
| | Parents with higher education | 0.248** (3.24) | -0.396** (-5.00) | 0.052** (3.34) |
| | _cons | -0.181**(-3.46) | | |
| | To some extent used to discuss politics (Ref. used to discuss) | -0.285** (-3.86) | -0.020 (-0.25) | -0.122** (-7.90) |
| | _cons | -0.071 (-1.36) | | |
| | Not very used to discuss | -0.466** (-7.39) | 0.322** (4.89) | -0.215** (-14.43) |
| | _cons | 0.708** (15.95) | | |
| Locality | Urban (Ref. rural) | 0.091 (1.56) | 0.044 (0.76) | 0.006 (0.54) |
| | _cons | -0.870**(-21.65) | | |
| Efficacy | Control over own life | 0.040 (0.73) | -0.101+ (-1.84) | 0.005* (2.20) |
| | _cons | 7.100** (187.83) | | |
| Political Opinion | Satisfaction with democracy (Ref. Very satisfied) – Rather satisfied | -0.103 (-0.79) | 0.000 (0.00) | -0.029 (-1.25) |
| | _cons | 2.333**(25.88) | | |
| | Not very satisfied | -0.008 (-0.06) | 0.312* (2.24) | 0.001 (0.04) |
| | cons | 2.057**(22.50) | | |
| | Not at all satisfied | 0.285+ (1.87) | 0.685** (4.35) | 0.023 (0.80) |
| | cons | 0.546**(5.05) | | |
| | No response | -0.464** (-2.73) | 0.359* (2.17) | -0.111** (-3.57) |
| | _cons | 2.333** (25.88) | | |
| | Social trust (Ref. high trust) | -0.155** (-2.73) | 0.408** (6.90) | 0.004 (0.40) |
| | _cons | 0.645**(16.49) | | |
| | No response | 0.017 (0.12) | -0.077 (-0.50) | -0.045+ (-1.72) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | -2.126** (-21.92) | | |
| | Confidence in parties (ref. a great deal) - quite a lot | -0.158 (-0.66) | -0.410+ (-1.75) | -0.031 (-0.63) |
| | *_cons* | 2.680** (15.55) | | |
| | Not very much | -0.232 (-0.99) | -0.418+ (-1.83) | -0.107* (-2.19) |
| | | 3.707** (21.98) | | |
| | None at all | -0.185 (-0.78) | -0.038 (-0.16) | -0.209** (-4.16) |
| | *cons* | 3.118** (18.31) | | |
| | No response | -0.880** (-3.31) | -0.546* (-2.16) | -0.167** (-2.93) |
| | | 1.598** (8.75) | | |
| | Confidence in government (ref. a great deal) – quite a lot | 0.176 (1.14) | -0.219 (-1.51) | -0.012 (-0.44) |
| | *cons* | 2.058** (20.96) | | |
| | Not very much | 0.339* (2.23) | 0.002 (0.01) | -0.037 (-1.32) |
| | *cons* | 2.342** (24.20) | | |
| | None at all | 0.448** (2.86) | 0.359* (2.47) | 0.009 (0.28) |
| | *cons* | 1.679** (16.67) | | |
| | No response | -0.315 (-1.53) | -0.129 (-0.70) | -0.039 (-0.92) |
| | *cons* | 0.221+ (1.78) | | |
| Control | N | 7.489 | | 7.319 |
| statistics | Aic | 299005 | | 7135 |
| | Bic | 299.907 | | 7445 |
| | Ll | -149374 | | -3522 |

Note: Source: EVS 2008.
For activism: Multinomial multi-level analyses with 32 countries (using gsem command in Stata).b= log of the relative-risk ratio (logs of the probability of the category, divided by the probability of the base category). (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001. _cons = the estimate for one category relative to base category when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. var(M1[country]) shows the variance on the country-level.
For standby-engagement: Binary multi-level analysis with 32 countries. b=coefficient. (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001.
For both: ll: log-likelihood. aic and bic show criteria for model selection, For further control statistics, see Tables 7 and 8. Controlled for but not displayed: Macro-level variables in Table 6 and 7. On individual-level: education level of parents (no response).

## 5.2 The role of the moderators: Personal political ideas

Satisfaction with democracy was included to portray the external efficacy of youth, meaning the likelihood with which action taken by the youth turns into governmental policies and debates. In Table 4, we find that young people can both be satisfied or dissatisfied with democracy and be engaged in standby activities. Only those non-responding are less likely to be standby engaged. For activism, the picture is different. On the one hand, external efficacy does not seem to be linked with the type of activism chosen. On the other hand, in line with our expectations, a higher external efficacy seems to make youth more likely to be engaged in legal activism than in low activism. Or formulated differently, those less satisfied with the way democracy works are less likely to use legal activism and are rather disengaged. This shows that withdrawal can be

chosen when the youth consider that their voice will not be heard by those in charge. Social trust refers to the impact of social capital and to the personal support the youth are receiving from their close surroundings. People in legal activism profiles trust other people, more than those disengaged or using all forms of activism activities. The fact that social trust is strongly significant for legal activism could imply that external motivation from parents, teachers, and friends can play an important part in supporting activism. This finding supports the "school of democracy" idea that "the building of social capital ... is the key to making democracy work" (Putnam, 1993, 185). For standby engagement, as it is characterised by a lower degree of social interaction and public engagement, the degree of social trust is not relevant.

Confidence in parties is linked to an increase in standby engagement, but shows no effect for activism. Parties, if considered trustworthy, might function as another motivator for staying up to date with the public debate. Confidence in government (and their policies), on the other hand, increases legal activism and reduces stronger forms of activism. A trustworthy government apparently makes stronger forms of activist expression unnecessary.

**Table 5**: Individual-level interaction terms from the multi-level models

| | Low ACT | All ACT | Low ACT | All ACT | Standby | Standby |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) |
| Personal value-conflict | **-0.251**** | **0.154**** | -0.454 | 0.234 | **0.050**** | -0.012 |
| | **(-4.25)** | **(2.71)** | (-1.38) | (0.76) | **(5.37)** | (-0.25) |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 0.095+ | **0.153**** | -0.260 | -0.041 | **0.018*** | 0.026 |
| | (1.81) | **(2.95)** | (-1.50) | (-0.24) | (2.18) | (0.92) |
| Social trust | 0.258** | **-0.159*** | 0.046 | -0.041 | 0.009 | -0.028 |
| | (3.29) | **(-2.17)** | (0.19) | (-0.24) | (0.80) | (-0.71) |
| Confidence in government | 0.071 | **0.199**** | 0.697** | 0.474* | 0.006 | -0.037 |
| | (1.21) | **(3.59)** | (3.47) | (2.56) | (0.62) | (-1.20) |
| Confidence in parties | -0.037 | -0.108+ | -0.332 | -0.178 | **-0.093**** | -0.080* |
| | (-0.61) | (-1.81) | (-1.61) | (-0.89) | **(-9.31)** | (-2.48) |
| Sat. democracy * value index | | | **0.191*** | 0.101 | | -0.004 |
| | | | **(2.14)** | (1.21) | | (-0.28) |
| Social trust * value index | | | 0.117 | -0.025 | | 0.019 |
| | | | (0.95) | (-0.22) | | (1.00) |
| Conf. in gov. * value index | | | **-0.337**** | -0.143 | | 0.022 |
| | | | **(-3.30)** | (-1.57) | | (1.45) |
| Conf. in parties * value index | | | 0.156 | 0.036 | | -0.006 |
| | | | (1.49) | (0.37) | | (-0.40) |
| *Control statistics* | | | | | | |
| N | 6294 | | 6294 | | 6294 | 6294 |
| Aic | 12727 | | 12726 | | 6351 | 6356 |
| bic | 13537 | | 13590 | | 6554 | 6585 |
| Log-likelihood | -6243 | | -6235 | | -3145 | -3145 |

Note: Source: EVS 2008. Social trust was binary coded (0 no trust, 1 high trust), while confidence in government, confidence in parties and satisfaction with how democracy works all had the following coding: 1- "a great deal" to 4 – "none at all". For ACT – Activism profile: Multinomial multi-level analyses for 32 countries (N 7489), not controlled for macro-level variables. b = log of the relative-risk ratio (logs of the probability of the category, divided by the probability of the base category). _cons = the estimate for one category relative to base category when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. For SBE – standby engagement profile: Binary multilevel model for 32 countries, not controlled for macro-level variables. b= marginal effects (AMESs). (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001

We now turn to the role of values at the individual level. Being more post-materialist than the majority of society (valuing freedom and liberties more than economic security) should generally present a motivation to desire change in the society. Looking at the interaction terms of the personal value orientation (or the gap towards the majority society's values, which is technically equivalent here) with variables that characterize various subjective context assessments of the young respondents enables us to better understand the strategies that value-conflicted youth adopt in different situations. As explained in the beginning of this chapter, Table 5 presents a separate estimation including the individual value-conflict indicator and its interactions, while not controlling for country-level value gaps. The political idea variables were treated as continuous for this calculation and the "no response" option was dropped from these variables (due to its categorical nature). Note that the satisfaction with how democracy works and the various confidence variables are coded such that *smaller* values indicate respectively a higher satisfaction with democracy and more confidence in government or parties.

Table 5 shows that post-materialist values are strongly associated with all forms of activism. A wider individual-level value gap greatly increases the odds of being engaged in legal activism, with an even higher distance to the main society values further increasing the likelihood for also choosing illegal forms. The same individual post-materialism difference still moderately increases the likelihood of high standby engagement.

The effect of individual values is, as expected, increased by our measure of external efficacy (satisfaction with how democracy works). Even value-conflicted youth are more likely to not use any form of activism, especially not legal forms, when external efficacy is low (low satisfaction with democracy). Lower trust in government on the other hand is a motivator for value-conflicted youth to engage in legal forms, and somewhat less so also in illegal forms of activism, but those with high trust in government do not choose activist forms at all. This is consistent with expectations, as government often would be the opponent targeted by activist participation. Confidence in parties as well as social trust retain their basic effects on participation, but seem unrelated to response changes specific to value-conflicted youth.

As expected (because standby engagement is not a situation-dependent strategy), for standby engagement none of the interaction terms shows any effect.

All, in all, *we can confirm Hypothesis 1: Youth with values further removed from the societal mainstream will be more likely to engage in activism and everyday standby engagement to express their opinion and feel represented. This is especially the case when they have trust in the functioning of democracy or when they distrust specific actors, in particular the government. When they, on the other hand, have less trust in general democratic practice in their country, they are more likely to refrain from any form of activism.*

## 5.3 The influence of the country background

The percentage of the cross-country variation that can be explained on the country level (rho) varies strongly according to the dependent variable. The multinomial analysis states the cross-country variance for activism at 13%. Binary multi-level analyses (not reported here) have shown that especially the variation in "low activism" can be explained by the country context. A third of the variation of the probability of young people not prepared to engage in any kind of activism is explained by the social background of each country. For illegal activities just 15% of the variation is due to country differences, and for legal activities the cross-country differences amount to a mere 6%. For standby engagement, 9% of the variation can be explained by the country level.

**Table 6**: Multi-level analysis of activism with country-level effects included

| | Youth transition schemes | Functioning of government | Social control | Social control squared | Value gap | GDP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t |
| Low activism | **-0.033**** | 0.098 | **-0.079*** | **0.001*** | **-6.024*** | **-0.002**** |
| | (-2.74) | (1.06) | (-2.05) | (2.56) | (-2.16) | (-2.77) |
| All activism | **0.022*** | **0.144*** | **0.088**** | **-0.001*** | -0.078 | 0.000 |
| | (2.46) | (2.06) | (3.06) | (-2.48) | (-0.04) | (0.02) |
| N | 7.489 | | | | | |
| var(M1[country]) | 0.082** | | | | | |
| aic | 299005 | | | | | |
| bic | 299.907 | | | | | |
| ll | -149374 | | | | | |

Note: Source: EVS 2008. Multinomial multi-level analyses with 32 countries (N 7489) for activism. Macro level variables were tested while controlling for M1 individual variables. b = logs of the relative-risk ratio (logs of the probability of the category divided by the probability of the base category). (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001. _cons = the estimate for one category relative to base category when the predictor variables in the model are evaluated at zero. ll: log-likelihood. aic and bic show criteria for model selection, var(M1[country]) the variance on the country-level. In bold: significant coefficients.

**Table 7**: Multi-level analysis of engagement with country-level effects included

| | Youth transition schemes | Functioning of government | Social control | Social control squared | Value gap | GDP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | |
| High engagement | 0.004+ | 0.010 | 0.013+ | -0.000 | 0.276 | **0.000*** |
| | (1.75) | (0.60) | (1.87) | (-1.40) | (0.54) | **(2.12)** |
| chi2 | 690 | | | | | |
| var_u1 | .2159 | | | | | |
| var_sum | 3.505 | | | | | |
| rho1 | .0616 | | | | | |
| aic | 7135 | | | | | |
| bic | 7445 | | | | | |
| ll | -3522 | | | | | |

Note: Source: EVS 2008. Logistic multi-level analyses with 32 countries (N 7489) for standby engagement. Macro level variables were tested while controlling for M1 individual variables. Displayed b´s are marginal effects. T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001. . ll: log-likelihood. aic and bic show criteria for model selection, var(M1[country]) the variance on the country-level. In bold: significant coefficients.

**Generational conflict:** The degree of social generational conflict at the country level, identified through the generational value gap at the country level, is significantly associated with a reduction of low activism among youth. It does not influence the choice for illegal activism however. Moreover the generational conflict is not related to different standby engagement patterns.

This finding reaffirms that values are one of the key motivators for action and that broader social value conflicts seem to be an enabler of societal participation. Moreover, it affirms that generational value differences are strong enough to serve as political motivators.

This confirms Hypothesis 1b: *In countries with a higher generational value gap and greater conflict potential, youth will be more likely to adapt a more engaged activism profile.* The association to standby engagement is on the other hand not confirmed.

**Political opportunities:** Political opportunities for input were controlled by the Freedom House scale of functioning of government, which runs from 0 (worst) to 12 (best) and is based on accountability of government, openness and transparency. A good functioning of the government is significant for increasing the use of all kinds of activism but has no effect on the choice between legal or low activism.

This runs counter to our assumptions. It is firstly striking that political opportunities do not seem to motivate legal activism of young people. This finding could be interpreted in two ways, either young people are claimants with a low standing for whom general political opportunities are not open, or alternatively, the topics or ideas that young people are interested in have few political windows of opportunities.

The strong association with illegal activism would support the interpretation that young people as claimants are not heard when not referring to more extreme forms of activism even in states in which high openness prevails, or that openness makes 'radical' activism forms more acceptable.

We therefore have to reject Hypothesis 2: *"In countries with a higher political openness, youth will be more likely to adapt a more engaged (but mostly legal) activism profile".* Choosing legal types of societal engagement over inactivity is not made more likely by better political opportunities. Rather, the dividing line for the effect is between no or legal activities on the one side and legal and illegal activities on the other side – only the latter increase with a more receptive state.

This is counter-intuitive, unless we adapt our understanding of what our indicators actually measure. It could be the case that, for the most politically open countries, the 'legal and illegal' class actually describes behaviours that are in fact not very risky in those open countries. Squatting or wild strikes are not likely to be prosecuted or, if prosecuted, to lead to prison sentences in e.g. Scandinavian countries or Germany. Under those circumstances it could well be that 'openness' works as a measure of liberality versus formally illegal behaviours.

**Social Control:** In order to understand the impact of social control by the state, the freedom of the press score (0 high freedom of the press, 100 low freedom of the press) is added as well as a

term that shows social control squared, as we expected a curvilinear relationship between social control and activism. This seems to be the case for both the low and the legal & illegal activism classes. As the social control term shows, when freedom is decreasing, legal & illegal activism increases while low activism decreases. The squared term, however, indicates that at some point repression becomes so strong that it will suffocate direct action and increase low activism. This confirms Hypothesis 3*: In countries with a higher social control, youth will be more likely to adapt a more engaged activism profile, until a certain point when the cost of using illegal action becomes too high*.

The same curvilinear relation is not found for engagement: here, higher degrees of social control are linked to lower engagement throughout at the 10% significance level. Therefore, our hypothesis on standby engagement has to be rejected. We assumed that a reduced access to political information in states with a high governmental control would lead to a decline of standby engagement. Contrary to this expectation, it seems that social control makes standby engagement slightly more likely. It might be that a high degree of social control reverts outright political activities into pre-political activities. Political debates would then not be led in the open but rather in private spheres[20].

**Youth empowerment:** The youth transition regimes portray the empowerment of youth through employment and education and thereby the centrality of their social position within a country. Countries with stronger youth empowerment show a lower number of youth that are only engaged to a low degree and a higher number of youth active in all forms of activism. In general, it seems that the better the governmental support towards youth, the more they feel inclined to express their opinion and demand change.

We have also estimated models looking at the different youth transition index indicators separately (see Annex 5). We found that when the labour market situation is analysed separately, in order to exclude the possible short-term fluctuations of the economic situation, the youth transition index remains significant. This confirms that the effect does not primarily stem from the labour market prospects of youth but is centrally related to the educational and financial resources provided by the state.

Educational resources provided to the young seem to be among the key factors reducing withdrawal and increasing legal but also stronger forms of activism. This is shown by the effect of “educational inequalities” on low activism and “educational budget” on “all activism”. The effect of educational inequalities makes it moreover important to consider not only the overall support given to youth, but in particular the support given to youth with lower initial resources in terms of social and financial capital.

The youth transition is also linked to a lower likelihood of low engagement for youth and increases high engagement (at a 10% significance level). The relation seems to be attributable in large parts to the state´s budget expenditures on families (see Annex 5). We could say that the

20 Also from a comparison of the activism rates among those standby engaged and non-engaged it seems that standby engagement is more important in preparing for activism within the countries that have a low level of activism.

more empowering the youth transition scheme is, the higher is the interest in politics of young people, which implies that they are in a better position to care about more than just their own life.

We can confirm Hypothesis 4*: In countries with a more inclusive youth transition scheme, youth will be less likely to adapt a low activism profile and will be more engaged in legal and standby engagement activities.*

The fact that they are also more likely to engage in stronger forms of protest could – as above for political openness – be explained by the fact that the more supportive countries are in general also more open and punish more radical forms of political activities to a lesser degree.

# 6 Discussion

Our results indicate that individual resources seem strongly linked to activism and engagement, also among the youth. In particular education shows a strong impact on the individual for both information-seeking and direct activism. Next to own educational resources, the parental background is playing an important role: Both the educational level of the parents and most of all the political socialisation by the parents are key factors determining the likelihood of young people to participate in society. Thus, not only youth trajectories (Lee 2014, Buchman&Kriesi, 2011) but also opportunities for social engagement seem to differ by social class.

This sheds an important light on those young people who do not stem from a household that provides enabling conditions and have fewer opportunities for everyday learning in their social surroundings, which have been commonly described as leading an *accelerated adulthood* (Lee 2014). They will be among the most likely to withdraw from formal as well as activist political action. It therefore seems to be support in social rather than in economic contexts[21] that young people require to stay engaged, as dependency, in the forms of recent experience of unemployment and of not living independently does not seem linked to changes in societal participation.

Political institutions also affect the decision for the choice of activism and engagement profile, with social trust having the highest impact on increasing activism and trust in parties on increasing engagement. This finding supports the “school of democracy” idea, (Putnam, 1993, 185) for activism. More than trust in political institutions, it is trust in other people or “enabling relationships” that increase political and social engagement.

On the other hand, external efficacy is a key determinant of deciding if young citizens choose voice, loyalty, or exit when they are not satisfied with certain decisions. Withdrawal and illegal activism are often adopted when the youth consider that their voice will otherwise not be heard by the government and those in charge (and other channels are deemed ineffective).

Lastly, individual values have confirmed their impact. Even though post-materialism is conceptually just one possible dimension on which values can differ, it is a broad measure representing many liberal and ‘modern’ attitudes. Being post-materialist clearly increases the

[21] Economic resources seem to be more important for stronger forms of social engagement, such as political activism, where a gradual association with income exists. For low-key forms of engagement, they are however not significantly associated to higher degrees of engagement.

likelihood of young people to engage. So far, the analyses presented here confirm for the young what has repeatedly been found before for citizens regardless of their age.

Next to individual determinants of social and political participation, objective country factors can explain a great deal of variance among the different profiles. This is another element specific to our analyses. Low activism is most strongly associated with the country setting. It is therefore not a general trend for all European youth to engage less, but more plausibly, this *exit* is especially marked in those countries that are lacking in the empowerment of youth. This is visible from the fact that the youth transition regime index is significantly reducing low activism and low engagement. Thus, low activism is less a product of short-term political decisions than of a more permanent situation of low youth support, produced by educational and financial support structures towards the youth within society.

On the other hand, the choice of stronger forms of activism (*voice*) or just legal forms of activism (*loyalty*) is a product of the windows of opportunity and social control and only to a limited extent linked to individual empowerment. With this result, we extent the finding of Soler-i-Martí & Ferrer-Fons (2014), who linked the centrality of youth in a society to institutional participation, protest and passivity. It is striking that not only civic duties such as voting or protests are influenced by the youth transition scheme design, but that it also seems to determine even the way in which the young relate to society and politics in their everyday life.

Our analysis is limited by several restrictions. Firstly, our analysis refers to very specific forms of social, or rather political, engagement. It is therefore not able to grasp the engagement of young people within their daily contexts, which might be very different. Secondly, certain motivators for personal action, e.g. individual efficacy, could not be measured very well due to data limitations. The same holds for the conceptualisation of social control, where an institutional proxy was used instead of an indicator for individual social control. Thirdly, the concept of young adults used implies a broad age range. It also does not include school age children. Ideally, we would carry out analyses for different young age cohorts separately, as their contexts and the policies used to bring change about in these contexts can vary widely. Unfortunately, the case numbers are too limited to follow this approach of finer age classes, and the lower age cut-off in the data is too high to look at youth below legal age.

# 7 Conclusion

This report considered individual and contextual factors leading to different social engagement profiles of young people aged 18-29. We have applied what more or less is a common theoretical reasoning from political participation research to the special group of young people and found that this approach generally describes the behaviours of youth and young people just as well as that of adults. Among the young, we find basically the same divisions of the intensity of engagement and of the choice between particular forms of action driven by individual resources and motivations, but also by 'structural' or societal limitations and opportunities, as we would expect for adults. So, despite sometimes markedly different life situations of young and adult persons, they follow the same basic logic and restrictions for becoming engaged or

not. This allows the general conclusion that, when thinking about measures that could ultimately stimulate the participation of young people in their societies, we need to think about improving their resources, but also about providing sufficient opportunities for their participation that are worth the inevitable investments of time and energy.

More specifically our results show that, among young people, low participation is essentially an expression of low social resources. Very different trajectories are followed by youth based on their opportunity structure, their individual social capital (Raffo & Reeves, 2000) and their imagined future (Evans, 2002), which are mirrored in different practises of social and political engagement (Schneider & Maksin, 2014). Youth experiencing an accelerated adulthood do not have the same possibilities to engage as those with an emerging adulthood, as they face different challenges. Conceptually, the term "bounded agency" (Evans 2002) therefore comes to mind.

In everyday reasoning, one could expect that those with lower resources would often be more inclined to choose the more radical and deviant forms of activism in order to circumvent the relatively higher hurdles they might perceive for themselves when using legal forms of activism. Our results did mostly *not* confirm this expectation. Rather, on the one side the poorer opt for withdrawal, while on the other side, there is a consistent relationship at the individual level between having cognitive (education), social (personal trust), and material (income) resources, and choosing more intensive and potentially costly forms of activism. Put very simply, it is *not* the poor that go for radical forms of protest if needed, but the wealthy, well networked, and well-educated. They also are more easily involved in legal forms as well, but going on to more radical forms seems to be part of a continuum of being ready and able to bear the 'cost' of engagement. On top of this comes the socialization background, where both better parental education and more confrontation with political information and discussion in the family environment are conducive to first legal participation, but on top of that, also for more radical activism.

On the one hand, this analysis identifies what young individuals need to engage in participatory activities outside voting. On the other hand, it points to the implied problem of unequal chances coming from the resource requirements, because the less well-resourced are then inevitably underrepresented in political activism. On normative grounds, one would therefore want to direct any efforts to enable participation especially at young persons with lower resources, in order not to widen existing participation disparities.

Regarding specific policy conclusions for fostering even more engagement by the young, this report has the positive message that the wider political/institutional environment clearly do matter for increasing participation rates, as became evident from the effects of political openness or the youth transition regimes in the cross-country comparison. Given the political will to provide such environments, we should indeed expect positive effects. However, this analysis was almost exclusively looking at long-term factors. The effects of such conditions will not easily change by singular political decisions, neither when considering the level of young persons and their life-courses, nor when considering the level of nations and their policies. Therefore, it would be pure speculation if we attempted to give recommendations for implementing specific policy measures, which are usually aimed at short-term effects.

This being said, the results still allow an assessment of what larger areas could be relevant arenas for developing potential long-term measures. Three such arenas can be named with some confidence:

Firstly, as discussions about social topics at an early age proved to increase engagement even when resources are low, this points to a possible role for schools to encourage and practise political debate in the classroom and create a culture of participation.

Secondly, more than trust in political institutions, it is trust in other people that was able to increase political and social engagement. Social work that provides young people with enabling social relationships and better social capital in their personal environment could therefore be a worthwhile route to improve personal engagement levels among the less well-resourced.

Thirdly, from the importance of educational inequalities for determining engagement levels it follows that improving education throughout, but especially by allowing the less educated to catch up, would improve the basic capabilities needed for engagement in societal and political affairs.

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## Annex 1: Intergenerational Value Gaps

Computed per Cramer's V coefficient of association between target variable and the generational young vs. adult flag variable

| | Ideas for the future | | | Political systems | | | Individualisation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Postmaterialism: focus on security vs. liberty | | | "The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed" | | | "Why are there people who live in need?" because of *injustice in our society / it´s their own fault* | | |
| **Country** | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* |
| **Austria** | **0,065** | **2940** | **0,002** | **0,068** | **2828** | **0,002** | 0,036 | 2954 | 0,438 |
| **Belgium** | **0,048** | **3309** | **0,022** | 0,041 | 1496 | 0,288 | **0,054** | **3352** | **0,046** |
| **Bulgaria** | **0,056** | **2377** | **0,025** | 0,027 | 1357 | 0,605 | 0,060 | 2433 | 0,064 |
| **Croatia** | **0,111** | **2406** | **0,000** | 0,053 | 1385 | 0,138 | **0,072** | **2458** | **0,012** |
| **Czech Rep.** | **0,088** | **3487** | **0,000** | **0,070** | **3284** | **0,000** | **0,062** | **3561** | **0,009** |
| **Denmark** | **0,077** | **2390** | **0,001** | **0,074** | **1464** | **0,017** | **0,132** | **2425** | **0,000** |
| **Estonia** | **0,085** | **2448** | **0,000** | **0,067** | **1375** | **0,044** | **0,110** | **2504** | **0,000** |
| **Finland** | 0,039 | 1952 | 0,234 | **0,123** | **1014** | **0,000** | 0,067 | 2017 | 0,063 |
| **France** | **0,075** | **3062** | **0,000** | **0,140** | **1479** | **0,000** | 0,055 | 3100 | 0,049 |
| **Greece** | **0,093** | **2539** | **0,000** | **0,088** | **1431** | **0,004** | **0,117** | **2621** | **0,000** |
| **Hungary** | **0,063** | **2436** | **0,008** | 0,053 | 1441 | 0,132 | **0,072** | **2460** | **0,012** |
| **Iceland** | 0,012 | 1726 | 0,879 | 0,025 | 765 | 0,781 | **0,174** | **1675** | **0,000** |
| **Ireland** | **0,095** | **1911** | **0,000** | **0,098** | **761** | **0,026** | 0,060 | 1948 | 0,139 |
| **Italy** | **0,120** | **3283** | **0,000** | **0,095** | **3289** | **0,000** | **0,075** | **3427** | **0,001** |
| **Latvia** | **0,069** | **2448** | **0,003** | 0,034 | 1410 | 0,446 | **0,069** | **2486** | **0,019** |
| **Lithuania** | **0,080** | **2399** | **0,000** | **0,055** | **2051** | **0,045** | **0,073** | **2442** | **0,012** |
| **Luxembourg** | 0,045 | 2624 | 0,071 | 0,051 | 1453 | 0,152 | 0,059 | 2756 | 0,050 |
| **Netherlands** | **0,079** | **2506** | **0,000** | 0,051 | 1480 | 0,147 | **0,074** | **2455** | **0,010** |
| **Norway** | 0,054 | 1078 | 0,203 | 0,059 | 1063 | 0,162 | 0,068 | 1083 | 0,281 |
| **Poland** | **0,073** | **2492** | **0,001** | 0,061 | 1285 | 0,092 | 0,042 | 2541 | 0,335 |
| **Portugal** | **0,093** | **2457** | **0,000** | **0,078** | **1465** | **0,011** | **0,087** | **2505** | **0,001** |
| **Romania** | **0,070** | **2435** | **0,003** | 0,023 | 1294 | 0,707 | 0,057 | 2545 | 0,083 |
| **Russia** | **0,115** | **3844** | **0,000** | 0,025 | 3489 | 0,328 | **0,082** | **3899** | **0,000** |
| **Serbia** | **0,068** | **1435** | **0,038** | 0,037 | 1390 | 0,384 | 0,061 | 1500 | 0,236 |
| **Slovakia** | **0,136** | **2615** | **0,000** | **0,073** | **1301** | **0,031** | **0,068** | **2739** | **0,012** |
| **Slovenia** | **0,081** | **2249** | **0,001** | 0,014 | 2196 | 0,818 | 0,045 | 2329 | 0,311 |
| **Spain** | **0,132** | **2479** | **0,000** | **0,082** | **1392** | **0,009** | **0,090** | **2577** | **0,000** |
| **Sweden** | 0,047 | 1822 | 0,131 | **0,130** | **972** | **0,000** | **0,096** | **2011** | **0,001** |
| **Switzerland** | 0,017 | 1228 | 0,844 | **0,096** | **1126** | **0,005** | **0,100** | **1238** | **0,014** |
| **Great Britain** | 0,023 | 1494 | 0,675 | **0,068** | **1351** | **0,046** | **0,078** | **2402** | **0,006** |
| **W-Germany** | **0,144** | **2017** | **0,000** | 0,079 | 971 | 0,050 | 0,067 | 2006 | 0,061 |
| **E-Germany** | **0,135** | **1915** | **0,000** | 0,006 | 898 | 0,981 | 0,044 | 1941 | 0,436 |
| **Total** | **0,064** | **101114** | **0,000** | **0,043** | **70295** | **0,000** | **0,011** | **104148** | **0,011** |
| | | Total EVS | **39** | | Total EVS | 20 | | Total EVS | 23 |

| | Gender debate | | | Independence | | | Relation with authority | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Gender role attitudes: *"Women want a home and children"* | | | Parental values: Important Child qualities: *Independence* | | | Parental values: Important child qualities: *Obedience* | | |
| **Country** | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* | *Cramer-V* | *No. of cases* | *Sig.* |
| **Austria** | **0,107** | **1339** | **0,001** | **0,082** | **3013** | **0,000** | 0,003 | 2985 | 0,861 |
| **Belgium** | **0,076** | **3293** | **0,000** | **0,062** | **3413** | **0,000** | **0,041** | **3414** | **0,018** |
| **Bulgaria** | 0,027 | 2212 | 0,654 | **0,067** | **2428** | **0,001** | 0,003 | 2382 | 0,898 |
| **Croatia** | **0,117** | **2340** | **0,000** | 0,038 | 1393 | 0,155 | 0,003 | 1367 | 0,920 |
| **Czech Rep.** | **0,096** | **3431** | **0,000** | 0,003 | 3674 | 0,838 | 0,010 | 3645 | 0,558 |
| **Denmark** | **0,065** | **2343** | **0,020** | **0,048** | **2520** | **0,015** | 0,012 | 2520 | 0,560 |
| **Estonia** | **0,063** | **2332** | **0,025** | **0,114** | **2509** | **0,000** | 0,018 | 2512 | 0,355 |
| **Finland** | 0,053 | 1846 | 0,159 | 0,023 | 2148 | 0,294 | 0,019 | 2149 | 0,375 |
| **France** | **0,072** | **2970** | **0,001** | **0,053** | **3110** | **0,003** | 0,005 | 3111 | 0,772 |
| **Greece** | **0,180** | **2527** | **0,000** | **0,111** | **2635** | **0,000** | **0,072** | **2634** | **0,000** |
| **Hungary** | **0,100** | **2415** | **0,000** | 0,025 | 2498 | 0,216 | 0,021 | 2498 | 0,293 |
| **Iceland** | **0,089** | **1600** | **0,005** | **0,058** | **1771** | **0,015** | **0,108** | **1771** | **0,000** |
| **Ireland** | 0,052 | 856 | 0,504 | 0,032 | 1734 | 0,177 | 0,004 | 1610 | 0,874 |
| **Italy** | **0,099** | **3145** | **0,000** | **0,084** | **3500** | **0,000** | 0,027 | 3505 | 0,115 |
| **Latvia** | 0,025 | 2241 | 0,699 | 0,044 | 2491 | 0,027 | **0,088** | **2481** | **0,000** |
| **Lithuania** | **0,089** | **2287** | **0,000** | 0,038 | 2455 | 0,058 | **0,052** | **2454** | **0,010** |
| **Luxembourg** | **0,103** | **2511** | **0,000** | **0,064** | **2806** | **0,001** | 0,031 | 2797 | 0,099 |
| **Netherlands** | **0,084** | **2424** | **0,001** | 0,014 | 2545 | 0,465 | **0,060** | **2540** | **0,002** |
| **Norway** | **0,086** | **1072** | **0,046** | 0,010 | 1088 | 0,743 | 0,020 | 1089 | 0,519 |
| **Poland** | **0,158** | **2366** | **0,000** | 0,052 | 2492 | 0,009 | **0,041** | **2433** | **0,042** |
| **Portugal** | 0,052 | 2397 | 0,088 | **0,062** | **2526** | **0,002** | 0,024 | 2533 | 0,223 |
| **Romania** | **0,076** | **2454** | **0,002** | **0,068** | **2354** | **0,001** | 0,003 | 2331 | 0,901 |
| **Russia** | **0,047** | **3741** | **0,039** | **0,111** | **3956** | **0,000** | 0,038 | 3946 | 0,018 |
| **Serbia** | **0,101** | **1427** | **0,002** | **0,052** | **1512** | **0,045** | 0,010 | 1512 | 0,686 |
| **Slovakia** | **0,080** | **2601** | **0,001** | 0,008 | 2778 | 0,690 | 0,001 | 2763 | 0,963 |
| **Slovenia** | **0,151** | **2253** | **0,000** | 0,033 | 2214 | 0,123 | 0,000 | 2212 | 0,983 |
| **Spain** | **0,126** | **2447** | **0,000** | **0,096** | **2691** | **0,000** | 0,016 | 2692 | 0,399 |
| **Sweden** | **0,081** | **1895** | **0,006** | 0,012 | 2187 | 0,586 | 0,006 | 2187 | 0,764 |
| **Switzerland** | 0,056 | 1138 | 0,313 | 0,042 | 1266 | 0,135 | 0,038 | 1267 | 0,175 |
| **Great Britain** | 0,031 | 2243 | 0,550 | 0,032 | 2533 | 0,112 | 0,007 | 2529 | 0,710 |
| **West Germany** | **0,138** | **1934** | **0,000** | **0,081** | **2074** | **0,000** | 0,011 | 2073 | 0,606 |
| **East Germany** | 0,021 | 1846 | 0,842 | **0,131** | **1996** | **0,000** | 0,003 | 1996 | 0,909 |
| **Total** | **0,045** | **94442** | **0,000** | **0,038** | **101853** | **0,000** | 0,002 | 101667 | 0,594 |
| | | Total EVS | **33** | | Total EVS | **22** | | Total EVS | 11 |

The generation gap in terms of post-materialism shows the highest number of significant values per country. Moreover, correlation checks between the different indexes as well as objective features (GDP, transition schemes) revealed that the post-materialism gap is closely related to other ideological gaps (particularly parental values and gender gap) and to objective living conditions. Therefore it can be used to reflect an important part of the generational divide.

## Annex 2: Representation of societal factors influencing the degree and kind of social and political engagement




Note: This figure represents the country-level influence factors, based largely on the PROMISE country reports (D4). The clouds represent youth specific items for social and political engagement. On the left side factors linked to youth empowerment are represented and on the right side factors related to political windows of opportunity.

★ Starred: variables included in the multi-level analysis.

⚑ Flagged: items indirectly included in the analysis by means of an index.

## Annex 3: Producing a youth transition scheme index

| | Employment | | | | | Education | | | | Independence | | | Welfare State | | | | Youth transition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **country** | NEET Not in Employment&training | | Youth unemployment | | Rank | Educational inequality | | Educational quality | | Rank | Age independent | Rank | Family expenditure (% of GDP) | | Educational expenditure (% of GDP) | | Rank | YTRI |
| | % | rank | % | rank | T% | % | rank | % | rank | T% | | T% | % | rank | % | rank | T% | |
| **AT** | 7,7 | 22 | 9,5 | 8 | 85 | 48 | 13 | 470 | 41 | 27 | 25,9 | 52 | 2,8 | 62 | 5,56 | 40 | 51 | 53,7 |
| **BE** | 10,7 | 39 | 20,7 | 42 | 59 | 47 | 17 | 506 | 73 | 45 | 25,1 | 61 | 2,6 | 58 | 6,37 | 59 | 58 | 55,8 |
| **BG** | 19,3 | 89 | 16,9 | 30 | 40 | 51 | 0 | 429 | 4 | 2 | 29,5 | 11 | 1,4 | 25 | 4,12 | 7 | 16 | 17,5 |
| **CH** | 7,0 | 18 | 7,8 | 3 | 90 | 40 | 46 | 501 | 68 | 57 | 22,5 | 90 | 1,3 | 20 | 4,95 | 26 | 23 | 64,9 |
| **CZ** | 8,0 | 24 | 15,0 | 25 | 76 | 46 | 21 | 478 | 48 | 35 | 25,3 | 59 | 0,8 | 8 | 3,99 | 4 | 6 | 44,0 |
| **DE-E** | 11,5 | 44 | 14,9 | 24 | 66 | 44 | 29 | 497 | 65 | 47 | 25,3 | 58 | 1,8 | 35 | 4,73 | 21 | 28 | 49,9 |
| **DE-W** | 7,8 | 22 | 9,6 | 8 | 85 | 44 | 29 | 497 | 65 | 47 | 25,0 | 62 | 1,8 | 35 | 4,73 | 21 | 28 | 55,5 |
| **DK** | 5,2 | 8 | 11,2 | 13 | 90 | 36 | 63 | 495 | 63 | 63 | 22,0 | 95 | 3,3 | 76 | 8,16 | 100 | 88 | 83,9 |
| **EE** | 12,5 | 50 | 24,1 | 52 | 49 | 29 | 92 | 501 | 69 | 80 | 26,9 | 40 | 1,1 | 14 | 5,67 | 43 | 28 | 49,5 |
| **ES** | 16,7 | 74 | 34,6 | 84 | 21 | 29 | 92 | 481 | 51 | 71 | 26,4 | 46 | 1,2 | 18 | 4,73 | 21 | 19 | 39,4 |
| **FI** | 8,9 | 29 | 19,6 | 39 | 66 | 31 | 83 | 536 | 100 | 92 | 22,0 | 96 | 2,5 | 55 | 6,29 | 57 | 56 | 77,4 |
| **FR** | 12,0 | 47 | 22,0 | 46 | 54 | 51 | 0 | 496 | 64 | 32 | 21,6 | 100 | 2,9 | 65 | 5,62 | 42 | 53 | 59,8 |
| **GB** | 13,0 | 52 | 18,0 | 34 | 57 | 44 | 29 | 494 | 63 | 46 | 26,3 | 47 | 3,5 | 81 | 5,28 | 34 | 57 | 51,9 |
| **GR** | 12,9 | 52 | 26,6 | 60 | 44 | 34 | 71 | 483 | 52 | 62 | 29,5 | 12 | 1,3 | 20 | 4,00 | 4 | 12 | 32,6 |
| **HR** | 13,6 | 56 | 27,2 | 61 | 41 | 32 | 79 | 476 | 46 | 63 | 29,6 | 10 | 1,0 | 11 | 4,30 | 11 | 11 | 31,4 |
| **HU** | 12,6 | 50 | 24,2 | 52 | 49 | 48 | 13 | 494 | 63 | 38 | 26,7 | 43 | 2,8 | 62 | 4,90 | 25 | 43 | 43,1 |
| **IE** | 17,2 | 77 | 21,8 | 45 | 39 | 39 | 50 | 496 | 64 | 57 | 24,4 | 68 | 4,1 | 100 | 5,87 | 47 | 74 | 59,5 |
| **IS** | 6,3 | 14 | 13,2 | 19 | 83 | 27 | 100 | 500 | 68 | 84 | 23,0 | 84 | 3,3 | 76 | 7,25 | 79 | 77 | 82,3 |
| **IT** | 17,7 | 80 | 24,9 | 54 | 33 | 32 | 79 | 486 | 55 | 67 | 29,3 | 13 | 1,4 | 23 | 4,43 | 14 | 19 | 33,0 |
| **LT** | 11,4 | 43 | 26,2 | 58 | 49 | 33 | 75 | 468 | 39 | 57 | 27,1 | 39 | 2,1 | 44 | 5,24 | 33 | 38 | 45,9 |
| **LU** | 5,7 | 10 | 16,3 | 28 | 81 | 40 | 46 | 472 | 43 | 44 | 24,6 | 66 | 3,6 | 84 | 5,33 | 35 | 60 | 62,8 |
| **LV** | 15,7 | 68 | 27,7 | 63 | 34 | 29 | 92 | 484 | 53 | 73 | 27,7 | 32 | 1,5 | 26 | 5,35 | 35 | 31 | 42,4 |
| **NL** | 3,9 | 0 | 6,9 | 0 | 100 | 37 | 58 | 508 | 75 | 67 | 21,6 | 100 | 1,7 | 32 | 5,38 | 36 | 34 | 75,2 |
| **NO** | 4,7 | 4 | 8,6 | 5 | 95 | 36 | 63 | 503 | 71 | 67 | 25,0 | 62 | 2,6 | 56 | 6,71 | 67 | 61 | 71,3 |
| **PL** | 10,0 | 35 | 20,4 | 41 | 62 | 39 | 50 | 500 | 68 | 59 | 27,2 | 38 | 0,7 | 6 | 5,03 | 28 | 17 | 43,9 |
| **PT** | 10,9 | 41 | 19,9 | 39 | 60 | 30 | 88 | 489 | 58 | 73 | 28,1 | 27 | 1,2 | 18 | 5,22 | 32 | 25 | 46,3 |
| **RO** | 14,0 | 58 | 20,6 | 42 | 50 | 36 | 63 | 424 | 0 | 31 | 28,7 | 20 | 1,6 | 30 | 3,81 | 0 | 15 | 29,1 |
| **RS** | 21,2 | 100 | 40,0 | 100 | 0 | 27 | 100 | 442 | 16 | 58 | 30,5 | 0 | 1,0 | 13 | 4,68 | 20 | 16 | 18,5 |
| **RU** | 14,2 | 59 | 16,5 | 29 | 56 | 37 | 58 | 459 | 31 | 45 | 28,2 | 26 | 0,5 | 0 | 4,10 | 7 | 3 | 32,6 |
| **SE** | 8,4 | 26 | 23,3 | 50 | 62 | 43 | 33 | 497 | 66 | 49 | 22,9 | 86 | 3,0 | 68 | 6,62 | 65 | 66 | 66,0 |
| **SI** | 7,0 | 18 | 13,0 | 18 | 82 | 39 | 50 | 483 | 53 | 51 | 29,0 | 17 | 0,6 | 1 | 5,41 | 37 | 19 | 42,2 |
| **SK** | 12,6 | 50 | 26,7 | 60 | 45 | 41 | 42 | 477 | 48 | 45 | 28,3 | 25 | 1,5 | 26 | 3,88 | 2 | 14 | 32,1 |

## Annex 4: Youth transition scheme index internal consistency

| Item | Obs | Sign | item-test correlation | item-rest correlation | average interitem correlation | alpha |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| neet_score | 32 | + | 0.7934 | 0.6949 | 0.3671 | 0.7768 |
| unempl_score | 32 | + | 0.7177 | 0.5927 | 0.3918 | 0.7944 |
| eduqual_sc~e | 32 | - | 0.6778 | 0.5406 | 0.4047 | 0.8031 |
| eduinequal~e | 32 | + | 0.3878 | 0.1943 | 0.4989 | 0.8566 |
| age_indepe~t | 32 | + | 0.8863 | 0.8270 | 0.3370 | 0.7530 |
| famexp_score | 32 | - | 0.6750 | 0.5371 | 0.4056 | 0.8037 |
| eduexp_score | 32 | - | 0.7352 | 0.6159 | 0.3861 | 0.7905 |
| Test scale | | | | | 0.3987 | 0.8228 |

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

An alpha above 0.8 indicates a good internal consistency of the index.

# ANNEX 5: Youth transition scheme index – Analysis of separate indicators

Annex table 5.1. Multi-level analysis of activism with separate youth transition indicators

| | | Employment score | | | Education score | | | Budget score | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Partial Youth transi-tion scheme* | Low NEET (Not in emp-loyment+ training) score | Low Youth unemplo yment score | Partial Youth transition scheme* | Low Educa-tional inequality | Educa-tional quality | Partial Youth transi-tion scheme * | Family expen-diture | Educa-tional expen-diture |
| | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t | b (t) |
| Low activism | **-0.021**** | -0.001 | 0.006 | **-0.016*** | **-0.006+** | 0.003 | -0.005 | -0.002 | -0.010 |
| | **(-2.70)** | (-0.20) | (0.91) | **(-2.23)** | **(-1.82)** | (0.46) | (-0.62) | (-0.37) | (-1.45) |
| All activism | **0.015**** | 0.004 | -0.000 | **0.013*** | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.002 | -0.004 | **0.015**** |
| | **(2.86)** | (0.99) | (-0.24) | **(2.44)** | (0.80) | (0.87) | (0.37) | (-1.61) | **(4.53)** |
| N | 8.494 | | | 8.494 | | | 8.494 | | |
| Bic | 299.935 | | | 299.934 | | | 299.915 | | |
| Log-likelihood | -149.384 | | | -149.383 | | | -149.374 | | |
| var(M1[country | 0.052* (2.31) | | | 0.058* (2.46) | | | 0.039*(2.32) | | |

Note: Source: EVS 2008. Multinomial multi-level analyses with 32 countries (N 7489) for activism. Macro level variables were tested while controlling for M1 individual variables and functioning of government, social control, social control squared. GDP was not included as a control variable due to its high correlation to the employment and budget variables. b = logs of the relative-risk ratio (logs of the probability of the category divided by the probability of the base category). (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001. ll: log-likelihood. aic and bic show criteria for model selection, var(M1[country]) the variance on the country-level. In bold: significant coefficients. *Youth transition scheme analysed without the specific element included in the separate analysis.

Annex table 5.2. Multi-level analysis of standby engagement with separate youth transition indicators

| | | Employment score | | | Education score | | | Budget score | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Partial Youth transi-tion scheme * | Low NEET (Not in emp-loyment+ training) score | Low Youth unemplo yment score | Partial Youth transition scheme* | Low Educa-tional inequality | Educa-tional quality | Partial Youth transi-tion scheme * | Family expen-diture | Educa-tional expen-diture |
| | b (t) | b (t) | | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t) | b (t | b (t) |
| Standby engage-ment | **0.004*** | -0.000 | | **0.003*** | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.001 | **0.002*** | 0.001 |
| | **(2.24)** | (-0.15) | | **(2.04)** | (0.60) | (-0.19) | (0.62) | **(2.50)** | (0.57) |
| N | 7351 | | | 7471 | | | 7319 | | |
| Bic | 7451 | | | 7600 | | | 7406 | | |
| Log-likelihood | -3543 | | | -3612 | | | -3525 | | |
| rho | .0699 | | | .0679 | | | .0590 | | |

Note: Source: EVS 2008. Binary multilevel analysis with 32 countries for standby engagement. Macro level variables were tested while controlling for M1 individual variables and functioning of government, social control, social control squared. GDP was not included as a control variable due to its high correlation to the employment and budget variables. The NEET score and low youth employment score were analysed as just one employment indicator due to their high correlation[22]. b = marginal effects (AMEs). (t) = T-test in brackets: +p/z < 0.1; *p/z < 0.05; **p/z < 0.001. ll: log-likelihood. aic and bic show criteria for model selection. In bold: significant coefficients. *Youth transition scheme analysed without the specific element included in the separate analysis.

[22] This did not create problems in the structural equation model but solely within the binary multilevel model. The non-significance of "employment score" also does not change in the activism-model when just one indicator is used.

## Annex 6: Treatment of missing values

| | Original variable | | New var | Original value | comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Social position** | x001 | **Sex** | 1: male | 1 | |
| | | | 0: female | 2 | |
| | | *Missings (9)* | . | *-5, -2* | |
| | x003 | **Age** | 1: 18-21 years old | 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 | only 12 cases for 16+17 year old people |
| | | | 2 : 22-25 years old | 22, 23, 24, 25 | |
| | | | 3: 26-29 years old | 26, 27, 28, 29 | |
| | | *Missings (189)* | . | *-2, -1* | |
| | x025r | **Level of education** | 1:Lower education | 1 | |
| | | | 2: Middle education | 2 | |
| | | | 3: Higher education | 3 | |
| | | *Missings (106)* | . | *-5, -2, -1* | |
| | v004e | **highest education level attained mother/father** | 0: don´t know | -5, -3, -2, -1 | Missings (N=749) get separate group |
| | | | 1: lower education | 1, 2,3 | 1 = reference group |
| | | | 2: Middle education | 4,5,6 | |
| | | | 3: Higher education | 7,8 | |
| | | *No missing cases excluded from analysis (0)* | | | |
| **Socialisation** | v012 - Discussed politics with mother | **Political discussions at home at age 14** | 1: Yes | 1, 2 (if v012=1/2 or v014=1/2) | Yes =Yes and too some extent |
| | v016 - Discussed politics with father | | 2: To some extent | 3 (if v012/14=3 and other lower or missing) | Coding in the highest category of either mother or father used as value |
| | | | 3: No | 4 (if v012 and 14=4 or one missing) | |
| | | *Missings (15)* | . | *-5, -4, 3,-2, -1* | If -3 "not applicable for both father and mother coded to 3"No".[23] |
| **citizenship** | g005 | **Citizen of country** | 0: foreign | 0 | |
| | | | 1: national | 1 | |
| | | *Missings (12)* | . | *-1, -2* | |
| **Youth transition** | x028 | **activity status** | 1: employed | *1, 2, 3* | Full-time, part-time dependent, self-employed |
| | | | 2: care-taker and other | 4, 5, 8 | Housewife, retired, other |

[23]The logic here being, that if neither mother, nor father were available, an important person to socialize the kids politically was missing. This applies to 194 cases.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 3: student | *6* | |
| | | | 4: Unemployed | 7 | |
| | | *Missings (95)* | . | *-1, -2* | |
| | x037_01 | **experience of unemployment longer than 3m** | 0: No | *0, -3 (Not applicable)* | |
| | | | 1: Yes | *1* | |
| | | *Missings (358)* | . | *-1, -2* | |
| | X022_03A living w. parents X022_04A living w. parents | **living independently** | 0: No | *If* X022_03A= 0 AND X022_04A = 0 | |
| | | | 1: Yes | *If* X022_03A= 1 OR X022_04A = 1 | |
| | | *Missings (143)* | . | *-1, -2* | |
| **Resources for action & opportunities** | x047b | **Monthly income** | 0: missings | *-1 (no answer)* -2 (don´t know) | Missing values get separate group as they form 28% of answers |
| | | | 1: 0-500€ | 1,2,3 | |
| | | | 2: 500-1000€ | 4 | 1 = reference group |
| | | | 3: 1000-1500€ | 5 | |
| | | | 4:1500-2500€ | 6,7 | |
| | | | 5: >2500€ | 8,9,10,11,12 | |
| | | *No missing cases excluded from analysis (0)* | | | |
| | x049a | **Location** | 0: Rural (below 20.000) | 1,2 | Iceland coded to rural |
| | | | 1: urban (above 20.000 | 3,4,5 | |
| | | *Missings (302)* | . | *-1, -2, -4, -5* | |
| **Individual efficacy & agency** | e110 | **satisfaction with the way democracy works in country** | 0: Don´t know | *-1* | Don´t knows (N=554) get separate group |
| | | | 1: Very satisfied | *1* | 1 = reference group |
| | | | 2: Rather satisfied | *2* | |
| | | | 3: Not very much | *3* | |
| | | | 4: Not at all | *4* | |
| | | *Missings (73)* | . | *-2* | |
| | a173 | **feeling of control over own life** | from 1:"not at all" to 10:"a great deal" | | |
| | | *Missings (149)* | . | *-1, -2, -4, -5* | |
| **Perceived need for social change** | y002 | **postmaterialism** | 1: Materialist | *1* | |
| | | | 2: Mixed | *2* | |
| | | | 3: Post-materialist | *3* | |
| | | *Missings (417)* | . | *-5* | |
| **trust in people** | a165 | | 0: Don´t know | *-1* | Don´t knows (N= 321) get separate group<br><br>1 = reference group |
| | | | 1: Most people can be trusted | *1* | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 2: Can´t be too careful | | |
| | | *Missings (94)* | . | *-2* | |
| | E069_12 | **trust in political parties** | 0: Don´t know | *-1* | Don´t knows (N= 404) get separate group |
| | | | 1 A great deal | *1* | |
| | | | 2 Quite a lot | *2* | |
| | | | 3 Not very much | *3* | 1 = reference group |
| | | | 4 None at all | *4* | |
| | E069_11 | *Missings (89)* | . | *-2* | |
| | | **trust in national government** | 0: Don´t know | *-1* | Don´t knows (N= 345) get separate group |
| | | | 1 A great deal | *1* | |
| | | | 2 Quite a lot | *2* | |
| | | | 3 Not very much | *3* | 1 = reference group |
| | | | 4 None at all | *4* | |
| | | *Missings (88)* | . | *-2* | |

Other variables considered but not included in final analysis

**Micro-level**

- Health: Not significant in analysis of either activism or standby engagement
- Extreme opinion: based on the left-right scale a variable for extreme opinion was constructed and used in the analysis. However, based on the recommendation of the reviewer to not focus on this dimension, it was excluded again, despite its high efficacy.
- Friends: A variable on "importance of friends" was included in order to see the effect of peer-pressure. After theoretical reconsiderations it was however excluded from the analysis.

**Macro-level**: Other variables from the QOG-dataset were tested to serve as indicators for social control and political structure but proved less significant.

- **Level of Democracy** (**fh_ipolity2)**: (Freedom House/Imputed Polity): Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10
- **Political corruption index** (**vdem_corr**): Question: How pervasive is political corruption? The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption.
- **Freedom of Speech** (**ciri_speech):** This variable indicates the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are affected by government censorship, including ownership of media outlets. Censorship is any form of restriction that is placed on freedom of the press, speech or expression.
- **Political Pluralism and Participation (fh_ppp):** This variable encompasses an examination of the right of the people to freely organize in political parties; the existence of an opposition with a realistic possibility to increase its support; the ability of the people to make political choices free from domination by the military, totalitarian parties or other powerful groups; and the existence of full political rights for all minorities

# Project Identity

**PROJECT NAME** Promoting Youth Involvement and Social Engagement (PROMISE)

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